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Summary 
 
The South African history of colonialism and apartheid created a massive housing crisis, and a basic 
service delivery deficit for the majority of people. Since the dawn of democracy, the current 
government has been trying to address this housing crisis and basic service delivery deficit. At the heart 
of the challenge created by this housing crisis, is the transformative vision of the Constitution and the 
proper role of courts, especially the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter of the rights protected and 
guaranteed in the Constitution. 
  
The central objective of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the Constitutional Court has 
given substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing, particularly in the context of the 
positive duties arising out of this right as entrenched in section 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution. To 
this end, the history and present state of housing for residents of informal settlements, and those in 
inadequate housing, including the challenges presented by housing delivery, are explored.  
 
This thesis seeks to explore the concept of transformative constitutionalism, particularly its significance 
in relation to the right of access to adequate housing. The thesis goes on to trace the origins, strong and 
weak points of the reasonableness review model used by the Court to adjudicate the positive aspects of 
socio-economic rights, in the context of the right of access to adequate housing. This is followed by an 
examination of how housing as a human right has been interpreted and enforced in international, and 
comparative law. I then analyse the major housing jurisprudence of the Court, and suggest tentantive 
solutions towards redressing some of the impediments standing in the way of a substantive 
interpretation of the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
It is found that the Court has developed the substantive content of section 26(3) through the 
development of various procedural, and substantive protections of this right, including an expansive 
meaning of the requirement of justice and equity, requiring judicial oversight in all sales in execution 
against peoples’ homes, creative remedies such as mediation, joinder of a relevant municipality in 
eviction cases, meaningful engagement, and alternative accommodation as components of the 
requirement of justice and equity that would have to be met for an eviction to be lawful. In contrast, in 
the context of the positive duties imposed by section 26, the Court has adopted the reasonableness 
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model of review without elaborating on the nature and scope of the right of access to adequate housing, 
and the values and purposes protected by this right in international law, and comparative law. 
Therefore, a relatively weak standard of judicial review is adopted by the Court when it adjudicates the 
negative duties of the right, as opposed to when it adjudicates the positive duties imposed by the 
right.This thesis proceeds to explore how the substantive interpretation of the right could be enhanced 
through following the methodology for interpretation of rights in the Bill of Rights prescribed in 
section 39(1) of the Constitution.   
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Opsomming 
 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis van kolonialisme en apartheid het 'n massiewe behuisingskrisis, en 'n 
tekort aan basiese dienslewering  vir die meerderheid van mense geskep. Sedert die aanvang van 
demokrasie, poog die huidige regering om die behuisingskrisis en tekort aan basiese dienslewering  aan 
te spreek. Aan die hart van die uitdaging wat  deur hierdie behuisingskrisis geskep is, is die 
transformerende visie van die Grondwet en die behoorlike rol van die howe, veral die Konstitusionele 
Hof as die finale arbiter van die regte wat in die Grondwet beskerm en gewaarborg word. 
  
Die hoofdoel van hierdie tesis is om ondersoek in te stel na die mate waartoe die Konstitusionele Hof 
substantiewe inhoud gegee het aan die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising, veral in die konteks van 
die positiewe verpligtinge wat voortspruit uit hierdie reg soos verskans in artikels 26(1) en (2) van die 
Grondwet. Om dit te bereik, word die geskiedenis en huidige stand van behuising vir inwoners van 
informele nedersettings, asook dié in ontoereikende behuising, ondersoek met inbegrip van die 
uitdagings wat deur die lewering van behuising gestel word. 
 
Hierdie tesis poog om die begrip van transformerende konstitusionalisme te ondersoek, vernaam die 
belang daarvan met betrekking tot die reg van toegang tot geskikte behuising. Daarbenewens, 
ondersoek hierdie tesis  die oorsprong, asook die sterk en swak punte van die Hof se model vir 
redelikheidshersiening om die positiewe aspekte van sosio-ekonomiese regte te beoordeel, in die 
konteks van die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising . Hierop volg  'n ondersoek na  hoe behuising as 
'n menslike reg in internasionale en vergelykende regskontekste geïnterpreteer en afgedwing kan word. 
Ek analiseer ook die  hoof behuisingsregspraak  van die Hof ten einde voorlopige  oplossings voor te 
stel met betrekking tot die regstelling van sommige van die hindernisse tot 'n substantiewe interpretasie 
van die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising. 
 
Ten slotte, word daar gevind dat die Hof  substantiewe inhoud aan artikel 26(3) gegee het deur die 
ontwikkeling van die  prosedurele en substantiewe beskerming van hierdie reg, insluitend 'n uitgebreide 
begrip van die vereistes van geregtigheid en billikheid wat geregtelike oorsig in sekere omstandighede 
vereis: alle verkope in eksekusie teen mense se huise, kreatiewe remedies soos bemiddeling, die 
noodsaaklike voeging van  munisipaliteite  tot uitsettings , sinvolle betrokkenheid, en die voorsiening 
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van alternatiewe akkommodasie as ‘n komponentvan die vereiste van geregtigheid en billikheid wat 
nagekom moet word vir  'n uitsettingsbevel om regmatig te wees. In teenstelling, met betrekking tot die 
positiewe verpligtinge wat deur artikel 26 opgelê word, het die Hof die model vir 
redelikheidshersiening  aangeneem sonder om uit te brei op die aard en omvang van die reg op toegang 
tot geskikte behuising, en die waardes en doelwitte wat deur hierdie reg beskerm word  in 
internasionale  en vergelykbare regskontekste. Gevolglik is 'n relatiewe swak standaard van geregtelike 
hersiening deur die Hof vasgestel wanneer dit  die negatiewe verpligtinge van die reg beoordeel, in 
teenstelling met wanneer  die positiewe verpligtinge van  die reg beoordeel word.  Hierdie tesis poog  
om vas te stel hoe die substantiewe interpretasie van die reg bevorder kan word ingevolge  die 
metodologie vir die interpretasie van die regte in die Handves van Regte soos voorgeskryf in artikel 
39(1) van die Grondwet. 
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 1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 1 Background 
 
The current government of the African National Congress inherited numerous service delivery 
challenges from the previous government of the National Party. Amongst the key challenges is the 
national housing backlog caused by colonialism and exacerbated by apartheid policies and laws. 
 
One of the results of colonialism and apartheid was to deprive black people of not only access to 
land, but also access to dignified housing with land tenure.
1
 This had the net result of relegating 
black people to informal settlements and inadequate buildings all over the country, even after the 
ushering in of democracy. In order to reverse this ominous position, the current government has 
adopted a number of policies and enacted much legislation.
2
 Despite these attempts, the challenges 
posed by access to adequate housing post-1994 remain, partly because the housing issues facing the 
poor in South Africa are numerous. These include a housing backlog, corruption in the allocation of 
houses and problems related to the building of houses.
3
 
                                                          
1
 Plaatje S Native Life in South Africa (1916). Platjie was the first author to eloquently capture the effects of apartheid 
and colonialism on black South Africans by documenting the humiliating manner in which black people were forcibly 
removed from their own land, and properties. See also: Bundy C “Land, Law and Power: Forced removals in the 
historical context” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place To Rest: Forced Removals History In South Africa 
(1990) 3-11 at 3-5 and 6-9; Terreblanche S A History of Inequality In South Africa: 1652-2002 (2002) at 6 and 299. 
2
 Breaking New Ground Policy: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlement 
(September 2004); Housing Act 107 of 1997; National Housing Code (2000, Revised in 2009); National Housing 
Programme: Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances (2004); Human Settlement Sector Strategy Plan 2009-
2014 (2009). 
3
 National Development Plan (2030) Chapter 8 at 269 and 269-273. The National development Commission records a 
plan to upgrade 400 000 households in well-located informal settlements by year 2030. The TimesLive Newspaper 
(2010-18-05) reports that “the South African housing back-lock is 2.1 million units, affecting 12 million people, and 
that there are currently 2.700 informal settlements in the country.” This report and statistics were officially confirmed 
by the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Zuma in the same article; The Department of Housing in its 
Human Settlement Sector Strategy 2009-2014 (Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements, 2 December 2009). The 
Human Settlement Ministry records in its 2009-2014 sector strategy that it aims to eradicate informal settlements by 
2014, a commitment that is six years early than the proposed date in the United Nation’s Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). See also: Richards R et al “Measuring the quality of life in informal settlements in South Africa” 
(2007) 81 Social Indicators Research Journal 375-388; Misselhorn M “A new response to informal settlements” 
(2010) Afesis-Corplan, available online at http://www.ngopulse.org/node/13699 (accessed on 30 March 2010). 
Misselhorn argues that a new strategy is needed in order to solve the housing crisis. Misselhorn argues for a parallel 
structure on housing delivery, which will be administered outside of the many policies and legislation on housing in 
order to respond urgently to the housing crisis.  See also: Statistics South Africa Report (2011), available online at: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/ P03014/P030142011.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2012) pages 52-64. This 
 2 
 
In addition, there are also social, political and human rights challenges. Barry and Heinz
4
 argue that 
the economic and social conditions in informal settlements are characterised by poverty and 
suffering of the worst kind, and difficulty in accessing channels within which to exercise human 
rights. This observation by Barry and Heinz seems to support the view  that a comprehensive 
strategy is needed in order to address issues of access to adequate housing. 
 
In the midst of these challenges is the constitutional commitment to ensure that everyone has access 
to adequate housing which is entrenched in section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’), and the question of the proper role of the judiciary in interpreting 
and enforcing this right. The Constitution has been described as transformative in academic 
literature and by our courts.
5
 Its stated purpose is to break away from the shackles of the past which 
were grounded in inequality and gross human rights violations, and to forge a new future for all 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
report notes a slight improvement in the number of informal settlements in that the number has decreased from 16.2% 
in 1996 to 13.6% in 2011, whereas the number of people living in formal housing has increased, while those living in 
traditional dwelling has almost halved. The report also shows a gradual improvement in the delivery of basic services 
overtime. 
4
 See Barry M and Heinz R “Data collection techniques for informal settlements upgrade in Cape Town, South 
Africa” (2005) 17 URISA Journal 43-52 at 43-46. Although this study focused on informal settlements in Cape Town, 
and surrounding areas, it is equally relevant to informal settlements across the country, as they share similar 
characteristics, and present similar challenges. The case of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 
Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others  [2008] ZACC 1; 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) is an example. 
This case captured vividly the conditions of those living in inadequate housing in the inner City of Johannesburg. 
5
  Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146-188 at 150. Scholars, judges 
and lawyers have elaborated on and explored the implications of “transformative constitutionalism” in various areas 
of constitutional law. See for example: Albertyn C and Goldblatt B “Facing the challenges of transformation: 
Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248–275; Van der Walt 
AJ “Tentative urgency: Sensitivity for the paradoxes of stability and change in the social transformation decisions of 
the Constitutional Court” (2001) 16 SAPR/PL 1–27; Mbazira C  “You are the weakest link” In realising socio-
economic rights: Goodbye-Strategies for effective implementation of court orders in South Africa” (2008)  Research 
Series 3; Pieterse M “What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SAPR/PL 
155–166; Van Marle K “Meeting the world half way “The limits of legal transformation (2004) 16 Fla. J. Int’l L. 651-
665; Usher T “Adjudication of socio-economic rights: One size does not fit all” (2008) 1 UCL Human Rights Review 
154-171; Van der Walt AJ “Legal history, legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy” (2006) 12 
Fundamina 1–47; Liebenberg S “Needs, rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights” (2006) 17 Stell LR 5–
36; Davis DM “Transformation: The constitutional promise and reality” (2010) 26 SAJHR 85-101; Liebenberg S 
Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 23-76. See also: Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15; Hassam v Jacobs NO and 
Others [2009] ZACC 19; 2009 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC) para 28; Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) paras 47 and 
55. For a critique of Klare’s views on transformative constitutionalism, see: Roux T “Transformative 
Constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African Constitution: Distinction without a difference” 
(2009) 20 Stell LR 258-285. 
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South Africans.
6
 The Constitution also aims to “dismantle systemic forms of disadvantage and 
subordination in our post-apartheid society.”7  
 
According to Fraser, in order to achieve social justice, a society would have to address the glaring 
forms of status subordination based on - for instance - race, gender, and sexual orientation as well 
as systemic patterns of social and economic disadvantage.
8
 Fraser’s analysis is applicable to the 
South African society, as this is a society currently struggling to eliminate vast economic and status-
based inequalities. 
 
Paying special attention to the socio-economic rights of poor South Africans is critical to 
consolidating and deepening democracy. These rights can help in the attainment of the goals 
envisaged by the Constitution. All the institutions of democracy, namely:  the executive, the 
judiciary, and the legislature have distinctive roles to play in fulfilling the constitutional mandate in 
respect of housing. Furthermore, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and organised business 
must also strive to play their roles, by assisting the three arms of government to further their 
constitutionally mandated roles, and where necessary, to monitor and hold government to account. 
 
Moreover, South Africa’s democracy depends on the proper functioning of the three arms of 
government. The judiciary has an important role to play in the interpretation and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights, but must fulfil this role with caution, taking into account the separation of 
powers concerns as well as the appropriate role of judicial deference. The judiciary should also 
ensure that the promises in the Constitution are not disregarded or taken lightly by the State, 
especially with regard to socio-economic rights.
9
 
                                                          
6
 The Preamble to the Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, and was conceived 
so as to, amongst other objectives “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights.”  
7
 Liebenberg 2006 (note 5 above); Liebenberg S “Transformative constitutionalism and the interdependence between 
substantive equality and socio-economic rights” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-361, 338.  
8
 See Fraser on the relationship between status subordination and distributional injustice, in Fraser N and Honneth A 
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 1-269 at 7-70. 
9
 See Hoexter C “The future of judicial review in the South African administrative law” (2000) 117 SALJ 484-519, on 
the roles of courts in administrative law judicial review and issues of deference. For an analysis of the judicial role in 
relation to socio-economic rights, see McLean K Constitutional Deference: Courts and Socio-Economic Rights In 
South Africa (2009) 1-244 at 61-87 and 105-116; Liebenberg 2010 (note 5 above) at 36-42 and 131-223, on the limits 
of adjudication in relation to socio-economic rights in general and the duty of the courts to give substantive content to 
socio-economic rights. 
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The reason I focus on informal settlement residents and those in inadequate housing is because they 
are the most deeply affected by decisions of the courts which fail to give substantive content to the 
right of access to adequate housing. In addition, they represent the people who are in urgent need of 
access to adequate housing. 
 
1 2  Research questions 
 
In this thesis, the following four central research questions  will be addressed: 
 
1 2 1 What is the role of the courts in enforcing the socio-economic rights entrenched  in the 
Constitution, and what are the main impediments which inhibit the courts from fulfilling this role? 
 
1 2 2 What has been the Constitutional Court’s (‘the Court’s) approach to the right of access to 
adequate housing? 
 
1 2 3 How can the South African Constitutional Court be more effective in developing a 
jurisprudence which gives substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing as a human 
right? 
 
1 2 4 How can the Court be more effective in adjudicating the positive duties imposed by socio-
economic rights with reference to the right of access to adequate housing? 
 
1 3 Hypothesis 
 
This thesis is premised on the following four hypotheses, namely that:  
 
1 3 1 The Constitution requires a more robust judicial role in the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. 
 
 5 
 
1 3 2  Housing as a human right protects a diverse and distinct set of values and purposes which can 
be derived from relevant international and comparative law as well as the human needs and 
purposes which housing protects in the South African context.  
 
1 3 3 The Constitution requires the courts to engage seriously and systematically with the values 
and purposes protected by section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
 
1 3 4  A model based on the development of the substantive content of housing as  human right, can 
facilitate the development of a more effective model of adjudicating access to adequate housing. 
 
1 4 Methodology and underlying assumption 
 
The Constitution provides a framework for the improvement of the quality of life of all people in 
South Africa. This is evident in the preamble to the Constitution.
10
 Some of the relevant obligations 
placed upon the State are further expressed in sections 26,
11
 and 28(1)(c)
12
 of the Constitution, 
amongst other provisions. 
 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution, specifically section 39(1)(a), requires “a court, tribunal or forum” 
to “promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.” Section 39(1)(b) requires the courts to consider international law, and 
section 39(1)(c) permits them to consider foreign law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
                                                          
10
 The relevant part of the Preamble provides that the Constitution is adopted in order to (amongst other objectives: 
[I]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person ...” 
 
11
  Section 26 of the Constitution provides that: 
 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing; 
 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right; 
 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
 
12
  Section 28(1)(c) provides that every child has the right: 
 
“to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;” 
 
 6 
 
Although the Constitution imposes certain obligations on the State, all members of society are 
nevertheless required to play their part. This includes organised business, courts, and ordinary 
people.
13
  Notwithstanding the imposition of these obligations and the passing of a reasonable 
period of time since the advent of democracy, the quality of life in South Africa has not improved 
much, especially for the poor and marginalised with inadequate housing. Instead, many in South 
Africa are still experiencing severe poverty which manifests itself in the shortage of employment, 
inadequate housing, and lack of access to water and sanitation services, to name but a few.
14
 
Moreover, a wide gap between the poor and the rich in South Africa continues to exist. This is 
supported by recent studies into the economic conditions of the poor in South Africa.
15
 
 
The research methodology adopted in this thesis consist of an analysis of literature, case law (South 
African, international law and comparative law), legislation, policy, regional human rights 
instruments and international human rights instruments.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Pieterse M “On ‘dialogue’, ‘translation’ and ‘voice’: Reply to Sandra Liebenberg” in Woolman S and Bishops M 
(eds) Constitutonal Conversations (2008) 1-347 at 333-347 and 336-339. See also sections 8(2), (3) and 39(2) of the 
Constitution. Section 8(2) provides that the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons alike, taking into account 
the nature of the right and the scope of any duty imposed. While section 8(3) gives courts powers to develop the 
common law in order to fill in gaps that may have been left by legislation and in order to give effect to the rights in 
question and provides for a limitation of rights through the common law, as long as that limitation complies with 
section 36(1) of the Constitution. Lastly, section 39(2) read with sections 8(2) and (3) instructs courts, forums, or 
tribunals to promote the spirit, purport and objects of our Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law. 
14
 See The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa Development Indicators (2009) and Leibbrandt M et al “Trends 
in South African Income Distribution and Poverty Since the Fall of Apartheid” (2010) OECD Social Employment and 
Migration Working Papers No. 101 1-90 at 13-68. Leibbrandt M and others argues that more and more people are 
unemployed, do not have access to basic necessities with the net result that the poorest of the poor are getting worse-
off with inequality in all spheres of everyday existence the order of the day. See also Mbeki M Architects of Poverty: 
Why African Capitalism Needs Changing (2009) chapters 2 and 3. Mbeki explains why African capitalism needs 
changing. He argues that African capitalism has only succeeded in creating parasitic political elites and black middle 
class, who consume without producing anything. This has had a negative effect of de-industrialisation in South Africa 
and Africa. 
15
 The Presidency Development Indicators (note 14 above) at 22-29.  The findings of this study indicate that the 
number of people living in poverty has decreased, with reference to years 1999-2007. However, this decrease has been 
slow as inequality remains a challenge all over South Africa. See also Leibbrandt M et al (note 14 above) chapters 1 
and 2.  They state that that the poor are worse off than they were under apartheid and that inequality has increased. 
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1 5 Brief overview of the leading housing cases in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
and their relevance to the thesis 
 
In this part, I provide a brief overview of the main housing cases, some of  which will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, and indicate their relevance to my thesis. 
 
The Constitutional Court first dealt with housing issues in the Grootboom and Others v Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others (hereafter ‘Grootboom’)16 but mainly focused on 
emergency housing.
17
  
 
The Grootboom case was followed by Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and Others (Mukhwevho Intervening)
18
 which also dealt with 
emergency housing, arising from the flooding of an informal settlement, Alexandra Township, 
Johannesburg.  The Jukskei River that runs through this township destroyed  homes of the people 
living on the banks of the river.
19
 The next case was Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers (hereafter ‘PE Municipality’).20 This case concerned residents who built an informal 
settlement on privately owned land and were facing an eviction from the said land.
21
   
 
The Court subsequently dealt with deprivation of the right of access to adequate housing (section 
26(1) of the Constitution) in Jaftha v Schoeman and Another, Van Rooyen Stoltz and Others 
(hereafter ‘Jaftha’).22 The Court acknowledged in this case that it has yet to deal with the right of 
access to adequate housing in detail and that this issue was dealt with in Grootboom albeit not 
fully.
23
 This is because, the Jaftha case was not about people in inadequate housing claiming access 
to adequate housing as envisaged in section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
16
  [2000] ZACC 14; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
17
  Grootboom (note 16 above) paras 3-5 and 5-12. 
18
  [2001] ZACC 19; 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC). 
19
  Kyalami Ridge (note 18 above) paras 1-9. 
20
  [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
21
  PE Municipality (note 20 above) paras 1-7. 
22
  [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 23. 
23
  Jaftha (note 22 above) para 23.  
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The Jaftha case was followed by President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
24
 which dealt with the unlawful occupation of a farm belonging to a 
private juristic person.
25
 This case is relevant to this study because it illuminates the Court’s 
approach to the right of access to adequate housing where private land has been occupied by those 
with inadequate housing, and the duties of the State thereto. This case will be used to contrast the 
Court’s approach to the right of access to adequate housing with the themes of this thesis.  
 
Jaftha was followed by Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others (hereafter ‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’)26 
which dealt with inner city evictions from buildings.
27
 This case will be used to contrast the weak 
protection the Court gives to positive duties imposed by the right of access to adequate housing as 
opposed to the strong protection given to the nagative duties of this right. Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road was followed by Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and 
Others (hereafter ‘Residents of Joe Slovo Community’)28 which dealt with the issues of relocation of 
an informal settlement, so that houses could be built on the land in which the informal settlements 
were situated.
29
 This case further developed the negative duties imposed by section 26(3). 
 
Moreover, Residents of Joe Slovo Community was followed by Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement 
SA and Another v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others.
30
 This case dealt with a 
piece of provincial legislation that sought to subordinate the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal 
Evictions From and unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998. This case illuminates the robust 
approach of the Court where the positive duties arising out of section 26 are not implicated. 
 
Lastly, Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others (hereafter 
‘Nokotyana’)31 which dealt with applicants who are members of the Harry Gwala Informal 
settlement, who approached the Court on appeal and claimed one ventilated pit latrine (toilet) per 
                                                          
24
  [2005] ZACC 5; 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
25
  Modderklip case (note 24 above) paras 1-9. 
26
  [2008] ZACC 1; 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
27
  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 26 above) paras 1-8. 
28
  [2009] ZACC 16; 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC).   
29
  Residents of Joe Slovo Community case (note 28 above) paras 8-14 (Yacoob J). 
30
  [2009] ZACC 31; 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC). 
31
  [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC). 
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household as basic sanitation needs. In addition, they claimed high-mast lighting, pending the 
decision of the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC), Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
(Johannesburg) as to whether to approve the settlement for upgrading in terms of chapter 13 of the 
National Housing Code.
32
 
 
The above-mentioned cases, Grootboom, Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Abahlali 
Basemjondolo; PE Municipality, Modderklip, and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, dealt with the 
nature of obligations imposed on organs of State and private landowners in the context of eviction 
applications. The positive obligations imposed in this context revolve primarily around the 
obligation to engage meaningfully with the affected occupiers and the provision of alternative 
accommodation to those evicted from their homes.
33
 
 
To date, the South African jurisprudence has not developed the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing entrenched in section 26 (1) of the Constitution and therefore this right 
remains undeveloped. A possible explanation could be that the reasonableness review test, as 
applied by the Court, does not incorporate a consideration of the goals that housing as a human right 
are meant to advance. 
 
The other problem might be that there are many impediments to the proper realisation of socio-
economic rights and to the achievement of a more robust judicial role in the enforcement of socio-
economic rights.
34
 The first impediment one can identify is the Court’s interpretation and 
application of the separation of powers doctrine and the notion of judicial deference. A second 
                                                          
32
  Nokotyana (note 31 above) paras 1-5. 
33
 See PE Municipality (note 20 above) paras 25 and 28-59, regarding the duty resting on organs of State and the 
duties resting on private landowners when pursuing eviction proceedings; See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 
26 above) paras 26, 42-43 and 46, regarding alternative accommodation duty; See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
paras 18-23, regarding the duty resting on organs of State to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupiers who would 
become homeless upon eviction. The Court held that meaningful engagement must occur prior to the institution of the 
eviction proceedings as required by section 26(3) of the Constitution and will constitute one of the factors taken into 
account by the court in assessing whether it is “just and equitable” to evict; See also Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community (note 28 above) paras 38, 42, 66 and 74 of Moseneke DCJ’s concurring judgment, and paras 138-146 of 
Ngcobo CJ concurring judgment, both cases dealing with meaningful engagement and endorsing Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road. Lastly, see Residents of Joe Slovo Community (note 28 above) paras 104-117 concurring judgment of 
Yacoob J, in which he highlights and upholds PE Municipality case on the issue of alternative accommodation 
requirement.  
34
 Such as the doctrine of separation of powers, judicial deference, and the failure of the Court to develop the potential 
of its earlier housing jurisprudence. 
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impediment concerns the failure of the Court to develop the potential of the Grootboom judgment in 
subsequent housing and socio-economic rights cases. I will seek to develop an argument that the 
failure of the Court to develop the purposes and values served by housing rights as outlined in the 
Grootboom case, has led to a static jurisprudence in the sphere of the right of access to adequate 
housing, particularly in relation to the positive duties imposed by this right.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, I will focus on these impediments to the adjudication of socio-economic rights. I will further 
investigate whether the Court has been overly deferential in recent cases dealing with housing, such 
as in PE Municipality,
35
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road,
36
 and Nokotyana.
37
 
 
I will address my research questions and aims through a detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
following cases: Grootboom, PE Municipality, Jaftha, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of 
Joe Slovo community, Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
38
 and Nokotyana. 
 
My tentative hypothesis is that the Court has been far more willing to develop the nature and 
content of the right of access to adequate housing in cases where the negative duties imposed by 
this right are at stake, or where a limited positive duty of emergency accommodation is affirmed. 
However, it has been far less willing to engage with the positive content of access to adequate 
housing in cases involving systemic and long-standing deprivation of adequate housing. This is 
particularly illustrated by its judgments in PE Municipality, Jaftha, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community and Nokotyana. 
 
1 6 Overview of structure and chapters 
 
The purpose and composition of the study are outlined in this chapter, chapter 1 provides an 
overview of the key housing rights cases in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and 
highlight the issues of relevance to my research aims and questions. 
 
                                                          
35
  PE Municipality (note 20 above). 
36
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 26 above).  
37
  Nokotyana (note 31 above).  
38
 [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC).   
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In chapter 2, I proceeed to investigate the role of the courts in enforcing the  socio-economic rights 
in the South African Constitution. I will do so by examining the nature and scope of transformative 
constitutionalism in relation to the role of the courts in socio-economic rights adjudication. In 
addition, I will examine the three key impediments to the adjudication of socio-economic rights 
which I have identified.  
 
In chapter 3, the potential of developing the substantive content of the right of access to adequate 
housing, is investigated. I do so by using the methodology specified in section 39(1)(a), (b) and (c) 
of the Constitution. First, I will examine the history and context of housing in South Africa.
39
 I take 
this point of departure from the statement of the Constitutional Court in Grootboom that “rights 
need to be interpreted and understood in their social and historical context (...)”40 
 
Second, I will seek to elaborate on the purposes and values protected by the right of access to 
adequate housing.
41
 In this regard, I will analyse relevant international law, in particular the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter ‘ICESCR’),42 the 
                                                          
39
 Plaatje (note 1 above). See also Bundy (note 1 above); Richards R et al (note 3 above); See also Misselhorn (note 3 
above). The Constitution requires a reversal of the housing injustices of the past and a restoration of the human rights 
that were taken away by old order legislation and conduct, amongst other things. This is implicit in the transformative 
character of our Constitution; See also Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) [1997] ZACC 17; 1998 (1) 
SA 765 (CC) para 8; Grootboom (note 16 above) paras 24-25 and 82-83; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road  (note 26 
above) paras 10 and 14; Residents of Joe Slovo Community (note 28 above) paras 62-63 of Moseneke DCJ’s 
concurring judgment and paras 90-108 of Ngcobo CJ’s concurring judgment. 
40
  Grootboom (note 16 above) para 25. 
41
 See Liebenberg S and Goldblatt B “The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under South 
Africa’s transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-360;  Liebenberg S “The value of human dignity in 
interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-30; Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of ownership, security of 
tenure, and eviction orders: a model to evaluate South Africa’s land-reform legislation” (2002) Journal of South 
African Law 254-289; Wilson S “Breaking the tie: Eviction from private land, homelessness and a new normality” 
(2009) 126 SALJ  270-290; The jurisprudence has attempted, albeit in very broad terms, to identify some of the values 
and purposes protected by socio-economic rights. See, for example: Soobramoney (note 39 above) paras 42-51 and 
56. However,  the cases of Soobramoney and Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2009] ZACC 
28; 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC), were instances in which the Constitutional Court did not develop in detail, the values 
and purposes underlying the relevant right by failing to give meaning to the implicated human rights; See also 
Grootboom (note 16 above) paras 1, 23, and 88; Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, 
Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development [2004] ZACC 11; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras 40, 64, 85, 
104 and 114; Jaftha (note 22 above)  paras 23 and 28; Residents of Joe Slovo Community (note 28 above) paras 18, 31 
and 33. 
42
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
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African regional human rights system,
43
 the European regional human rights system,
44
 and the 
Inter-American human rights system.
45
 I will also examine the emerging international law norms 
and instruments and selected cases from foreign jurisdictions in which the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing has been developed. 
 
In chapter 4, the extent to which the Court has given substantive content to the right of access to 
adequate housing will be examined. Here, I will look at the selective jurisprudence of the Court 
which best illuminates its approach to the right of access to adequate housing. I will focus 
particularly on the following cases: Grootboom,
46
 Jaftha,
47
 PE Municipality,
48
 Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road,
49
 Residents of Joe Slovo Community
50
 and Nokotyana.
51
 
 
I focus on these cases as they represent a selection of the leading decisions of the Constitutional 
Court dealing with various aspects of section 26. They will enable me to analyse the extent to which 
the  Constitutional Court has developed the substantive content of the right to adequate housing in 
various contexts. I will seek to identify both the positive and negative features of the relevant 
judgments from the perspective of my research aims. 
  
The Court has a duty to elaborate the meaning of section 26(1) of the Constitution. I will develop an 
argument that this is essential for all cases falling within the ambit of s 26, whether the cases concern 
the reasonableness of the State’s actions or omissions in terms of s 26(2), or the eviction of people 
from their home in terms of s 26(3).
52
 By doing this, the courts will not only have  engaged 
                                                          
43
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the jurisprudence of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the African Commission Human and People’ Rights. Most notably the Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, Communication number 55/96. 
44
 See Kapindu R From Global to the Local: The Role of International Law in the Enforcement of Socio-economic 
rights In South Africa (2009) 6 Research Series 1-50 at 23. 
45
 Kapindu R (note 44 above) at 23-24. 
46
  Grootboom (note 16 above). 
47
  Jaftha (note 22 above). 
48
  PE Municipality (note 20 above).   
49
  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case (note 26 above). 
50
  Residents of Joe Slovo Community (note 28 above). 
51
  Nokotyana (note 31 above). I will however, also focus on cases such as Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Residents 
of Joe Slovo Community which entail primarily the negative duties arising out of section 26 of the Constitution. I seek 
thereby to illustrate the contrast in how the Court approaches these cases compared to cases which concern mainly the 
positive duties arising out of the right of access to adequate housing. 
52
 See Grootboom (note 16 above) paras 34 and 44 where the court held that the subsections of section 26 are 
interrelated and should be read together. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that reasonableness review must be seen in 
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effectively with section 26 as a whole, but also started to develop the substantive content of section 
26(1) for future cases concerning a failure to realise the right of access to adequate housing.  
 
In chapter 4 of the thesis, I examine whether the Court’s jurisprudence gives proper effect to the 
purposes and values of housing rights and relevant international human rights law. I will also 
examine whether relevant comparative law has been taken into account. Finally, I will give my 
overall assessment of how the Constitutional Court has approached the right of access to adequate 
housing as described  in section 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
 
In chapter 5, I will suggest alternative approaches which could contribute to the development of a 
more substantive approach to housing in the South African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. I 
will do so by suggesting ways of overcoming the impediments to the adjudication of socio-economic 
rights, by highlighting the importance of assessing the reasonableness review test in the context of 
the purposes and values promoted by the right of access to adequate housing. In addition, I will 
examine the implications of this approach for the development of the jurisprudence. 
 
Chapter 6 of the thesis will be a summary of my findings and a conclusion.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
light of the Bill of Rights as a whole.  See also Liebenberg 2010 (note 5 above) chapter 2, 51-54 and chapter 4, 170-
172. 
      
14 
 
CHAPTER    2:      THE ROLE OF COURTS IN ENFORCING SOCIO-ECONONOMIC  
RIGHTS UNDER SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION     
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
In this section, the significance as well as the theoretical and practical applications of transformative 
constitutionalism in the context of the adjudication of socio-economic rights under the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’), will be explored. To this end, I will 
examine the history and meaning of transformative constitutionalism, its practicality in the South 
African context, and also criticisms of the concept.  
 
In addition, I will consider how the concept of transformative constitutionalism contributes to 
conceptualising an appropriate role for courts in adjudicating socio-economic rights. To this end, I 
will explore the various theoretical underpinnings of the concept of transformative constitutionalism 
that have developed since the concept first appeared in our constitutional jurisprudence. The aim of 
this will be to put forward suggestions regarding the role of courts in enforcing socio-economic 
rights under South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism as a foundation for the analysis of the 
particular role of the courts in the enforcement of the right to adequate housing in section 26 of the 
Constitution. 
 
2 2 Transformative constitutionalism 
 
2 2 1 Introduction 
 
The transformation of the economy has received much attention since the dawn of our democracy in 
1994. At the heart of this debate is the elimination of the vast economic and social inequalities that 
were inherited by the new government from the previous government.
1
 This transformation debate 
                                                          
1
 See: Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1) for a comprehensive impact of colonialism and apartheid in creating the past 
and current inequalities on South Africa’s population, especially black people; and Ramphele M Laying Ghosts To 
Rest: Dilemmas of The Transformation In South Africa (2008) 7-13 and 46-72. It is also well documented that these 
vast economic and social inequalities have more than doubled since 1994. In this regard see: The Presidency of the 
Republic of South Africa Development Indicators (2009) and Leibbrandt M et al (ch 1, n 14) 1-90. 
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has also put the spotlight on the South African judiciary, particularly regarding the role it is 
supposed to play in the pursuit of social justice when performing its duties under the Constitution.
2
 
  
2 2 2 History and meaning of transformative constitutionalism 
 
The term transformative constitutionalism originates from Klare’s article, in which he described the 
South African Constitution as transformative in character and aspirations. He described 
transformative constitutionalism as: 
 
...[A] long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed 
(not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of 
inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law. I have 
in mind a transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase ‘reform,’ but 
something short of or different from ‘revolution’  in any traditional sense of the word.3 
 
Klare went on to describe the South African Constitution as “post-liberal,” and as one that is 
committed to “…wide-ranging egalitarian social transformation.”4 By this he means that the South 
African Constitution is different from the constitutions of other countries, such as the United States 
of America, because its design is towards an “…empowered model of democracy.”5 
 
Klare cautioned though that he would be prepared in another setting to contend that a post-liberal 
reading of the Constitution is the best reading of the Constitution, but this was not his design here, 
as other readings of the Constitution are still possible. His purpose was to add clarity to the problem 
created by concepts, so that a debate can take place about a “post-liberal, or neoliberal, or 
conservative or any other reading of the Constitution.”6 
                                                          
2
 Klare at 150 and authors referred to in (ch 1, n 5).  
3
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 150-151. 
4
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 151-156. 
5
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 151-153. 
6
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 152. 
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In addition, Klare argues that there is a problem resting on the presumption prevalent in our legal 
culture that a liberal reading of the Constitution is a “legal” interpretation of the Constitution, 
whereas a “post-liberal” reading is a “political interpretation.”7 Klare holds that seeing issues in this 
light is wrong, as the traditional view of our legal culture is just as political as the post-liberal 
interpretation.
8
 
 
Klare makes a case for his “post-liberal” reading of the South African Constitution, by arguing that 
the Constitution is: 
 
 social, redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly horizontal, participatory, multicultural, and 
self-conscious about its historical setting and transformative role and mission, as opposed to 
classical liberal documents.
9
 
 
This means that the Constitution envisages a society in which political rights do not exist in 
isolation, but exist in ways that allow people to have the social resources to exercise their rights. 
This is in contrast to the classical liberal Bill of Rights, such as that of the United States of America, 
which pre-occupies itself with securing individual liberty and private property rights from 
interference by the government.
10
 Flowing from this, it is evident that the Constitution contains 
many provisions that make it clear that they are not self-executing, but are open-textured and must 
be interpreted and applied in their context.
11
 This, according to Klare, is also evidence that the 
Constitution as a post-liberal document necessarily envisages new conceptions of judicial roles and 
responsibilities.
12
 
 
Furthermore, Klare acknowledges the constraints of adjudication, and the limitations placed on all 
role players in the legal profession.
13
 In terms of traditional conceptions of the rule of law, judges 
are expected to leave their politics out of adjudication, by interpreting legal texts in ways devoid of 
                                                          
7
  Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 151-156. 
8
  Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 151-156. 
9
  Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 153-156.  
10
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 153-156. 
11
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 157.  
12
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 155-156. See also: Moseneke D “The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture” (2002) 28 
SAJHR 309-319 at 314.  
13
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 149. 
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“personal or subjective views.”14 Lawyers too, struggle with interpretive problems when engaged in 
the functions of interpreting legal texts and materials, owing to the prevailing legal culture.
15
 This 
implies that enough space is left for judges and other role players in the legal profession to 
gradually give meaning to legal materials through interpretation of rights and the crafting of suitable 
remedies. 
 
He further insists that the great weakness in the traditional legal theory lies in  its insisting on the 
strict separation between law and politics, and between “professionally constrained legal practices 
and strategic pursuit of political and moral projects.”16 This means that legal stakeholders are 
constrained by their legal training, and by extension, the accepted legal culture in a particular 
society, which leads  them to interpreting legal materials in a particular way, and not in other 
ways.
17
A prudent decision-maker cannot solve a case by simply resorting to her politics or morals, 
even if resort to external materials were regarded as prudent.
18
 This is because her ideological 
preconceptions are unlikely to provide her with guidance on how to deal with challenging legal 
precedents, even in cases where external resort was considered appropriate.
19
  
 
Klare goes on to urge for the closing of the divide between law and politics in adjudication.
20
  He 
identifies two primary reasons for this approach, namely that the interpretative work that judges, 
and other players in the legal field perform partially make up legal materials, and imbues them with 
“value-laden meanings” that conciously or unconciously shape their sense of what materials are 
relevant to a certain question, and to fairness.
21
 Therefore, judges and advocates need to be aware of 
assuming that they are always constrained by legal materials,
22
 and need to understand and not 
underestimate the extent of the indeterminacy of legal materials.
23
 This is because failure to do so 
                                                          
14
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 157. Klare argues that traditional conceptions of the rule of law impose certain requirements 
on Judges to leave their politics outside of court. 
15
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 160-166. 
16
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 166-166. 
17
 Klare (ch1, n 5) at 166-172. Klare defines legal culture as the “professional sensibilities and prevailing habits in a 
particular legal system,” Klare at 166. 
18
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 161. 
19
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 161. 
20
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 160-164. 
21
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 163 and 162-166. 
22
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 165. 
23
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 165-166. 
      
18 
 
leads to denial of the choices and power that they wield through interpretive processes or 
adjudication.
24
 
  
Moreover, Klare argues that judges’ political leanings and moral values form part of the interpretive 
processes and adjudication.
25
 Therefore, the most prudent thing to do in that regard would be for 
judges and lawyers to acknowledge to the public their part in moulding the social order through 
interpretive and adjudicative tools, so that the public are aware of this in order to promote and 
uphold the democratic principles of openness and accountability.
26
 This is not because judges are 
weak or easily give in to political temptation, but because the traditional divide maintained by the 
rule of law is impossible to uphold.
27
 Reliance on available legal materials and ways in which 
things were done in earlier times may act as a limiting factor on constitutional interpretation. This 
could in turn limit the achievement of democratic transformation.
28
 He argues that this is the risk 
that South Africa faces today, owing to the legal actors’ blind reliance on “culturally available 
intellectual tools and instincts handed down from earlier times.”29  
 
The implications of Klare’s arguments are that the proponents of social justice, such as lawyers and 
judges may be working against social justice through their deployment of available legal materials 
without critically interrogating to what extent these legal materials act as constraints rather than aids 
to interpretation. This is because legal actors in a particular legal system are conditioned to accept 
certain legal arguments as convincing and others as not convincing.
30
 It may be that the legal 
arguments that are accepted as more convincing are actually not advancing social justice or the 
transformative designs of the Constitution. For instance, in the field of socio-economic rights, it 
could be argued that lawyers and judges pre-occupy themselves unduly with court procedures and 
                                                          
24
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 165-166. 
25
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 159-166. 
26
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 159-166. Klare further justifies this proposition by comparing the South African legal system 
to the United States legal system, where the judiciary has openly acknowledged the politics of adjudication. He 
further reasons that this is “not because Judges are weak and give in to political temptation, but because the 
exclusion called for by the traditional rule-of-law ideal is quite simply impossible,” Klare at 165. This is 
acknowledged by Moseneke (note 12 above) at 317-318, where he expresses agreement with the sentiments 
expressed by Klare that judges are influenced by their political and moral leanings in adjudication.  
27
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 163-166. This is confirmed by Moseneke (note 12 above) at 317 where he argues that 
“…personal intellectual and moral pre-conceptions of judges do intrude into their adjudication (...).” 
28
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 168. 
29
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 168. 
30
 Klare (ch 1, n 5) at 166-170. 
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formalistic concepts which may well be out of tune with the transformative designs of the 
Constitution. This could manifest itself in how courts approach concepts such as positive and 
negative duties, reasonableness review, separation of powers doctrine and judicial deference. These 
doctrinal approaches and concepts may have the negative effect of derailing social change and 
stopping the development of the law by blocking out substantive legal reasoning. An unduly limited 
or narrow perspective which is part of a certain legal culture shapes ones imagination and beliefs, 
and may exclude alternative legal arguments, but immersion in another legal culture may expose 
one to alternative arguments, and serve to dissolve one’s legal culture, which may not be 
convincing anymore.
31
 
 
Klare argues that the antidote to this is a constitutional duty resting on the judiciary and legal 
profession to search and critically examine the prevailing legal culture and its influences on 
interpretive practices and adjudication.
32
 Klare develops the above-mentioned arguments by 
pointing out that the democratic South Africa mandated a new, transformed legal culture.
33
 
However, it is hard to develop and grow a new legal culture using the tools and habits that were 
used before this new legal culture was ushered in.
34
 Klare further argues that future generations will 
assess the Constitutional Court based on the contribution it has made to achieving equality, 
advancing social justice, and deepening the culture of democracy, multi-racialism, and respect for 
human dignity.
35
 Klare argues therefore that “…how tightly the Court squares its arguments with 
textbook canons and maxims will be far less important at the end of the day.”36 
 
Klare’s idea of a transformative constitution has been adopted and elaborated upon in academic 
literature, and by the South African courts.
37
 However, there remain many questions as to how 
precisely the courts should approach their role, particularly in the context of the interpretation and 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. 
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Liebenberg asserts that the Constitution is “backward-looking, as well as ‘forward-looking.”38 In 
addition, she develops this line of argument by contending that in order to achieve transformation, 
the focus must not only be on the apartheid past, but also on the future.
39
 This is particularly 
instructive in adjudicating socio-economic rights to achieve social justice, because the complexity 
of socio-economic rights require that courts adjudicate in ways that are committed to addressing 
yesterday’s injustices and also contribute to guiding the post-democratic social changes. 
 
Van Marle, on the other hand, questions the overzealousness of transformative constitutionalism 
based on laws’ limitations in driving substantive changes in “…politics, citizenship and 
community.”40 She argues that, “[i]f the change encompasses nothing more than the transformation 
of the system by the system, the change amounts to evolution in contrast to transformation as 
defined”41 by Cornell. This means that the courts and everyone else would have to pursue social 
change in a way that radically changes the way in which we approach social justice. This would 
encompass examining ourselves and the current system and identifying the impediments it presents 
to social change, and ways in which this can be corrected, so that, with time, meaningful social 
change, especially in the field of socio-economic rights, can be achieved. 
 
Roux
42
 offers a different reading of the Constitution based on another reading of Klare, grounded in 
Ronald Dworkin, in contrast to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) school of thought. Dworkin’s 
method is based on the argument that political morality as informing the Constitution is often 
presented as an objective correctness of a particular view.
43
 Roux’s reading of Klare and his 
suggested way of reading the Constitution, leads to the same conclusions that Klare reaches using 
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CLS, which is that the South African judiciary and its role players have to acknowledge the politics 
or political morality implicit in adjudication, in the interest of democratic principles of openness 
and accountability so that the public is aware of these factors.
44
  
 
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of transformative constitutionalism as a signpost 
provided by the Constitution to the courts in their search for social justice. Courts are mandated by 
the Constitution to interpret rights to advance the fundamental objectives and founding 
constitutional values set out in  the preamble and  section 1(a) of the Constitution.
45
 These 
objectives and values have a manifestly transformative purpose. If transformative constitutionalism 
is interpreted and applied by the courts in line with the objectives and values of the Constitution, it 
has the potential to guide the courts towards developing a more substantive conception of socio-
economic rights. This is because all facets of transformative constitutionalism suggest that, over 
time, there should be tangible improvements in the realisation of socio-economic rights, including 
the right of access to adequate housing. It implies further that the courts should play an active role 
in facilitating the achievement of socio-economic transformation in society.
46
 The implications of 
transformative constitutionalism for the role of the courts is elaborated on in the following section. 
 
2 2 3 Transformative constitutionalism and the role of courts in socio-economic rights 
adjudication 
 
Transformative constitutionalism goes to the heart of the role of courts in adjudicating socio-
economic rights cases. The courts, as one of these institutions of democracy, are enjoined by the 
Constitution to interpret and enforce the rights in the Bill of Right. In the context of socio-economic 
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rights, this means that the courts, in adjudicating socio-economic rights, need to be more aware of 
the challenges facing the poor. In adjudicating socio-economic rights, courts must be guided by our 
unique South African history as well as by the constitutional goals set out in the preamble, namely 
those of building a future founded on “social justice,” an improvement in the “quality of life of all 
citizens,” and the “freeing of the potential of each person.” 
  
Jackie Dugard argues that the post-apartheid South African judiciary, specifically the Constitutional 
Court, has failed to act as an “institutional voice for the poor,”47 and has instead found refuge in 
“jurisprudential conservatism” It will be recalled that the apartheid judiciary was highly deferential 
to the executive and parliamentary branch, and its preferred style of legal interpretation was legal 
positivism.
48
 According to Jackie Dugard, the current judiciary has adopted methods of adjudication 
steeped in legal conservatism, which are similar to the methods of adjudication that were used by 
the apartheid judiciary.
49
 This constrains the judiciary from playing an active role in giving 
substantive content to socio-economic rights. 
  
The call for the substantive approach to socio-economic rights has sparked fierce debates in 
academic literature
50
 and in the courts, where the debate has turned on the appropriate standard of 
judicial review in socio-economic rights cases.
51
 This debate gained momentum in 1992, when 
Mureinik argued for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution. Mureinik reasoned 
that a Bill of Rights which does not protect these rights can be viewed as “elevating luxuries over 
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necessities.”52 This means that there is almost no point in protecting other rights, when the most 
fundamental rights, such as socio-economic rights are not protected in the Constitution, and are 
subject to judicial review.
53
 Mureinik’s proposed model of review based on rationality and 
sincerity
54
 arguably informed the model of reasonableness review adopted in socio-economic rights 
cases.
55
 The Court has however, distinguished between rationality and the reasonableness review 
model it developed in earlier cases dealing with socio-economic rights.  The Court in the Khosa 
case reasoned that “the test for rationality is a relatively low one. As long as the government 
purpose is legitimate, and the connection between the law and the government purpose is rational 
and not arbitrary, the test will have been met.”56 This, continued the court, is not the test for 
determining constitutionality under the Constitution because section 27(2) of the Constitution lays 
down a standard of reasonableness which is higher than rationality.
57
 
 
This standard of review was elaborated upon and defined in clear terms in the Grootboom case.
58
 
The Court reasoned that the reasonableness review model is a standard of review used to review 
whether the government has complied with the positive duties imposed on it by socio-economic 
rights.
59
 The criterion for determining whether the reasonableness review model has been met, is 
held to be that “the programme must be comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated; appropriate 
financial and human resources must be made available for the programme; it must be balanced and 
flexible, and make appropriate provision for short, medium, and long term needs; it must be 
reasonably conceived and implemented; it must be transparent and its contents must be made 
available to the public;it must provide relief to those whose situation is desperate and those who are 
in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.”60 
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The Grootboom and TAC2 cases essentially elaborated on what the reasonableness review model 
entails and also affirmed this standard, as first formulated in Soobramoney, albeit in a different 
context. In addition, emphatic rejections of the minimum core concept were made in various socio-
economic rights cases that came before the Court.
61
 The minimum core was rejected because it 
presented many difficulties to the Court, this was because the needs of the people in the context of 
the right of access to adequate housing are diverse, since some  need land, while others need both 
land and houses, and still others need financial assistance.
62
  
 
There were also difficulties with the definition of the minimum core, and the availability of 
sufficient information to enable the Court to determine it.
63
 However, the Court indicated that it 
would be willing to consider the minimum core in the reasonableness enquiry in certain cases in 
order to determine if the measures taken by the State are reasonable, provided enough information 
was placed before the Court on the nature and scope of the minimum core.
64
 The Court’s adoption 
of the reasonableness review and its refusal to embrace the minimum core in examining whether the 
positive duties imposed on the government by socio-economic rights have been fulfilled, has led to 
much criticism.
65
 However, some authors have defended the reasonable review standard as 
currently applied by the Court.
66
 
 
Bilchitz argues that the court in Grootboom erred in rejecting the minimum core concept as 
presenting many difficulties, because the court misunderstood the concept of the minimum core.
67
 
This is because the arguments against the minimum core proffered by the Court show confusion as 
to the nature of the minimum core duties, which arises from failing to make a distinction between 
the different, universal standards that must be met in order to comply with the duties, and the 
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various specific methods that can be adopted in order to comply with a constitutional duty.
68
 
Bilchitz develops these arguments by pointing out that the minimum core concept must be 
understood with reference to a distinction that must be drawn between two interests that are 
protected by a right,
69
 “basic needs and more general interests needed for human survival and 
flourishing.”70 The minimum core represents certain basic needs that the government is obliged to 
protect and provide in accordance with its positive duties. These basic needs are essential for human 
survival, and cannot be reduced below a certain level.
71
 
 
Kende, on the other hand, has argued that the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence from the Grootboom, to TAC2 cases, and by implication its reasonableness review 
model is evidence of a careful balancing act on the Court’s part.72 Kende argues that the Court 
recognises the obligations imposed on the government by socio-economic rights, but allows 
government appropriate space to comply with these constitutional duties.
73
 Other scholars, like 
Liebenberg, argue for a “substantive conception of the reasonableness review model.” 74 She argues 
that, although the reasonableness review model allows the courts “a flexible and context-sensitive 
basis for evaluating socio-economic rights claims,”75 there is still a dire need for courts to develop 
the normative values and purposes against which the reasonableness of State’s acts or omissions can 
be tested and to engage in systematic evaluation of the evidence in socio-economic rights cases.
76
 
This she argues, is avoided by the conflation of “the two-stage approach to constitutional 
analysis”77 in the Court’s application of the reasonableness review model. The first stage of 
constitutional analysis is concerned with the question of whether there has been a violation of a 
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right as protected in the Constitution. The second stage concerns the purposes of limiting the right 
in question, and the question of whether the limitation in question is justifiable in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution, the general limitations clause.
78
 The reasonableness review model makes no 
easily discernible difference between the determination of the reach of the right, concerning 
whether it has been violated or not, and the justification for the said violation, if any.
79
  
 
This conflation, according to Liebenberg, allows courts to avoid the “initial principled engagement” 
with the purpose and fundamental values of the right in question and the impact of the violation on 
the applicants.
80
 As a result of this conflation, the courts fail to develop the substantive content of 
socio-economic rights, as much focus is directed at assessing whether the government programme 
in question complies with abstract standards of reasonableness in the model they develop.
81
 She 
argues that individuals are also entitled to “a standard of socio-economic rights provisioning which 
enables them to thrive and achieve their goals.”82 The fulfillment of the minimum core duties is 
urgent as people’s survival needs depends on it, because without it, the State’s duties to 
progressively achieve the full realisation of socio-economic rights, would be impossible.
83
 The role 
of courts in adjudicating socio-economic rights becomes critical here, as the courts need to prioritise 
basic needs, by requiring the State to give convincing reasons for its failure to fulfil the  basic needs 
of people in a particular case.
84
 
 
In response to the critics of this robust judicial role in adjudicating socio-economic rights, 
Liebenberg further argues that the reasonableness review model, particularly if substantively 
interpreted and applied, has substantial implications for the relationship between the courts and the 
other arms of government. Such implications are not dissimilar to those arising through an 
application of the minimum core approach.
85
 This is because the reasonableness review model 
results in courts delivering orders which have far reaching implications for government policy, as 
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government is required to adjust its policies in compliance with these court orders.
86
 She argues that 
this is not at odds with democratic values, as it serves the functions of judicial review in a 
constitutional democracy, and is in harmony with the carefully crafted interrelatedness of the 
functions of the three arms of government and the dialogic nature of this relationship.
87 
An 
institutional dialogue between the three branches of government is necessary, but not enough to 
meet the transformative goals of the Constitution, owing to the challenges that each branch faces.
88
  
 
Contemporary legislatures are also subject to disadvantages, owing to lack of time, and resource 
scarcity in comparison to the executive, which has sound technical know-how and resources to meet 
and to perform its duties in terms of the Constitution.
89
 Moreover, legislatures are susceptible to 
corruption by big business, and other influential interest groups.
90
 These challenges in legislative 
roles and functions result in legislation which leaves out people who are politically, economically 
and socially marginalised.
91
 The implications of this are that the courts’ role becomes critical in the 
intepretation and enforcement of constitutional guarantees in ways that protect the marginalised.  
 
Lastly, Liebenberg argues that the argument suggesting that the quest for an uncontested standard to 
guide the prioritisation of socio-economic rights is misplaced. This is because there are no easy, 
incontestable answers
92
 since “the survival standard does not guarantee the clarity and certainty 
which is claimed for it in defining priority claims in socio-economic rights adjudication.”93 
According to Liebenberg, survival needs should be handled in a way that fulfils people’s immediate 
needs, as vital components of the positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights.
94
 However, this 
should not mean that long-term needs are neglected. A balanced approach should apply in this 
regard,
95
 requiring account to be taken of survival needs as well as needs which foster other 
constitutional values such as participatory democracy, equality, and human dignity.
96
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Liebenberg links the above arguments on the minimum core and reasonableness review arguments 
with arguments for a reconception of the reasonableness review model developed by the Court.
97
 
She argues that although the model of reasonableness review is subject to criticism for not engaging 
substantively with the nature and content of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights, it serves other important purposes.
98
 She argues that infusing greater substance into the 
reasonableness model of review would incorporate a number of considerations peculiar to the 
applicants, such as “the nature of the service or resource in question, as well as the historical, 
economical and social context.”99 The implications of this approach are that the assessment of 
whether the reasonableness standard has been met or not, is not performed in a normative vacuum. 
 
The reasonableness review model avoids an inflexible position, and creates a continuous chance of 
challenging various socio-economic rights violations and deprivations.
100
 This has enabled the 
courts to bring the government to book for its actions or inaction in the field of socio-economic 
rights, and also provides for an ongoing dialogue between all stakeholders.
101
 This has been evident 
in various cases in which the courts have dealt with socio-economic rights.
102
 
 
Liebenberg also laments the failure of the Constitutional Court to engage satisfactorily with relevant 
international human rights standards and comparative law on socio-economic rights.
103
 According 
to Liebenberg, the aim of taking international law into account is to compare and extract 
interpretations of socio-economic rights, which best align with the transformative values of our 
Constitution, “not to uncritically import interpretations of socio-economic rights developed in other 
jurisdictions.”104 She expands this proposition by arguing that considering international human 
rights and comparative law standards could allow us to see our own socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence in a new light.
105
 The implication of this is that the courts need to take in account the 
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values explicit in section 39 of the Constitution, which enjoins all courts to interpret the Bill of 
Rights and other provisions of the Constitution in light of the values espoused in the Constitution, 
and the provisions of section 39. 
 
Others writers have variously praised and criticised the reasonableness review model for amounting 
to an administrative law model.
106
 Thus Cass Sunstein has argued that the Court in Grootboom 
adopted an administrative law model of reasonableness to socio-economic rights adjudication.
107
 
This is because “administrative law, like constitutional law can be seen as a form of democracy-
promoting minimalism”108 which induces the State to give reasons for its decisions and conduct.109 
Sunstein concludes that reasonableness review enables the Court to attain an optimal balance 
between respecting the legislative and policy-making roles of the legislature and executive, whilst 
not abdicating its responsibility to ensure that the relevant priority-setting policy choices are 
reasonable.
110
 Steinberg disagrees with Sunstein’s understanding of the reasonableness review 
model. Steinberg argues that reasonableness review in the context of socio-economic rights has a 
“discrete character” despite being rooted in administrative law.111 This is because reasonableness 
review in the context of socio-economic rights requires an intense assessment of government 
conduct, and the values of human dignity and equality are more heavily weighted in the 
proportionality exercise applied in socio-economic rights cases.
112
 In contrast, the administrative 
law model of reasonableness is more rooted in rationality review.
113
 
 
The points of similarity between the reasonableness review model in socio-economic rights and 
reasonableness review model found in administrative law are two-fold. Firstly, there is the principle 
that the government should give enough breathing space to the legislative and executive branches of 
government to choose ways of fulfilling their constitutional duties. Secondly, both standards are 
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described and applied contextually to a given set of facts.
114
 Steinberg seems to have a point on the 
nuanced differences and similarities between the reasonableness review model found in 
administrative law and that found in socio-economic rights. 
 
Besides the differences and similarities highlighted by Steinberg, there are additional jurisdictional 
requirements when dealing with the application of administrative law, as opposed to socio-
economic rights adjudication. For instance, if action or conduct does not qualify as administrative 
action as defined in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’), it 
is the end of the matter and there will be no assessment of the merits, and whether the said action is 
reasonable or not within the purview of administrative law.
115
 This should not mean that courts 
should not look to administrative law remedies to adjudicate socio-economic rights in appropriate 
cases, as administrative law could assist in providing the much needed substantive content of socio-
economic rights.
116
 
 
The other stark difference between the reasoableness review model and the administrative law 
reasonableness is that the administrative law inquiry does not factor in the constitutional values of 
human dignity, equality, and  freedom in its assessment.
117
 Others, like Davis
118
 have adopted a 
cautious approach, by criticising the minimum core, while pointing out the weaknesses in the 
reasonableness review model. Davis argues that the Court’s reasonableness review model should be 
commended for now.
119
 This is born out of the Court’s awareness of the State’s economic policies 
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and deference issues, including the fact that our democracy is still too young to embrace a robust 
minimum core approach to socio-economic rights.
120
 
 
In spite of the various positions highlighted above on what would constitute a substantive approach 
to socio-economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing,
121
 the Court has shown 
many signs of resistance to these proposals, most recently in the Nokotyana,
122
 and Mazibuko
123
 
cases. This resulted in the Court moving further away from embracing the transformative designs of 
the Constitution. 
 
The most sensible way in which the Court could go about developing the substantive content of 
socio-economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing, is to apply the 
reasonableness review model in ways that embrace the values and purposes which section 26 seeks 
to promote and achieve.
124
 This would involve recognising that constitutional values such as human 
dignity and equality cannot be separated from socio-economic rights.
125
 This conception of socio-
economic rights, according to Liebenberg underscores that rights such as adequate and culturally 
appropriate housing are not simply commodities to meet basic needs, but enable people to fulfil 
their potential and to compete as equals in society.
126
 The right of access to adequate housing in this 
context “is more than simply the provision of shelter from the elements, but enables people to fulfil 
a diverse range of psychological, social, cultural, and economic needs.”127 
 
What challenges stand in the way of the courts in advancing the transformative goals of the 
Constitution through a more robust interpretation of socio-economic rights? In the following 
section, I examine this question and the possible impediments which inhibit a more robust judicial 
role in the enforcement of socio-economic rights.  
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2 3 Impediments to the adjudication of socio-economic rights 
 
2 3 1 Introduction 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers and judicial deference have constantly been relied on by the 
Court as a justification of its reasoning and orders in most, if not all, cases of socio-economic rights, 
including the right of access to adequate housing. In these sections, I will briefly recall the 
importance and theoretical foundation of the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial 
deference, and how they operate to impede a transformative interpretation of socio-economic rights 
as a precursor to the more detailed arguments pertaining to the application of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and judicial deference in the context of the right of access to adequate housing 
developed in chapter 5. 
 
2 3 2 The separation of powers doctrine as an impediment 
 
The separation of powers doctrine originates from the early writings of Montesquieu in the 17
th
 
century.
128
 Montesquieu reasoned that the purpose of the separation between the three arms of 
government was “…so that there may be no abuse of power, it is necessary that, through the 
disposition of things, power be stopped by power ….”129 This then, over time, became known as the 
separation of powers doctrine.  However, others expressed great doubt about this doctrine, since it 
was not easy to define and differentiate between the the three arms of government.
130
 Madison 
highlighted the difficulties attendant in trying to dissect a straightforward and precise doctrine of 
separation of powers, which is easily applicable in practice, with clearly defined roles for the three 
arms of government. This is because the roles of the three arms of government overlap and intersect 
in many respects. 
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The Constitution serves as a good example of this fact, as it does not expressly provide for a 
doctrine called the separation of powers. However, a careful examination of its provisions reveals 
that this doctrine is implied in its provisions.
131
 In addition, the Court has held in Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996,
132
 that the principle of separation of powers reflects our historical situation 
and recognises the separation of functions and the independence of the branches of government, and 
that this doctrine allows the intrusion by one branch of government into the domain of another 
branch, where the Constitution allows.
133
 The Court has given effect to the doctrine of separation of 
powers in many forms,  subject to the checks and balances imposed by the Constitution.
134
 
  
Jackie Dugard argues that the Court has taken excessive refuge in the separation of powers doctrine 
and that this has contributed to the Court’s failure to develop the substantive content of socio-
economic rights.
135
 Liebenberg and Pieterse advocate for the reconceptualisation of the separation 
of powers debate in the context of socio-economic rights, Pieterse locates his examples using the 
TAC2 case to fortify his views.
136
 He argues that the TAC 2 case is testament that the evolving 
South African model of separation is radically different from that espoused by Locke and 
Montesquieu because of its transformative orientation, and concern with preserving flexibility in 
policy decisions, so that the executive is able to adapt policy to the changing needs of society. 
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Liebenberg argues for a conception of the separation of powers doctrine that seems to be in line 
with the conception of separation of powers of Madison.
137
 This is clear from Liebenberg’s 
acknowledgement of a system of “mutual control” between the three branches of government.138 
This resonates with the point made by Madison, albeit in a different context, to the effect that it is 
difficult to dissect a straightforward and precise doctrine of separation of powers.
139
 In Liebenberg’s 
view, this doctrine should not be used by courts to stifle transformation and social justice.
140
 Socio-
economic rights adjudication requires a break-away from many essential components of the classic 
liberal constitutional theory, by requiring the courts to closely scrutinise policy and social issues, 
and to adjudicate socio-economic rights in a manner that brings significant changes to social and 
policy issues where necessary.
141
 The Constitution imposes an obligation on the State to redistribute 
resources in a way that ensures that everyone has access to the socio-economic rights promised by 
the Constitution.
142
  
 
According to Liebenberg, the doctrine of separation of powers serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
allows for the task of governance, law-making and law enforcement to be performed by the 
appropriate institution of government.
143
 Secondly, it guards against the abuse of power which may 
arise when too much power is placed at the disposal of one of the branches of government by 
dividing power amongst the three branches of government.
144
 The significance of this allocation of 
powers to the different branches of government is vital to the transformative purpose of the 
Constitution.
145
 Each branch of government is allocated functions that it is able to perform, and a 
system of checks and balances is created which leads to accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.
146
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There is a danger that lurks within the separation of powers doctrine, and this danger can become 
critical when the separation of powers doctrine is relied upon to stifle transformation. This happens 
when  a strict division of functions and roles between the three branches of government  is assumed 
and when courts use this to abdicate their mandate of protecting and enforcing constitutional rights, 
instead of fostering responsiveness and holding government to account. According to Liebenberg, 
this danger is particularly acute when courts adjudicate socio-economic rights, because these rights 
challenge many vital components of the classic liberal constitutional theory by requiring State 
intervention in the redistribution of resources.
147
  
 
The adoption of a flexible approach grounded in a dialogic model of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, which upholds the principles of checks and balances is appropriate to promoting the 
transformative vision of the Constitution.
148
 This means that courts should step in through 
consistent prodding of the legislature and the executive to protect and promote the substantive 
realisation of socio-economic rights in a situation where these branches of government are failing to 
fulfill their constitutional mandate in relation to these rights.
149
 This would not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine because the courts would still be acting within their constitutional 
mandate. 
 
The separation of powers doctrine is not an impediment in itself to the proper realisation of socio-
economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing. It only becomes an impediment 
to its realisation when the courts engage it in a manner that does not advance the transformative 
designs of the Constitution, such as advancing social justice. When the courts use it as a shield with 
which they avoid their constitutionally mandated judicial functions, which include giving concrete 
meaning to the rights in the Bill of Rights, they fail to hold government accountable for the 
fulfillment of socio-economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing.   
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2 3 3 Judicial deference as an impediment 
 
The other aspect of the debate on the proper role of courts in adjudicating socio-economic rights is 
judicial deference, which has generated much interest from academic writers and courts alike.
150
 In 
certain cases, the courts have not expressly mentioned judicial deference, but clearly deference or 
respect
151
 for the institutional role and competencies of the other branches of government were key 
considerations in the judicial decision-making process.
152
 
 
The issue of deference frequently arises in judicial review of conduct, legislation and policy for 
compliance with constitutional norms. At the centre of the concept of deference is the courts’ 
understanding of its role in relation to the roles of the other branches of government.
153
 The courts 
in this context are usually faced with a number of questions and challenges, ranging from whether 
they should entertain cases in which they would be required to pronounce on the correctness of the 
conduct, legislation and policy of government functionaries, to the standard of review to be applied 
in the particular case. Questions also arise as to how much deference should be afforded to the 
government functionary involved. 
 
McLean argues that deference “is comprised of three intersecting principles, namely: the court’s 
views on the democratically legitimate role of a court in a constitutional democracy; the court’s 
views on its appropriate role, given its institutional limits; and the nature of the dispute before the 
court.”154 In addition, McLean argues that there is a need for a further “free standing principle of 
judicial deference,”155 derived from the separation of powers doctrine and accepted as a general 
principle of constitutional adjudication. She calls this latter concept, “constitutional deference.”156 
She argues that her approach to deference counters the criticisms levelled against judicial deference 
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by Trevor Allan, who argues that there is no need for a further free-standing doctrine of deference 
since the separation of powers doctrine already serves similar uses.
157
 McLean counters this by 
arguing that the constitutional deference principle that she proposes integrates the existing 
theoretical approaches to deference into “a principled doctrine of separation of powers.”158 This, 
McLean argues, allows the discussion of constitutional deference to be used to examine the reasons 
underlying the Court’s deferential position in selecting a lower standard of review in particular 
cases.
159
 
 
McLean’s approach is different from the approach that focuses on the theory of deference that 
preoccupies itself with questions of when courts should defer and when courts should not defer to 
the other branches of government.
160
 Her approach focuses more on the reasons for the particular 
deferential approach adopted by the court.
161
 Furthermore, McLean argues that although deference 
issues and separation of powers raise vital issues on the balance of powers between the three arms 
of government, it does not automatically constitute an obstacle in the enforcement of socio-
economic rights. This is because there is no one-size-fits-all model of deference. The courts’ 
approach to deference will depend on a number of contextual factors as well as prevailing attitudes 
of the bench.
162
 This includes the nature of the matter before the court, the pre-existing attitudes of 
the judges and judicial culture.
163
 This means that courts should craft a principled approach to 
deference that balances the various competing interests, functions and roles of the other arms of 
government.
164
 Deference in this context will depend on the particular circumstances and context of 
a case before the courts.
165
 The implications of this are that courts will generally defer on issues of 
policy and issues which the other branches of the government are well placed to address because of 
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the expertise they possess. However, this will depend on the facts of each case and does not give the 
other branches of government unlimited margin to violate constitutional rights with impunity.
166
 
 
Hoexter emphasises the need for courts and potential litigants to be aware of the limits and 
challenges posed by judicial review.
167
 Hoexter cautions that the litigants must be constantly aware 
that courts are limited to scrutinising process and procedure when engaging in judicial review, and 
must not cross over to appeal.
168
  Fuller argues that courts are not appropriate forums to determine 
“polycentric problems,”169 as doing so would violate the separation of powers.170 Polycentric 
disputes and decision are issues that are many-centred and give rise to unpredictable situations.
171
 
  
Allison criticises Fuller‘s position on polycentric issues as too vague to use as a principle of 
adjudication because Fuller fails to explain the alternatives to judicial resolution of polycentric 
matters.
172
 Dworkin on the other hand contends that courts are perfectly capable of deciding 
polycentric issues, and that judicial review enhances democracy. Accordingly, a Dworkian judge 
would not defer to the other arms of government on issues of the enforcement of fundamental 
rights.
173
 Liebenberg argues that the challenges posed by polycentricism are not limited to 
adjudication of socio-economic rights, but affect the adjudication of all rights.
174
 She gives an 
example of a case involving the abolition of the death penalty, which she argues requires the re-
sentencing of prisoners on death row, and the building and maintenance of prison facilities to 
accommodate all those whose sentences have been commuted from death sentences to some other 
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sentence.
175
 These arrangements have many effects on the administration of justice and the system 
of justice as a whole, as the government will have to allocate or adjust budgets in order to deal with 
this scenario.
176
 This illustrates that the problem of polycentricism and budgetary constraints also 
arise in cases that are traditionally regarded as falling within the ambit of civil and political rights.  
 
Furthermore, polycentric cases are not beyond the reach of adjudication. This is because even Fuller 
admits that issues such as those involving the economic market which by their nature are 
polycentric issues because they involve “…the making of rules that will make the market function 
well,” remain suitable for adjudication.177 It is not polycentric issues in themselves that are 
problematic for Fuller, but polycentric decision-making in cases involving social welfare that is 
problematic.
178
 Liebenberg argues that this shows “…the general bias in classic liberal legal theory 
against the judicial enforcement of welfare rights.”179 
 
The Court’s approach to socio-economic rights has not always been biased against the 
interepretation and enforcement of these rights. The TAC2
180
 and Khosa matters serve as examples 
of cases in which the Court did not use judicial deference as an excuse for refusing to give content 
to socio-economic rights.
181
 However, the same cannot be said of the overly deferential  approaches 
in Mazibuko
182 
and Nokotyana.
183
 
  
According to Hoexter, certain functions which require resources and expertise should be left to the 
arms of government that have those resources and expertise, as they are the appropriate 
functionaries to perform such functions.
184
 Furthermore, the failure to leave certain functions to the 
appropriate arm of government may create undesirable friction between the arms of government 
and may impede social transformation.
185
 However, this does not mean that the courts should not 
                                                          
175
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 73. 
176
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 73. 
177
 Liebenberg (ch 1, n 5) at 73. 
178
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 73. 
179
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 73. 
180
 TAC2 (note 51 above). 
181
 Khosa (ch 1, n 41).      
182
 Mazibuko (ch 1, n 41). 
183
 Nokotyana (ch 1, n 31). These and other issues are taken up in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
184
 Hoexter 2000 (ch 1, n 9).  
185
 Hoexter 2000 (ch 1, n 9) at 499-505; Jackie Dugard (note 47 above) at 979-980 and 234-238. 
      
40 
 
intervene where administrative agencies, and other branches of government fail to comply with 
their constitutional duties, and human rights.
186
  
 
Both McLean and Hoexter acknowledge the roles played by the separation of powers doctrine and 
judicial deference in regulating the relationship between the three arms of government. They both 
accept, however, that judicial deference does not represent an automatic constraint to the courts 
exercising robust review functions in particular cases. Much will depend on the specific facts of the 
relevant case, including the interests at stake and the role and justifications provided by the relevant 
organ of state. Where vital constitutional rights – such as socio-economic rights – are at stake, 
courts must not hesitate to hold the government to account where it fails to fulfill the guarantees 
contained in the Constitution. 
 
I now turn to examine the South African Constitutional Court’s failure to develop the substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
2 3 4 The South African Constitutional Court’s failure to develop the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing 
 
In order to fully understand the Court’s failure to develop the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing, an understanding of what constitutes a substantive approach to socio-
economic rights must be developed. This issue must be explored in the specific context of the right 
of access to adequate housing which is the specific focus of this thesis. As the above analysis has 
indicated, the key criticism of the Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence is that the Court has 
not developed a sufficiently substantive interpretation of the relevant rights. Linked to this is the 
question of what such a substantive interpretation should entail in light of the transformative 
requirements of the Constitution.
187
 The Court adjudicates the right of access to adequate housing, 
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and other socio-economic rights using the reasonableness review model.
188
 This model of review 
has a lot of potential to propel the Court to develop the substantive content of this right as evidenced 
by the Grootboom case, provided the Court applies it in the light of the transformative vision of the 
Constitution. However, to date the Court has failed to follow its own guidelines on the right of 
access to adequate housing, as indicated above.
189
  In the remainder of this thesis, how the courts 
could go about infusing substantive content in the interpretation of the right to adequate housing is 
explored, as well as the implications of this approach for the adjudication of housing rights. 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
 
In the above sections, the concept of transformative constitutionalism has been examined, by 
exploring its history, significance, and specific role in the context of the adjudication of socio-
economic rights. In addition, the theoretical foundations of the doctrine of separation of powers and 
judicial deference were laid with the aim of demonstrating how the separation of powers doctrine 
and judicial deference serve important purposes in the adjudication of socio-economic rights and 
other rights when used appropriately. However, it was noted that they can also undermine the 
transformative goals of the Constitution when they are used formalistically as a shield for the 
judiciary to shirk its constitutional duties in adjudicating socio-economic rights. 
  
 In the next section, the aim is to investigate the potential of developing the substantive content of 
the right of access to adequate housing. I do so by using the methodology specified in section 
39(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution for the interpretation of rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
 
                                                          
188
 See 2 2 3 above for full discussion. 
189
 See Joseph (ch 1, n 38). In Joseph, the applicants argued that electricity was part of the right of access to 
adequate housing, but the Court left this question undecided. See also: Nokotyana (ch 1, n 31). The Nokotyana case 
is discussed in more detail in chapter 4 along with issues raised here. The Nokotyana case represents a perfect 
example of a case in which the Court failed to give substantive content to the rights of access to adequate housing 
and other rights in the Bill of Rights. This is a decisive break away from the guidelines laid down by the Court in 
earlier cases on socio-economic rights, such as those laid down in the Grootboom case, where the Court stated that 
those in desperate and emergency situation must be protected through the provision of emergency housing and basic 
services. 
   
           
   
42 
 
CHAPTER    3: DEVELOPING THE CONTENT OF HOUSING AS A HUMAN     
   RIGHT 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
In this section, the potential for developing the substantive content of the right of access to adequate 
housing will be investigated. This will be done through the methodology provided in section 39(1) 
(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution as expanded by case law. I will first examine the history and 
context of housing in South Africa. Secondly, I will seek to elaborate on the purposes and values 
protected by the right of access to adequate housing, within the context of the Constitution. I will 
rely on the theoretical foundations and cases elaborating on the purposes and values protected by 
socio-economic rights, and then deal with the purposes and values protected by the right of access 
to adequate housing.  
 
Thirdly, I explore international human rights law pertaining to the right to housing, focusing on the 
purposes and values protected by the right of access to adequate housing within relevant regional 
and international human rights law instruments. This examination will focus on the major 
international instruments protecting economic, social and cultural rights, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter ‘the ICESCR’), housing rights in other 
international human rights treaties,  as well as the African regional human rights system, the 
European human rights system, and the Inter-American human rights system. In addition, I will 
briefly examine some emerging international law norms and instruments pertaining to housing 
rights. Fourthly, I will briefly examine selected cases from foreign jurisdictions in which aspects of 
the substantive content of the right to adequate housing have been developed. I conclude by 
summarising the key normative components of housing as a human right as developed from the 
above analysis. 
 
3 2 History and context of housing in South Africa 
 
3 2 1 Introduction 
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The Court in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal),
1
 held that the context against 
which the Bill of Rights must be interpreted and applied is the “deep social and economic inequality 
that pervades our society, and that these deep social and economic inequalities already existed when 
our Constitution was adopted.”2 Furthermore, the Court in Soobramoney reasoned that our 
Constitution, in particular the preamble, enjoins us to address these deep seated inequalities, and 
this is to be found in different provisions of the Constitution, such as sections 26 and 27.
3
 
 
The history of housing and social inequality in South Africa will in the period prior to 1994,
4
 and in 
the period after 1994 will be considered. 
 5
 Naturally the latter period is profoundly influenced by 
the legacy of colonialism and apartheid in the former period. This history is characterised by the 
close relationship that existed and still exists between power, land and human capital.
6
 Terreblanche 
documents that the South African white farmers and colonial powers unfairly enriched themselves 
using the indigenous population, mainly black people from the mid-17
th
 century until the late 20
th
 
century, through the creation of an exploitative economic and political structure.
7
 This system was 
managed through the enforcement of a battery of racist laws and brutal force applied in the rural 
and urban areas. 
 
3 2 2 The rural land tenure of black people post 1910 
 
The rural land tenure of black people post Union was governed by the Natives’ Land Act 27 of 
1913 (hereafter ‘the Natives’ Land Act’). The Natives’ Land Act strengthened an already existing 
plethora of racist laws that were passed prior to the Union. The purpose of the Natives’ Land Act 
was to identify and regulate the reserve land put aside for the exclusive occupation, and purchase by 
                                                          
1
 Soobramoney (ch 1, n 39) paras 8-9; Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 22. 
2
 Soobramoney (ch 1, n 39) paras 8-9;  
3
 Soobramoney (ch 1, n 39) para 9 
4
 Plaatje (ch 1, n 1). See also Bundy (ch 1, n 1) at 3-5; Claassens A “Rural land struggles in the Transvaal in the 
1980s” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place To Rest: Forced Removals History In South Africa (1990) 27-
65; Marcus G “Section 5 of the Black Administration Act: The case of the Bakwena ba Mogopa” in Murray C and 
O’Regan C (eds) No Place To Rest: Forced Removals History In South Africa (1990) 12-26; Terreblanche 2003 (ch 
1, n 1). 
5
 Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1).  
6
 Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1) at 6. 
7
 Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1) at 6-7 and 260-264.  
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natives.
8
 The consequence of the Natives’ Land Act was that the 4 500 000 million natives were to 
purchase, hire and live on the small parts of land reserved for them. 
 
The living conditions in the reserves or Bantustans were deplorable, since black people and other 
people did not have basic services and access to other necessities. In addition, the resultant shortage 
of land, housing and escalating poverty led to mushrooming informal settlements near urban areas, 
as people searched for employment and a way to make a living in these areas.
9
 
 
3 2 3 The urban land tenure of black people post 1910 
 
The urban areas were also heavily regulated by the Union Government, through the policies and 
legislation of separate development for different racial groups.
10
 These policies were given effect 
mainly through the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, but also through other related legislation. Section 
49 of the Group Areas Act of 1966 repealed the Group Areas Act 77 of 1977, which in turn 
repealed the original Group Areas Act 41 of 1950.
11
 The objects of the Group Areas Act were to 
introduce separate development according to race, and to control the use, occupation and ownership 
of land and all immovable property in urban areas, and in the racially designated areas.
12
  
 
Housing for black people in urban areas consisted of hostel accommodation, and later native or 
black townships, alongside informal settlements which surrounded them.
13
 This was still a 
continuation of the policies of segregation by the apartheid government. Townships houses and 
                                                          
8
 See section 1(1) (a) and (b) read with section 1(2) of the Natives’ Land Act. The reserve land put aside for black 
people and other racial groups first amounted to 8.3% of the total land under the Native Land Act of 1913, later 
expanded to 13%. See also: Khunou SF “Traditional leadership and independent Bantustans of South Africa: Some 
milestones of transformative constitutionalism beyond apartheid” (2009) 12 PER 81-360 at 84-90. 
9
 May J and Rankin S “The differentiation of the urbanization process under apartheid” (1991) 19 World 
Development 1351-1365. See also: Khunou 2009 (note 8 above). This system was merely a sub-system of 
governance under the control of the apartheid government. This is because the Bantustan authorities worked for the 
apartheid government, and in turn received salaries and other benefits such as positions within these Bantustans. 
10
 Schoombee JT “Group areas legislation – the political control of ownership and occupation of land” (1985) Acta 
Juridica 77-118; Maylam P “Explaining the apartheid city: 20 years of South African urban historiography” (1995) 
21 Journal of Southern African Studies 19-38 at 19, 27-34; Gassama IJ “Reaffirming faith in the dignity of each 
human being: The United Nations, NGOs, and apartheid” (1995) 19 Fordham International Law Journal 1464-1541 
at 1477-1478. 
11
 Schoombee 1985 (note 10 above) at 77. 
12
 Schoombee 1985 (note 10 above) at 78-82. 
13
 May and Rankin 1991 (note 9 above) at 1353; Maylam 1995 (note 10 above) at 22-33 and 33-35. 
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accommodation were arranged according to racial groups: black, Indian and coloured groups had 
their own separate townships. However, black townships were further divided into different slots 
according to languages and culture.
14
 This was to ensure that black people of different cultural 
heritage never united with each other or with Indians and coloureds. 
 
The housing and living conditions in these black or native townships were very poor, and still are in 
many parts. The housing consists of low-quality bizarre rows of houses joined together, with 
inadequate living space inside and outside.
15
 Furthermore, these houses were situated a great 
distance from the cities, making it hard to access certain services such as household necessities, 
quality healthcare, payment of rates, quality education, employment, and other basic services.
16
 
This social and economic history of South Africa, which includes the housing history as detailed 
above, demonstrates the historical primary causes of the current housing crisis in South Africa. 
 
What are the housing conditions of black people post 1994? 
 
3 2 4 The social and policy context of housing in South Africa 
  
The effects of the housing crisis caused by colonialism and apartheid, has continued to be keenly 
felt in the democratic South Africa. Concerted action from the current government in order to deal 
with this crisis was needed, taking into account the debilitating nature of this crisis coupled with 
worsening poverty levels.
17
 The current government has to date adopted various policies,
18
 laws
19
 
and other strategies to gradually reverse the impact of these past policies and laws. 
                                                          
14
 Maylam 1995 (note 10 above) at 22-33. 
15
 Maylam 1995 (note 10 above) at 30-36; Parnell S “South African cities: Perspectives from the ivory tower of 
urban studies” (1997) 891-906, available online at http://usj.sagepub.com/content/34/5-6/891 (accessed on 28 June 
2011). 
16
 Maylam 1995 (note 10 above); Parnell 1997 (note 15 above). 
17
 See Presidency Development Indicators (ch 1, n 14) and Leibbrandt M et al (ch 1, n 14) at 13-68. Leibbrandt M 
and others argue that more and more people are unemployed, and do not have access to basic necessities, with the 
net result that the poorest of the poor are becoming worse-off with inequality in all spheres of everyday existence 
being  the order of the day. However, the Statistics SA Census Report (2011) (ch 1, n 3) shows slight improvement. 
18
 White Paper on Housing: A new housing and strategy for South Africa (1994); People’s Housing Process (1998); 
Breaking New Ground Policy (2004), Inclusionary Housing Policy (2007); National Housing Code (2000, revised in 
2009); Department of Human Settlement Sector Strategy (2009-2014) on 2 December 2009. For a full account of 
housing policies, laws, see: Tissington K “A resource guide to housing in South Africa 1994: Legislation, policy, 
programmes and practice” (2011) available at: http://www.serisa.org/index.php?option=com_content 
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Despite the best efforts of the government to adopt legislative and other measures to address the 
housing situation in South Africa, the majority of people, mainly black people, still reside in 
informal settlements and in inadequate housing or buildings across the country.
20
 In addition, the 
Department of Human Settlements estimates the number of informal settlements to be more than 2 
700 in year 2010, while the national housing backlog stands at 2.1 million housing units.
21
 The 
living conditions of informal settlement residents are grim, since most people who reside in these 
informal settlements have limited to no access to basic services such as water, healthcare services, 
electricity, basic sanitation, and other amenities, the amenities that are available are of poor 
quality.
22
  
 
The living conditions of people residing in a number of dilapidated buildings in Johannesburg, and 
other cities are no better and cannot be described as adequate housing either. The people in these 
buildings live in overcrowded rooms, with limited to no basic services such as water, electricity, 
and basic sanitation. This is compounded by the fact that many people who live in these buildings 
are either low-income workers or unemployed people, who are preyed on by unscrupulous 
slumlords.
23
 
 
3 3 The purposes and values protected by the right of access to adequate housing 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
&view=article&id=17&Itemid=29 (accessed on 10 June 2011) at 57-59. These discussions were dominated by 
debates concerning who would bear the primary responsibility for providing housing, and what the respective roles 
of other stakeholders would be in the provision of housing in the democratic South Africa. 
19
 The main housing provision is section 26 of the Constitution. This section is then given effect by various pieces of 
legislation and policies, such as: Housing Act 107 of 1997 as amended, Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and 
Unlawful Occupation of land Act 19 of 1998; Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 as amended; National Norms and 
Standards for the Construction of Stand Alone Residential Dwellings Financed Through National Housing 
Programmes (2007); Social Housing Act 16 of 2008. 
20
 “South African President pledges urgent action to militate human settlements needs” Cities Alliance Report 18-
05-2011 available online at: http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/node/2043 (accessed on 20 June 2011); National 
Development Plan (2030). 
21
 National Development Plan (2030) (ch 1, n 3); Tissington resource guide 2010 (note 18 above) at 25-40, for more 
on the housing backlog and other challenges facing housing delivery in South Africa from 1994-2010. 
22
 Richards R, O’Leary B and Mutsonziwa K “Measuring the quality of life in informal settlements in South Africa” 
(2007) 81 Social Indicators Research Journal 375-388. 
23
 IRIN “South Africa: Slumming it in Jo’burg” Mopanitree Report 8-06-2011, available at: 
http://www.mopanetree.com/content/1638-south-africa-slumming-jo-burg.html (accessed on 25 June 2011). It is 
reported that there are about 1500 slum buildings in Johannesburg which were abandoned by their owners in early 
1994 during the emigration of white people. These buildings have now been ‘hijacked’ by slumlords who charge 
rent but do nothing to maintain the buildings. 
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3 3 1 Introduction 
 
Before turning to examining the particular purposes and values protected by the right of access to 
adequate housing, it is useful to briefly explore the reasons for the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution, in order to conceptualise the debate on the values and purposes protected 
by these rights.  Secondly, I intend to explore the purposes and values underpinning the socio-
economic rights in general as guaranteed in the Constitution, since all socio-economic rights are 
underpinned by a number of specific purposes and values which can be found in the Constitution 
and in case law.
24
  
 
The reasons for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution can be traced back to the 
political and legal history, and the transition to democracy in South Africa. The political and legal 
history entailed a complex web under which the majority of  black people were deprived of their 
civil and political rights by the then government, which took over from colonial powers and built on 
the infrastructure they had created. In addition, the majority of the people were also denied socio-
economic necessities through colonial and apartheid racist policies and laws that operated to 
arrogate the lion’s share of the country’s economic resources and opportunities to the minority, the 
white people.
25
  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of socio-economic rights was influenced by the material changes to the 
political and legal structure of South Africa following multi-party negotiations.
26
 This resulted in a 
move away from parliamentary sovereignty that dominated under apartheid to a system that 
entrenched judicial review, and guaranteed a number of rights in the Constitution, including socio-
                                                          
24
 The preamble to our Constitution is the starting point in this regards, and it provides thus: 
“…Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental     
human rights; 
… 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and 
….” 
Section 1(a) of the Constitution provides that our democracy is one founded on the values of human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
25
 See: Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1) at 25-45; 371-400. 
26
 Terreblanche 2003 (ch 1, n 1) at 95-138. For an account of South Africa’s transition to democracy, see: Spitz R 
and Chaskalson M The Politics of Transition: The Hidden History of South Africa’s Negotiated Settlement (2000). 
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economic rights.
27
 In particular, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress 
argued forcefully during the multi-party negotiations for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution, probably because they shared an understanding of the debilitating economic 
results of past policies and laws on the majority of the people, and the need to protect and promote a 
culture of human rights.   
 
Moreover, academics also argued for the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution.
28
 
Mureinik stressed the need to constitutionally guaranteed socio-economic rights in order to entrench 
a culture of justification under South African law. By this he meant that legislation and government 
action or inaction should be subject to judicial review for “sincerity and rationality” in the same 
way other rights not classified as economic rights are reviewed, because economic rights raised the 
same difficulties as other rights.
29
 Other academic writers opposed the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution, suggesting that socio-economic rights should be protected as Directive 
Principles of State Policy following the example of the provisions of the Indian Constitution. These 
directives would not be directly justiciable in courts, but would merely influence our 
jurisprudence.
30
 According to Davis, vesting unelected and unaccountable judges with powers to 
enforce socio-economic rights would give judges too much power and this would disturb the 
carefully balanced roles of each sphere of government to the detriment of the other two branches of 
government and civil society.
31
 
  
The arguments in favour of including socio-economic rights in the Constitution were later adopted 
by the Constitutional Court in Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter Certification 
                                                          
27
 Dugard J Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978); Jackie Dugard 2007 (ch 2, n 47) at 967-969. 
The legal system under apartheid was corrupted by the then government of the National Party through the 
appointment of judges sympathetic to its grand apartheid policies and laws, and through placing crude restrictions on 
judicial review, thereby impairing judicial independence and placing severe restrictions on the accountability of 
parliament. 
28
 Mureinik 1992 (ch 2, n 50).  
29
 Mureinik 1992 (ch 2, n 50) at 469-471. 
30
 Davis DM “The case against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a Bill of Rights except as directive 
principles” (1992) 8 SAJHR 475-490 at 486-487. Davis, however, subsequently became a supporter of a more 
substantive approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights under the Constitution. See in this regard: Davis 
2006 (ch 2, n 50); Davis 2010 (ch 1, n 5). 
31
 Davis 1992 (note 30 above) at 486. According to Davis, judges would become social engineers if socio-economic 
rights were included in the Constitution. 
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Judgement’), and other cases.32 The Court in the Certification judgment reasoned that socio-
economic rights gave rise to the same concerns as civil and political rights, because a court 
enforcing civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, equality, and  fair trial, would have 
separation of powers and budgetary consequences.
33
 The reasoning of the Court in this regard was 
upheld in the Grootboom case.
34
 
 
The combined implications of the Certification Judgment and Grootboom cases put an end to the 
debate on the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, and questions regarding their 
enforcement. The attention then shifted  to what were the most appropriate models of review and 
enforcement of socio-economic rights in particular cases. The acknowledgment of the justiciability 
of socio-economic rights by the Constitutional Court represents an awareness of the role of socio-
economic rights in redressing the political and legal injustices of the past that operated to strip the 
majority people of their human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution places a duty on courts, tribunals and forums when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights to “promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.” In addition, courts, tribunals and forums are required by the 
Constitution when performing their constitutionally mandated duties, to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, and developing the common law 
or customary law.
35
 Liebenberg argues that section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution confirms the focal 
role given by the Constitution to the values of “democracy, human dignity, equality and freedom in 
the interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights (...).”36 In addition, sections 7(1) and 39(1)(a) of 
the Constitution mandates the courts, tribunals and forums to take all the necessary steps to promote 
the values underpinning the rights in the Constitution. Liebenberg further argues that section 
                                                          
32
 Certification Judgment (ch 2, n 132) paras 76-78; Soobramoney (ch 1, n 39); Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 20.  
33
 Certification Judgment (ch 2, n 132) para 77-78. The Court dismissed the objections and held that these socio-
economic rights were to be regarded as justiciable rights. 
34
 Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 20. 
35
 See section 39 (2) of the Constitution; Liebenberg S “The value of freedom in interpreting socio-economic rights” 
(2008) Acta Juridica 149-176 at 149-150. 
36
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 97. 
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39(1)(a) is indicative that the Constitution is mainly concerned with positive as opposed to negative 
constitutionalism, and to redress past injustices.
37
 
 
The implications of this, according to Liebenberg, are that the constitutional values of human 
dignity, equality, freedom and other values “illuminate[s] important dimensions of socio-economic 
rights and are interlinked.”38 This means that all these constitutional values can be invoked to 
interpret and adjudicate socio-economic rights in a particular case. Depending on the facts of a the 
particular case, one or more of these values may be more relevant. 
 
3 3 2 The purposes and values underpinning section 26 
 
The Court in Grootboom
39
 endorsed and elaborated on the Soobramoney
40
 case with regard to the 
purposes and values protected by socio-economic rights under the Constitution. The Court reasoned 
that the Constitution guaranteed both civil and political rights, and that the rights in the Bill of 
Rights are inter-related, mutually sustaining and protect certain values and purposes.
41
 The Court 
also held that foundational values of human dignity, equality and freedom are denied to those who 
do not have food, clothing or shelter.
42
 
 
The implications of this are that the rights in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted and applied 
holistically and not in isolation, and must be interpreted and applied by our judiciary in ways that 
embrace the foundational values of human dignity, freedom and equality. This means that socio-
economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing must act as a vehicle for our 
                                                          
37
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 98. 
38
 Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 44-54 and 98-101. 
39
 Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) paras 1-2, and 23-24 and 83. 
40
 Soobramoney (ch 1, n 16) paras 8-9. 
41
 Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 23. The other emerging constitutional value that informs the interpretation of rights 
in the Bill of Rights, such as socio-economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing, is the 
constitutional value of ubuntu, see: English R “Ubuntu: The quest for an indigenous jurisprudence” (1996) 12 
SAJHR 641-648; Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 
15-24; Mokgoro JY “Ubuntu, the Constitution and the rights of non-citizens” (2010) 21 Stell LR 221-229; Cornell D 
& Marle V “Exploring ubuntu: Tentative reflections” (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 195-220; Metz T 
“Towards an African moral theory” (2007) 15 Journal of Political Philosophy 321-341; Roederer C & Moellendorf 
D Jurisprudence (2007) 1-653 at 441-462; Keevy I “Ubuntu versus the core values of the South African 
Constitution” (2009) 34 Journal of Juridical Science 19-58; Tshoose CI “The emerging role of the constitutional 
value of ubuntu for informal social security in South Africa” (2009) 3 African Journal of Legal Studies 12-19. 
42
 Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 23. 
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society to achieve substantive and meaningful social justice. The Court further reasoned that taking 
into account the values protected by socio-economic rights, including the right of access to housing 
was not merely a theoretical construct, but was critical in the adjudication of socio-economic.
43
 
 
Academic writers
44
 including  Liebenberg elaborated and endorsed the views of the Court in this 
regard in the context of positive duties imposed on the government by socio-economic rights, the 
purpose being to facilitate and provide access to social benefits.
45
 She argues that the value of 
human dignity as a relational value and its respect requires us to focus especially on the “conditions 
of material disadvantage and its impact on different groups in our society.”46 In addition, human 
dignity requires us to respect personal independence and choices.
47
 Furthermore, Liebenberg 
fortifies these arguments by arguing that seeing the value of human dignity in this light does not 
mean the adoption of an inflexible constitutional value. It means viewing human dignity as an 
evolving constitutional value which changes with the socio-economic conditions in society where 
necessary.
48
 This means that the government should intervene where necessary to limit liberties of 
some people in society in order to fulfil the socio-economic rights constitutional guarantees, 
however, such interference by the government should not unduly take away their “basic human 
capabilities.”49 
 
The implications of this are that human dignity as a value is important in the interpretation and 
application of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, including socio-economic rights. There are 
however, challenges placed on human dignity by the availability of resources in society and this 
needs to be addressed by the government and others. Resource availability and challenges should 
not be used by government as an excuse to escape its constitutional duty to fulfil and protect socio-
                                                          
43
 Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) para 83. 
44
 Liebenberg S “The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-31; 
Liebenberg S and Goldblatt B “The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under the South 
Africa’s transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-360; McLean 2009 (ch 1, n 9) at 138-143; Mbazira 
2009 (ch 2, n 114) at 135-137.  
45
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 4-5. 
46
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 9-11. 
47
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 9. 
48
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 9-11. 
49
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 10-11. 
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economic rights, because human dignity is inherent in all human beings.
50
 The resource challenges 
should instead make government conscious of the need to make priority decisions in order to 
respond to those individual or group needs that are most urgent, in the sense that they are needed for 
human survival.
51
 This is because we are somehow not complete as a society if others are bereft of  
the ability to function as equals in the social and economic life of society.
52
  
 
To this end, the current model of reasonableness review developed by the Court for interrogating 
whether the government has complied with its positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights 
must place human dignity at the centre of its enquiry.
53
 This would require the Court to interrogate 
with a varied scrutiny the reasons proffered by the government for its failure to fulfil its positive 
duties imposed by socio-economic rights, depending on the nature of the claims at issue. If the 
claims at issue concern the failure by the government to protect, promote and fulfil access to 
resources needed for survival and participation in society, then the standard of judicial scrutiny in 
this context should be intense, otherwise our democracy would be in danger of becoming 
meaningless.
54
 
 
Liebenberg and Goldblatt have further developed these arguments in the context of the 
constitutional value of equality.
55
 They argue that the approach that the courts, especially the 
Constitutional Court should embrace in its equality jurisprudence in the context of socio-economic 
rights, is one that embraces substantive equality.
56
 They argue that when the Court interrogates 
whether the particular government policy complies with the reasonableness review model, the Court 
should ask itself whether the particular government policy advances substantive equality.
57
 This 
approach to equality “requires full acknowledgment of the racial, gender, social, economic, cultural 
                                                          
50
 Kant I Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (Second Section: 
Transition From Popular Moral Philosophy To The Metaphysic Of Morals) (2010); Dawood and Another v Minister 
of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) paras 34-35; Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) 
para 83. 
51
 For a detailed discussion of the duties of courts to distinguish between urgent basic needs and general basic needs, 
see: Bilchitz 2002 (ch 2, n 50) at 486-489. 
52
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 11-13. 
53
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 21-30. 
54
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 21-30. 
55
 Liebenberg & Goldblatt 2007 (note 44 above) at 340-348 and 348-360. 
56
 Liebenberg & Goldblatt 2007 (note 44 above) at 340-448 and 348-360. 
57
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 14-21; Liebenberg & Goldblatt 2007 (note 44 above) at 340-348 and 348-360. 
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and other differences between groups in society.”58 In addition, this approach to equality also 
requires a contextual approach which is capable of identifying the “real situations of disadvantages 
experienced by various groups in the light of our history, as well as current social, economic, 
political and gender relations.”59 This is because the search for equal worth or dignity is not a  quest 
for uniformity, but a quest to obliterate the disadvantages and inferior status that attach to 
membership of particular groups.
60
 
 
Bilchitz, on the other hand, argues that societies should not strive to ensure equal treatment of 
individuals, but should instead focus on what it can do to create conditions conducive to individuals 
affected by its rules, so that these individuals can live a good life on their own terms.
61
 This means 
that society must not seek to achieve equality through socio-economic rights but must seek it 
through the recognition of the equal importance of each individual’s life, by ensuring that it 
provides each individual with the necessary tools to live a meaningful life. The danger inherent in 
Bilchitz’s approach to the values underpinning socio-economic rights is that they may lead to 
jurisprudential and policy approaches which are not effectively designed to redress the structural 
inequalities that exist in South Africa as a result of the economic and political history of South 
Africa. The beneficiaries of apartheid for instance, who continue to benefit from the past injustices 
could by the application of this theory of equality, be provided with more tools to acquire more 
economic resources, resulting in even more inequality in South Africa.
62
 
 
The other constitutional value which is critical to the interpretation and adjudication of socio-
economic rights,  is the constitutional value of freedom.
63
 Liebenberg endorses and elaborates on 
the arguments of Jennifer Nedelsky by arguing that the value of freedom has the potential to lead us 
                                                          
58
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 14-21; Liebenberg & Goldblatt 2007 (note 44 above) at 340-348 and 348-360. 
See also: Chenwi L and McLean K “‘A woman’s home is her castle?’ –poor women and housing inadequacy in 
South Africa” (2009) 25 SAJHR 517-545 at 527-529. 
59
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 14-21; Liebenberg & Goldblatt 2007 (note 44 above) at 340-348 and 348-
360; Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights (ch 2, n 50) at 57-74. 
60
 Liebenberg 2005 (note 44 above) at 14. 
61
 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights (ch 2, n 50) at 64-65. 
62
 For a discussion of an individual-based and group based conceptions of equality, see: Albertyn and Goldblatt 
1998 (ch 1, n 5) at 257-258. What Bilchitz advocates for would only work after the group-based economic 
inequalities and denial of human dignity have been dealt with comprehensively. 
63
 Liebenberg 2008 (note 35 above); Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 97-101. For a different view, see: Bilchitz 
Poverty and Fundamental Rights (ch 2, n 50) at 57-74. 
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to the substantive content of socio-economic rights.
64
 Liebenberg further argues that the 
reasonableness review model developed by the Court has to be applied in the  light of the value of 
freedom as well, so as not to restrict the development of people’s capacity for self-determination.65 
The implications of taking the value of freedom into account are that socio-economic rights need to 
be adjudicated in the light of the freedoms implicated by the particular claims. This will not only 
propel the courts towards the substantive content of socio-economic rights, but will also allow the 
ordinary people involved to participate in decisions that affect their socio-economic conditions, and 
to be able to choose freely what they want to do with their own lives.  
 
The other very useful and often overlooked constitutional value that has emerged recently,
66
 is the 
constitutional value of ubuntu. The constitutional value of ubuntu is critical in the interpretation and 
adjudication of the rights in the Bill of Rights, such as socio-economic rights, including the right of 
access to adequate housing because of its potential to contribute to the substantive conception of 
socio-economic rights and other rights. The constitutional value of ubuntu has been often 
overlooked and under-analysed because of the misunderstanding that surrounds it.
67
 
 
Ubuntu has been defined as: 
   
                                                          
64
 Liebenberg 2008 (note 35 above) at 149-151. 
65
 Liebenberg 2008 (note 35 above) at 154-157 and Liebenberg 2010 (ch1, n 5) 165-173. 
66
 See: S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) paras 223, 263 and 307-308; Hoffmann v South African Airways 
2001 (1) SA (1) (CC) para 38; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37 ; Bhe 
v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) paras 45 and 163; City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others [2006] 2 All SA 240 (W) paras 62-3; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) 
paras 68-69 and 113-121. Academic writers have also attempted to explain and analyse the constitutional value of 
ubuntu, see: English 1996 (note 41 above); Mokgoro 1998 (note 41 above) Mokgoro 2010 (note 41 above); Cornell 
& Marle 2005 (note 41 above); Metz 2007 (note 41 above); Roederer & Moellendorf 2007 (note 41 above); Tshoose 
2009 (note 41 above). 
67
 I argue elsewhere that the courts, including the Constitutional Court and academic writers have misunderstood the 
constitutional value of ubuntu by conflating it with the value of human dignity, and by failing to account for the 
components that make up the popular maxims that have erroneously been held to constitute the value of ubuntu. See 
Radebe S “Ubuntu and the law: Deconstructing and claiming back ubuntu” (2011) unpublished article by author. I 
argue that ubuntu is the African way of living, and embraces certain components that make up the maxims such as 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu or motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe, and is related to human dignity but not the 
same. 
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African philosophy, which covers humanness, respect for humanity, moral virtue, 
interconnectedness, compassion, group solidarity and group-centered individualism, prioritising 
the interests of the most vulnerable, amongst other aspects of the idea of ubuntu.
68
  
 
Ubuntu has also been defined in terms of popular African maxims such as umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu or motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe (in IsiZulu and Sesotho translations).
69
 These 
phrases can be roughly translated  to mean a person is a person because of other people.  
 
The courts have underscored the importance of the constitutional value of ubuntu in a variety of 
contexts such as the right to life,
70
 evictions,
71
 and discrimination, amongst others. The Court has 
held that the process of evictions must be undertaken in the  light of the spirit of ubuntu. The Court 
further developed the constitutional value of ubuntu in Hoffmann, when it reasoned in the context of 
its unfair discrimination jurisprudence using the constitutional value of ubuntu as an interpretive 
tool, that people who are living with the HIV virus must be “treated with compassion and 
understanding, we must show ubuntu towards them.”72 
 
It can therefore be argued that ubuntu is a critical interpretive tool in the context of socio-economic 
rights, and that the right of access to adequate housing and its potential has yet to be realised. 
Ubuntu can act as a catalyst in the search for the substantive content of these rights. Ubuntu in this 
light is very useful, because it emphasises active community responsibility and solidarity in the 
alleviation of poverty, homelessness, hunger, and other social ills, in contrast to other constitutional 
values such as human dignity with their close associations with liberal individualism.  
 
Viewing Ubuntu in this context would also mean that ubuntu shuns the idea of someone going 
hungry, be it a neighbour or a random man in the street, ubuntu also disapproves of the 
normalisation of the crude reality of people living in homelessness or inadequate housing, with no 
access to affordable health, clean water, and other basic necessities which they need in order to live 
as human beings. For example, it is not unusual for a traditional healer to heal someone in African 
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 Mokgoro 2010 (note 41 above) at 224-226. 
69
 Mokgoro 2010 (note 41 above at 225. 
70
 Makwanyane (note 66 above) paras 130-131. 
71
 Rand Properties (note 66 above) paras 62-63; PE Municipality (note 66 above) paras 37 and 43. 
72
 Hoffmann (note 66 above) para 38. 
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societies, and to allow for payment later when the person is in a better position to pay for the 
services rendered. This is because the health and life of a person in African societies is sacred and 
has always been put above profits or personal gain. Ubuntu also disapproves of the abuse of women 
and children in whatever form.
73
 African societies are steeped in the idea of sharing things with the 
less fortunate, be it salt with the neighbour or water and shelter with a lost or passing stranger.  
 
Ubuntu can act as a useful interpretive tool for the Court to use when giving  substantive content to 
the right of access to adequate housing. The provision of adequate housing could also be achieved 
through community and government partnerships to build houses for residents of informal 
settlements or those in inadequate housing. The government could  provide financial and other 
resources to supplement what is contributed by the community concerned. This would be consonant 
with the component of ubuntu that shuns the idea of human suffering of whatever kind. 
 
Housing in this context of ubuntu would depend on the location of the community,  the culture of 
that community, the size of the family, and what is generally regarded as habitable housing by the 
community concerned. This means that if the community decided to assist an individual family with 
the building of a house, that house would look more or less similar to houses in the same 
community, and would take into account the culture of the community. The size of the house would 
depend on the size of houses occupied by families of similar size in that community.  
 
Habitability is also important, but the family cannot lay claim to a house with electricity when other 
houses in the community do not have electricity, and cannot lay claim to a house with a water tap 
when the whole community relies on other means to source water, nor can it lay claim to a brick 
                                                          
73
 Women are very important in African societies, not because of their potential as caregivers, but because it has 
always been understood that societies would not survive long without them. This is where maxims such as umama 
wesizwe (mother of the nation) originate. Similarly with children, a child was and still is regarded in many African 
communities as belonging to the community, not only because the family lineage survives through him or her, but 
for other reasons as well. These included caring for the child, which entailed disciplining the child when the said 
child misbehaved. In the absence of his or her biological parents, any adult in the community would remonstrate 
with the child. In addition, when a child needed help in situations where his or her parents were not around, any 
adult or parent in the community would voluntarily step in and assist the child, see in this regard: Tydesley J 
Nefertiti-Egypt’s Sun Queen (1998) 1-232; Nafukho MF “Ubuntu worldview: A traditional African view of adult 
learning in the workplace” (2006), available at: http://adh.sagepub.com//content/8/3/408.full.pdf (accessed on 30 
June 2011) 408-415 at 412-413; Familusi OO “The Yoruba culture of ASO EBI (Group Uniform) in socio-ethical 
context” (2010) Lumina 1-11 at 6. 
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house when the community as a whole does not have brick houses. The focus of ubuntu is not only 
the well-being of the individual, but the whole community.  
  
In the next section, I examine how the purposes and values protected by the right to housing have 
been developing within an international and regional law context. 
 
3 4 Relevant international human rights law 
 
3 4 1 Introduction 
 
The Constitution contains various provisions that place duties on courts, forums or tribunals to 
consider international law in adjudication.
74
 These duties have also been elaborated upon and 
endorsed by our courts, especially by the Court.
75
  In doing so, courts, forums or tribunals are  also 
required to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
76
 The Court in Makwanyane 
reasoned that international law and foreign sources are important in the interepretation of the 
Constitution, because they provide useful insight into how similar legal problems are dealt with 
outside of the local system.
77
 The Court further defined international law that was relevant for the 
interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights in terms of section 39(1)(b), as including both 
binding and non-binding instruments, reports, and law generated by various human rights bodies 
under the United Nations, and through the regional human rights system.
78
 
 
                                                          
74
 Sections 39(1)(b), 37(4)(b)(i) and  233 of the Constitution. The combined reading of these sections also means 
that South Africa follows the dualist tradition as opposed to the monist tradition. For more on this see: International 
Commission of Jurists “Courts and the legal enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: Comparative 
experiences of justiciability” (2008) International Commission of Jurists Report Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Series: No 2, available online at http://www.icj.org/dwn/img_prd/ESCR1.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2011) 1-116 at 
19.  
75
 Makwanyane (note 66 above) paras 33-39; Azanian Peoples Organization (Azapo) and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others [1996]; ZACC 16; 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) paras 26-32; Certification Judgment 
(ch 2, n 132) para 91; Grootboom (ch 1, n 16) paras 26-30; Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
and Others [2007] ZACC 22; 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) paras 56-57; Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa [2004] ZACC 5; 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) paras 33-35; Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa [2011] ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (hereafter ‘Glenister 2’). See also: Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 
101-118. 
76
 See section 39 (1) read with 39 (2); Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 102-104. 
77
 Makwanyane (note 66 above) para 34 and 36. 
78
 Makwanyane (note 66 above) para 35; Glenister 2 (note 75 above). 
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The South African government signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 1994,
79
 but has not ratified this covenant to date. It has however signed and ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (‘ICCPR’), which protects civil and 
political rights, and many other important United Nations treaties such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).
80
 I 
proceed to analyse these treaties and their specific implications for the right to adequate housing in 
the sections which follow. 
 
3 4 2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The protection of the right to housing and other social rights is now widely recognised in 
international human rights.
81
 The ICESCR, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948),
82
 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965),
83
 the Convention on the Right of the Child (1989),
84
 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979),
85
 the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2006),
86
 the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951),
87
 and the 
International Labour Organisation recognise economic, social and cultural rights.
88
 Article 11(1) of 
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 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted on 16 December 1966 (entered into 
force on 3 January 1976) 993 NTS 3. 
80
  Pieterse 2004 (ch 2, n 136) at 883. 
81
 The discussion of the ICESCR in this section focuses in the main on the right to housing or the right to adequate 
housing as found in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, and elaborated upon by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in its General Comments and its reports and concluding observations on State reports under the 
periodic reporting system in articles 16-19 and 21-22. The protection of the right to adequate housing in other 
treaties is mentioned in passing to show the growing protection of this right in other areas. The focus is therefore on 
the ICESCR and relevant regional human rights systems because of the relatively evolved jurisprudence under these 
systems. 
82
 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
83
 Article 5(iii) read with article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. 
84
 Articles 16(1) and 27(3) of the Convention on the Right of the Child. 
85
 Article 14(h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
86
 Articles 9(1)(a) and 28(1)(d) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
87
 Article 21 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
88
 Articles 2 and 5(2) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 117 Concerning Basic Aims 
and Standards of Social Policy (1962); article 88(1) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
No.110 Concerning Conditions of Employment of Plantation Workers (1958); International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989). The other 
international human rights law instruments that protect the right to housing are: article 17 of the International 
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the ICESCR imposes duties on State Parties to improve the living standards of their people, and to 
take appropriate legislative and other measures to realise housing and other rights.
89
 Articles 11(1) 
of the ICESCR provides that:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard 
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to 
ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of 
international cooperation based on free consent. 
 
 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR has been elaborated upon by the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter ‘the Committee’) in its General Comments and 
concluding observations on State Parties’ reports under the ICESCR.90 The Committee’s General 
Comments seek to provide clarity on the normative content of the rights and the nature of 
obligations imposed on States’ Parties to the Covenant. In addition, concluding observations on 
State reports in terms of the reporting procedures in Part IV of the Covenant encourage State Parties 
to remedy the non-compliance with the ICESCR. They follow a dialogue between the State Party 
and the Committee during the consideration of the State Party’s report that sometimes leads to the 
identification of clear violations of the ICESCR and recommendations.
91
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); articles 43(1)(d) and (3) International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990); articles 49, 53, 85 and 134 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). 
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 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR. State Parties’ obligations in respect of article 11 and the other rights protected in the 
Covenant are also encored in article 2 of the ICESCR. See also: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3 (Fifth Session, 1990) The Nature of State Parties Obligations (art 2(1) of 
the Covenant) UN doc E/1991/23. General Comment No. 3 provides detailed guidelines on the nature and scope of 
State Parties’ obligations under the ICESCR. 
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 See: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4 (Sixth 
Session, 1991) Article 11(1): The right to adequate housing, UN doc E/C 12/13/1991. Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR 
read with General Comment No. 4 and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No.7 (Sixteenth Session, 1997) Article 11(1) of the Covenant: Forced evictions, UN doc E/C 20/05/1997. General 
Comment No.7 makes provision for the “right to adequate housing” in evictions. The Committee consists of 
eighteen independent experts on economic, social and cultural rights issues, whose mandate is to assist the United 
Nations Economic and Social Rights Council to perform its functions on the implementation of the ICESCR. The 
Committee also monitors State Parties’ compliance with their obligations under the Covenant through a reporting 
procedure, and generates interpretive guides in the form of General Comments. 
91
  Riedel E “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of 
Human Rights: A Texbook at 142-143. It is noteworthy that General Comments and concluding observations of 
treaty bodies like the Committee are not legally binding, but are very influential in the assessment of human rights 
compliance in countries, See in this regard: O’Flaherty M “The concluding observations of United Nations Human 
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General Comment No. 4 notes that many people in both developing and developed countries live in 
inadequate houses, and that some are homeless.
92
 As General Comment No 4 notes, there are many 
reasons for this stark reality. They include challenges faced by State Parties in securing the right to 
adequate housing, and the provision of insufficient information on the nature and scope of these 
difficulties by State Parties.
93
 General Comment No.4 provides an elaborate set of criteria regarding 
what would constitute adequate housing within the scope of the ICESCR, and how this right should 
be interpreted.
94
  
 
Housing in this context should be seen as constituting more than a roof over one’s head, but also as 
“a place to live somewhere in peace, security and dignity.”95 It must also be adequate in the sense 
that it provides the following elements: adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, 
adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regards 
to work and basic facilities – all at a reasonable cost.”96 The right to housing in this context places 
justifiably onerous positive duties on State Parties, and recognises the critical role that housing 
plays in people’s lives. In addition, the Committee notes further that in order for shelter to be 
adequate, it must take into account certain factors, in particular legal security of tenure, availability 
of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, 
and cultural adequacy.
97
 Despite these detailed guidelines on housing, people living within many 
State Parties’ borders are still struggling to access housing owing to many challenges faced by State 
Parties. However, the Committee itself had been unable to appreciate the full nature of these 
difficulties owing to incomplete information from the State Parties.
98
 This is also illustrated by the 
Committee’s concluding observations on the right to adequate housing.99 For example, the 
Committee concluded against the Zimbabwean government when it noted that the provision of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rights treaty bodies” (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 27-52; Low JE “Engaging with the United Nations treaty 
bodies: A fruitful dialogue?” (2006) 13 Austl. Int’lLJ 57-96. 
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 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 4. 
93
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 5. 
94
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) paras 7-10. 
95
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 7. 
96
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 7. 
97
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 8. 
98
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 5. 
99
 See: Concluding Observations of the CESCR: Zimbabwe, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1/Add.12 (1997) paras 13; 
Concluding Observations of the CESCR: Argentina, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1/Add.38 (1999) paras 35-36; Concluding 
Observations of the CESCR: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and 
the Overseas Dependent Territories, UN Doc. E/C. 12/GBR/CO/5 (2009) paras 16 and 29-31. 
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shelter by the extended family prevented the homelessness of some people in Zimbabwe, but 
housing provision remained inadequate, with many people living in illegal structures or 
unauthorised housing in Zimbabwe.
100
 
 
According to the Committee, the right to adequate housing applies equally to both genders, despite 
the reference to “himself and his family” in article 11(1) of the ICESCR.101 In addition, the right to 
adequate housing must apply free of discrimination as to age, economic status, group, as mentioned 
in article 2(2) of the ICESCR, which prohibits discrimination on listed grounds.
102
 Furthermore, the 
Committee has observed that the right to adequate housing should be interpreted in a generous and 
wide manner.
103
 This means that this right must not be seen as just a roof over one’s head or a 
commodity, but that account should be taken of other practical factors such as cultural suitability, 
size, location, and materials used to build the house.
104
 
 
The Committee further notes that there are certain steps that must be taken immediately to secure 
the right to adequate housing, regardless of the State’s level of development.105 These steps may 
include the government’s non-interference with existing housing rights, and the creation of an 
enabling environment for people to help themselves in the promotion and protection of their right to 
adequate housing.
106
 States Parties must seek international assistance and co-operation in 
accordance with articles 11(1), 22 and 23 of the ICESCR where the steps that are required to realise 
the right to adequate housing are beyond the State Parties’ maximum available resources.107 The 
implications of this are that States are not required to exhaust their public purse in the realisation of 
the right to adequate housing at the expense of other rights like the right to health, but must seek 
assistance when they need more resources. 
 
                                                          
100
 Concluding Observations of CESCR: Zimbabwe (note 99 above) para 13. The Zimbabwean government was 
urged to take measures aimed at correcting this situation in line with the Covenant. 
101
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 6. 
102
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 6. 
103
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 7. 
104
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 7. 
105
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 10. 
106
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 10. 
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 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 10. 
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Finally, the Committee observed that the steps that State Parties are required to take in order to 
achieve the full realisation of the right to adequate housing will differ from state to state, and the 
Covenant requires each State Party to take whatever steps necessary to achieve the full realisation 
of the right to adequate housing.
108
 The taking of these steps will still be in line with the ICESCR 
since any steps can be taken by the States for this purpose. However, the said steps must be 
comprehensive and democratic.
109
 This means that State Parties to the Covenant have a wide 
discretion on which measures to adopt for the purposes of ensuring the right to adequate housing, as 
long as these measures are consistent with a democratic society which respects the human rights 
and the guidelines set out in this General Comment. 
 
The Committee also elaborated on Article 11(1) of the ICESCR in the context of evictions in 
General Comment No.7. The Committee notes that evictions are not compatible with the provisions 
of the ICESCR. The Committee also notes the seriousness of forced evictions, and impresses upon 
State Parties the need to take all the necessary steps to ensure security of tenure  through legal 
protection for all people against forced evictions. In addition, the Committee notes that human 
rights must be taken into account whenever evictions are considered, and that State Parties need to 
comply with the obligations imposed by the Covenant on State Parties,
110
 by ensuring in this 
context that where evictions are inevitable, alternative accommodation is provided to those about to 
be affected by evictions.
111
 
 
Leckie notes that State Parties have often relied on the loose formulation of article 2 to attempt to 
justify their non-compliance with the obligations imposed by the ICESCR.
112
 The broad 
formulation of article 2 does not imply that the Covenant does not impose concrete duties on State 
Parties. These duties have been interpreted through the General Comments of the Committee to 
establish important principles pertaining to the realisation of social rights, including the minimum 
essentials that State Parties are required to provide.
113
 State Parties’ duties have further been 
                                                          
108
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 12. 
109
 General Comment No. 4 (note 90 above) para 12. 
110
 Such as those imposed on State Parties by Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
111
 General Comment No.7 (note 90 above) paras 1-16 
112
 Leckie S “The human right to housing” in Eide, Krause C and Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Texbook (2001) 149-168 at 154. 
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elaborated upon by the Committee to deal with justifications based on a lack of available 
resources.
114
  
 
State Parties to the ICESCR have an obligation in terms of article 2(1) of the ICESCR to realise the 
rights protected in the ICESCR, including the right to adequate housing, progressively through 
legislation, as well as a wide array of other measures. State Parties’ duties to progressively realise 
the rights in the ICESCR have been elaborated upon by the Committee in General Comment No. 
3.
115
 Progressive realisation in this context means the taking of steps to achieve the full realisation 
of these rights, but State Parties are in addition to this, required to prioritise their resources to 
achieve the minimum core in the immediate and short term.
116
 This, according to the Committee, 
means that a State Party that has a large number of people living without basic shelter and housing, 
is failing to meet its duties under the ICESCR.
117 
 
 
The other way in which the Committee has assisted in clarifying the State Parties’ duties arising 
from the Covenant in relation to the right to adequate housing, is through classifying the obligations 
arising out of ICESCR into three sets of obligations - the obligation to respect, protect, promote, 
and fulfill.
118 
 The obligation to respect in the context of housing has been said to require the State 
and all its agents to refrain from interfering in any manner with the individual’s enjoyment or 
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 General Comment No. 3 (note 89 above) para 10; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, see Guide No. 10. The Maastricht Guidelines elaborates on the Limburg Principles with regard to 
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117
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promote, and fulfil. 
   
           
   
64 
 
fulfillment of this right.
119
 The duty to protect in the context of housing, obliges the State and its 
organs to prevent the contravention of these rights by any other person or non-state person.
120
 In 
addition, the duty to promote in the context of housing requires the State to take certain steps to 
make sure that no actions or conduct is taken to intentionally undermine the right to adequate 
housing.
121
 This also requires the State to take various measures, legislative and policy measures, to 
make sure that this right is promoted and not undermined.
122
  
 
In the context of widespread homelessness and inadequate shelter, a critical obligation is that of the 
State to fulfil the right of everyone to adequate housing.This obligation requires the State to take 
positive steps to progressively fulfill the right to adequate housing. These steps may involve the 
allocation of public funds and other measures such as “government regulation of the economy and 
land market, housing subsidies, monitoring rent levels and other housing costs, the provision of 
public housing, basic services, taxation and subsequent redistributive economic measures.”123 
 
The ICESCR has recently been strengthened by the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR.
124
 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR makes provision for an individual complaints 
and inquiry procedure before the Committee. This procedure allows individuals or groups to submit 
complaints to the Committee and for complaints or communications to be submitted on their behalf, 
with good justification.
125
 Once this Protocol enters into force, it will add significant impetus to the 
protection and promotion of economic, social and cultural rights and the mandate of the Committee. 
 
How does the ICESCR apply to the right of access to adequate housing? Liebenberg argues that the 
ICESCR is critical in the interpretation of sections 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution because the 
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ICESCR played a major role in the drafting of these sections as a source of inspiration for their 
drafting.
126
 This is illustrated by the reference in the Constitution and the ICESCR to concepts of 
“the taking of reasonable  legislative and other measures,” “progressive realisation,and the 
limitations imposed by “available resources”127  
 
The Court in Grootboom reasoned that there were differences between the provisions of the 
Constitution and the ICESCR with regard to the socio-economic rights formulations, and that these 
differences were important in interpreting the ICESCR provisions and in determining their 
influence on the Constitution, in particular the right of access to adequate housing.
128
 The Court 
reasoned further that these differences were that the ICESCR made provision for “a right to 
adequate housing whereas the Constitution made provision for the right of “access to adequate 
housing, section 26(1).”129 The other difference between the ICESCR and the Constitution was 
noted as the requirement under the Constitution, which  “obligates the State to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures while the ICESCR required …state parties to take appropriate steps 
which must include legislation.”130 The implication of this has been a great deal of uncertainty on 
the overall relationship between the ICESCR and the Constitution, despite the Court accepting the 
‘progressive realisation’ concept as consonant with that found in the Constitution.131 
 
The ICESCR remains a very important reference point in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
right of access to adequate housing, despite the Court’s distinguishing between the Constitution and 
the right to adequate housing in the ICESCR. I now turn to examine the regional human rights 
system. 
 
3 4 3 The African regional human rights system 
 
3 4 3 1 Introducing the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
                                                          
126
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Civil and political rights, as well as socio-economic rights, are also protected in regional human 
rights systems. Of particular relevance to South Africa is the African regional human rights 
system.
132
 Economic, social and cultural rights are fully enforceable together with other human 
rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Charter’). This is 
abundantly clear from the provisions of the African Charter, which does not draw a distinction 
between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights.
133
 This means that the 
rights in the African Charter are indivisible, as confirmed by the African Commission’s 
jurisprudence.
134
 
 
The African Charter also does not make compliance and fulfilment of any duties imposed on State 
Parties, dependent on the available resources, as far as economic, social and cultural rights are 
concerned, a huge deviation from the provisions of the ICESCR. This deviation by the African 
Charter from the ICESCR was soon corrected by the African Commission, when it imported the 
idea of taking into account available resources in fulfilling socio-economic rights. This was done 
because of  the African Commission’s awareness of the pressing poverty levels and inappropriate 
allocation of resources in the region which made it difficult to meet the challenges posed by 
economic, social and cultural rights.
135
 The African Commission also imported from the ICESCR 
the principle that State Parties retain the core duties to take meaningful, targeted and non-
discriminatory steps in complying with the obligations imposed by the African Charter.
136
 
 
It is noteworthy that there is a limited number of economic, social and cultural rights in the African 
Charter, due to the minimalist approach that was adopted when it was drafted. The consequences of 
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this minimalist approach have been omissions of crucial human rights, such as the right to social 
security, the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, 
and the right to the progressive improvement of of living conditions.
137
 However, the omission of 
these crucial human rights was corrected by the African Commission through its adoption of the 
implied rights theory.
138
 The African Commission arguably developed the implied rights theory, a 
theory that implies the existence of other rights through the combined reading and interpretation of 
expressly guaranteed rights by applying Article 60 of the African Charter.
139
 
 
The preamble to the African Charter affirms the values of equality, justice and dignity, as well as 
freedom as critical to the achievements of the goals and aspirations of the African people. In 
addition, it confirms its interconnectedness to the international human rights regime through the 
confirmation of the importance of co-operation between States regionally and internationally, and 
taking account of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the quest for a 
better life for the African people.
140
  
 
The African Charter guarantees a number of economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right 
to work,
141
 right to health,
142
 right to education,
143
 and the right to a general and satisfactory 
environment.
144
 However, the African Charter does not expressly guarantee the right to housing, the 
right to social security, and the right to food. This has attracted criticism from academic 
commentators.
145
 However, some of these gaps in the African Charter, and criticisms have since 
been addressed by the African Commission in its interpretation of various provisions of the African 
Charter in its individual communications procedure.
146
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The African Charter does not expressly protect the right to adequate housing. However, its other 
sister human rights instruments expressly protect this right amongst other rights.
147
 Article 20(2)(a) 
of the African Charter on the Rights of the Child requires Member States to “take appropriate steps 
to provide assistance to the parents and other persons responsible for the child in case of need with 
support regarding nutrition, health, education clothing and housing in accordance with their means 
and national conditions.”148 However, this provision does not usurp the primary role of parents and 
other persons responsible for the child to care for the child because the duties on Member States are 
secondary in nature. They are only activated when the primary caregivers are unable to provide for 
the material needs of the child.
149
 
 
It has been argued that the most significant contribution of the African Charter on the Rights of the 
Child is that it is detailed compared to the African Charter in its identification of the nature and 
obligations arising out of economic, social and cultural rights.
150
 This makes it easier for Member 
States and others to identify their duties with precision, and also makes it easier for those relying on 
its provisions to enforce the rights protected in it.
151
 
 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa also protects women’s right to adequate housing.152  Article 16 of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Rights of Women provides that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Communication 
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Women shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions in a 
healthy environment. To ensure this right, State Parties shall grant to women, whatever their 
marital status, access to adequate housing.
153
 
 
The implications of article 16 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Right of Women are that 
Member States are required by this Protocol and the African Charter to take positive steps to ensure 
that women enjoy all economic, social and cultural rights.
154
 In the context of the right to adequate 
housing, Member States must ensure women’s full access to adequate housing regardless of their 
marital status. This proviso seems to also entrench and recognise African women’s independence, 
and the need to treat them as equals in all aspects of life. The Protocol to the African Charter on the 
Rights of Women differs however, from the African Charter on the Rights of the Child because it 
does not have its own monitoring mechanism that complements those under the African Charter, 
compared to the African Charter on the Rights of the Child, which does.
155
 The Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women can be enforced in the African Commission and African 
Court. 
 
Before I turn to examine the jurisprudence of the African Commission on housing rights, it is 
important to address the status of the recently developed Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (hereafter ‘the Principles and Guidelines’), and the State Reporting Guidelines for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(hereafter ‘State Reporting Guidelines’).156 This is because the Principles and Guidelines and the 
State Reporting Guidelines cannot be separated from the discussion of the African Commission’s 
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social rights jurisprudence because they may prove significant in the future development and 
interpretation of economic, social and cultural rights by the African Commission and the African 
Court.
157
 
 
The Working Group was established by the African Commission at its Ordinary Session held on the 
23 November-7 December 2004.
158
 The Principles and Guidelines and the State Reporting 
Guidelines were drafted by the Working Group pursuant to this mandate. In addition, they are 
aimed at further elaborating on the content of the economic, social and cultural rights in the African 
Charter in so far as there are gaps in its content. To that end, they lay down general principles of 
interpretation, elaborate on the nature of Member States’ duties arising out of the African Charter, 
and elaborate on the express and implied rights in the African Charter.
159
 The State Reporting 
Guidelines aim to guide and encourage State Parties to comply with their obligations in terms of the 
African Charter.
160
 
 
The Principles and Guidelines elaborate on the right to housing even though it is not expressly 
protected by the African Charter.
161
 The Principles and Guidelines recall that the right to housing is 
not expressly guaranteed in the African Charter, but was impliedly protected by the combination of 
the right to property, the right to enjoy the best attainable standard of mental and physical health, 
and the rights accorded to the family as noted by the African Commission in its jurisprudence.
162
 In 
addition, the Working Group has noted that the right to adequate housing in human rights embraces 
the right of everyone to  “gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to live 
in peace and dignity.”163  
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Furthermore, the right to housing according to the Working Group imposes what it refers to as 
certain minimum core duties, such as the duty to refrain from conducting forced evictions, and 
ensuring that evictions are conducted lawfully, in accordance with national, international and 
humanitarian laws.
164
 This also entails securing the security of tenure to those people who lack 
security of tenure to homes, and land.
165
 Moreover, Member States are required to ensure at the 
very least, that people in their borders have access to basic shelter.
166
 This conception of the right to 
adequate housing also included the basic amenities which are indispensable to decent living 
conditions such as “safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating, cooling and lighting, 
sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage, and 
emergency services.”167 
 
Finally, Member States are required to adopt comprehensive national policies, legislation and other 
detailed measures aimed at addressing the housing situation in their borders, and to carry out a 
comprehensive review of national policies and legislations in order to conform to international 
human rights provisions.
168
 Member States are also required to protect the security of tenure of the 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society, such as women and children against evictions, and 
to also ensure their equitable access to housing, land, and all that comes with housing, such as basic 
amenities.   
 
The housing provisions in the Principles and Guidelines regard housing as standard everywhere and 
for everyone, whereas in the African context, housing must not only be habitable, and contain basic 
amenities for it to be adequate, but must also be culturally appropriate. This is owing to the fact that 
Africa has people from different tribes and who speak different languages and have different 
cultural practices, some of which cannot be separated from the kind of accommodation which is 
appropriate for the relevant practices.  To African tribes and people, housing and land hold certain 
cultural importance which differs from tribe to tribe, which is why housing must be in accordance 
with their cultural customs and practices.  
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The African Commission has decided some ground-breaking cases pertaining to economic, social 
and cultural rights.
169
 The African Commission in SERAC found that the Nigerian government had 
violated many provisions of the African Charter, in particular articles 2 (rights of individuals to 
enjoy rights guaranteed in the African Charter free of discrimination of any kind), 4 (right to human 
dignity and life), 14 (right to property), 16 (right to health), 18(1) (right to family), 21 (right to 
freely dispose of their wealth and resources), and 24 (right to a general and satisfactory 
environment).
170
 In addition, the Commission found that the right to housing or shelter, and food 
were not expressly recognised in the African Charter. However, housing is derived from a 
combined reading of articles 14, 16 and 18(1) of the African Charter, while the right to food is 
derived from a combined reading of articles 4, 16 and 22 (right to economic, social and cultural 
development).
171
 
 
Furthermore, the African Commission found that the right to housing or shelter imposed minimum 
duties on the government of Nigeria not to destroy the housing of its citizens either through legal, 
policy, or ether measures or to prevent them from rebuilding the destroyed homes.
172
 The 
government was also obliged by this right to protect citizens from interference with their right to 
housing or shelter by other individuals or non-state actors.
173
 The African Commission also found 
that the right to housing or shelter in the African Charter entailed more than a roof over one’s head. 
It encompassed the right of an individual to be left alone, to  “live in peace whether under one’s 
roof or not.”174 The African Commission also drew inspiration from the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in formulating its evictions 
principles.
175
 It found that the right to housing or shelter also encompasses protection against forced 
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evictions and the fact that evictions cause trauma, psychological, physical, emotional distress, and 
loss of economic means of survival.
176
 
 
The African Commission also adopted and endorsed the fourfold obligations that States have under 
socio-economic rights, namely, the obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfill human 
rights.
177
 It reasoned that the rights guaranteed in the African Charter are not an exhaustive list, this 
means that other rights are by implication, protected by the African Charter through the 
interpretation of other provisions in the African Charter such as that the right to life implies the 
right to food, and the property right implies the protection of the right to housing and other rights.
178
 
Lastly, the African Commission also confirmed the relevance and application of the minimum core 
under the African Charter when interpreting socio-economic rights.
179
 However, It is noteworthy 
though that the minimum core conception in the context of the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission, has more to do with the negative aspects of economic, social and cultural rights, such 
as the right not to interfere with existing enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, this also 
entails the rights not to “destroy shelter or housing,” “contaminate food and water sources” amongst 
others. This is in contrast to the minimum core conception under the ICESCR as developed by the 
Committee in its General Comments because the minimum core conception under the ICESCR has 
more to do with the positive duties to ensure that everyone has access to essential levels of the 
relevant economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
The implications of this are that States have negative and positive duties arising out of the African 
Charter to protect economic, social and cultural rights. Negative duties in this context would entail 
the non-interference by the State and others with existing economic, social and cultural rights such 
as the right to housing or shelter, and the right to food. The positive duties of the State in this regard 
would entail the taking of measures by the State concerned to protect the citizens and communities 
from interference with their rights by individuals, non-state actors and state actors. In addition, the 
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fact that certain rights are not explicitly guaranteed in the African Charter does not mean that those 
rights are not protected.
180
 
 
Finally, the African Commission has further elaborated on its housing jurisprudence recently, in the 
COHRE v Sudan communication.
181
 The African Commission in COHRE v Sudan found that 
articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12(1) and (2), 14, 16, 18(1) and 22 of the African Charter have been violated by 
the government of Sudan.
182
 In the context of the right to adequate housing, the African 
Commission found that “cruel or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment” had to be 
interpreted in a wide sense as far as possible to include protection against physical or emotional 
abuse.
183
 In addition, the African Commission noted that exposing victims of human rights 
violations to personal suffering and indignity violated the right to human dignity, and that this 
personal suffering and indignity can take many forms depending on the facts of each case.
184
 Based 
on this analysis, the African Commission concurred with the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture in the matter of Hijrizi v Yugoslavia
185
 that the forced evictions and destruction of housing 
undertaken by non state actors amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, 
when the State fails to protect the victims of such violations.
186
 Forced evictions, destruction of 
homes and similar structures in the context of this case were found to have not only violated the 
right to adequate housing, but also articles 4 (the right to integrity of the person) and 5 (prohibition 
on cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment) of the African Charter.
187
 
 
The implications of the COHRE v Sudan communication in the context of housing are that the 
African Commission elaborated on the SERAC communication,
188
 by upholding the SERAC 
communication and extending it to interpreting the right to adequate housing and evictions 
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principles as intertwined with the right to integrity of the person, and the prohibition on cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The COHRE v Sudan communication also 
provides guidelines on Member States’ duties arising out of the African Charter and international 
law in similar contexts. Furthermore, it provides guidelines on specific remedies available to the 
victims of such human rights violations.
189
 The African Commission has therefore gone some 
distance in giving substantive content to many rights protected in the African Charter, including the 
right to housing or shelter.
190
 However, this development has been mainly in the context of duties to 
respect and protect housing rights, and not yet in terms of developing the obligations of State 
Parties to provide decent housing to those who lack access to housing or those in inadequate 
housing. 
 
I shall now deal briefly with the significance of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The African Court was established by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court.
191
 The establishment of the African Court 
represents an opportunity to develop the jurisprudence of the African Commission, particularly in 
relation to the positive duties of State Parties in the context of the right to housing, as well as 
developing effective remedies for breaches of housing rights.
192
 
 
3 4 4 The European regional human rights system 
 
3 4 4 1 Background 
 
The other regional human rights system that protects and promotes socio-economic rights is the 
European regional human rights system. The European human rights system enshrines socio-
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economic rights and other human rights in a statute-based human rights system,
193
 and treaty based 
human rights systems.
194
 The European Convention on Human Rights focuses mostly on civil and 
political rights,
195
 with a limited indirect protection of economic, social and cultural rights.
196
 
Article 8 and its interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights provide some measure of  
indirect protection to the right to adequate housing, through the right to respect private and family 
life and home.
197
 The protection of housing in the old European Social Charter on the other hand is 
guaranteed in article 16 of this Charter, which deals with the “right of the family to social, legal and 
economic protection.”198 The wording of article 16 of the old European Social Charter (1961), as in 
the case of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, places more emphasis on the 
family, as opposed to individual, self-standing rights to housing. In contrast, the Revised European 
Social Charter (1996)  guarantees housing under various provisions, namely articles 15(3), which 
makes housing provision for the disabled,  and article 16, which is similar to article 16 in the old 
European Social Charter (1961). 
  
                                                          
193
 The Council of Europe established on 5 May 1949. On the European human rights system, see generally: 
Drzewicki K “European system for the promotion and protection of human rights” in Krause C and C Scheinin M 
(eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2009) at 365-388; Lawson R “The European 
Convention on Human Rights” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A 
Textbook (2009) at 389-424; De Schutter O “The European Social Charter” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2009) at 425-442; Khaliq U and Churchill R “The European 
Committee of Social Rights: Putting flesh on the bare bones of the European Social Charter” in Langford M (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 428-452; Clemens L 
and Simmons A “European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic unease” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 409-427; Rosas A “The European 
Union and fundamental rights/human rights” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of Human 
Rights: A Textbook (2009) at 443-474. 
194
 Drzewicki 2009 (note 193 above) at 370-387. The main system for the promotion and protection of human rights 
under the European system of human rights is the treaty-based human rights system, which falls under the Council 
of Europe. The Council was established by ten signatures of Member States on 5 May 1949. Its main design is to 
cultivate the spirit of “fundamental values and principles common to all democratic” States in Europe and to bring 
European States together. The membership of the Council is limited to European States that observe democracy and 
the rule of law, uphold and protect human rights and continue to fulfil these conditions from the date of membership 
and during membership. 
195
 See: articles 2-7, and 9-18. This was however modified by the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocol No.11, which added the right to education, and 
property as part of the European Convention on Human Rights, see: Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocol No.11. For 
jurisprudence on article 2 (right to education), see: Clemens and Simmons 2008 (note 193 above) at 424-425. 
196
 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
197
 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I deal with the jurisprudence of the European Court on 
Human Rights pertaining to the right to housing in the section that follows below. 
198
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The Revised European Social Charter protects and promotes housing in various provisions, besides 
in the main provision. Article 23 of the Revised European Social Charter makes provision for 
housing for the elderly, while article 30 (“the right to protection against poverty and social 
exclusion”) of the Revised European Social Charter also guarantees the right to housing, while 
article 31 is the main housing provision in the Revised European Social Charter. Article 31 of 
Revised European Social Charter places duties on Member States to: 
 
(1)  promote access to housing of an adequate standard; 
(2)  prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination;  
(3) make the price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources.  
 
In the following sections I consider how the European Court on Human Rights and the Committee 
on Social Rights respectively have dealt with the right to housing under the European system of 
human rights. 
 
3 4 4 2 European Committee on Social Rights 
 
The European Committee on Social Rights has also decided a number of important complaints on 
issues pertaining to human rights, in particular on housing rights.
199
 In European Roma Rights 
Centre (ERRC) v Greece, the Committee found Greece to have violated article 16 of the European 
Social Charter by failing to provide suitable permanent housing to the Roma people, failing to 
provide temporary stopping facilities, and forcefully evicting the Roma people.
200
 The Committee 
reasoned that the right to housing allows the exercise of many other rights, civil and political, as 
well as economic, social and cultural rights, and is critical to the institution of family.
201
 The 
Committee reasoned further that the State Contracting Parties have a duty to supply housing to 
families, take the needs of families into account when devising housing policies, and ensure that the 
                                                          
199
 Complaint No. 15/2003, European Roma Rights Centre v Greece, Decision on the merits, para 24. For similar 
decisions, see: Complaint No. 51/2008 (decision on European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France, Decision on 
the merits, 19 October 2009); Complaint No. 52/2008, Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v 
Croatia, Decision on the merits. 
200
 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Greece (note 199 above) paras 40-43 and 46-47. 
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housing is of an adequate standard, and includes essential services, such as heating and 
electricity.
202
  
 
The Committee further developed its jurisprudence in European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v 
France. The Committee found France in violation of article 31(2) of the Revised European Social 
Charter because of the manner in which the Romani people were forcefully evicted from their 
homes. Of particular concern was the failure of the authorities to respect the procedural rights of the 
community prior to carrying out the eviction. Furthermore, the evictions were carried out under 
conditions that did not respect their human dignity, and no alternative accommodation was made 
available.
203
 Moreover, the Committee found violations of article E of the Charter read with article 
31 of the Revised Social Charter, and articles 16 and 30. In this regard, the Committee held that the 
conditions under which the Romani people lived perpetuated social exclusion and amounted to a 
violation of their human dignity. This was because the housing policy of France made no provision 
for promoting access to adequate housing for people who lived or risked living in conditions of 
social exclusion.
204
 
 
The combined implications of the above decisions are that housing refers to more than a dwelling. It 
must contain amenities such as heating, electricity, must be culturally suitable, and be of suitable 
size considering the make-up of the family. This manner of viewing the right to housing also 
applies to security from unlawful evictions.
205
 In addition, economic, social and cultural rights such 
as the right housing are a gateway to an enjoyment of civil and political rights - the two sets of 
rights are interrelated and indivisible.  
 
Moreover, the Committee found that the principles of equality and non-discrimination were an 
important part of the right to housing as a result of the preamble to the European Social Charter. 
This formed the basis for the finding that Greece had violated article 16 of the Charter by providing 
insufficient housing and temporary stopping facilities, and by subjecting the people of the Roma to 
                                                          
202
 European Roma Rights Centre v Greece (note 199 above) paras 24 and 51. 
203
 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France (note 199 above) paras 67-71. 
204
 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France (note 199 above) paras 67-71 and 97-107. 
205
 European Roma Rights Centre v Greece (note 199 above) para 24 and 47-51. This means that alternative 
accommodation must also be of appropriate standards. 
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forced evictions.
206
 The implications of this are that the Committee is willing to engage 
systematically with the positive obligations imposed by both socio-economic rights and civil and 
political rights, and this has led to an interpretation of the right to housing in ways that embrace the 
substantive content of this right. 
  
3 4 4 3 European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Court on Human Rights’s housing jurisprudence revolves primarily around article 8 
of the European Convention. Article 8 of of the European Convention provides that: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
It is noteworthy though that textually, article 8 of the European Convention concerns mainly the 
duty to ensure respect of a person’s private and family life, his home and correspondence. Article 8 
is thus primarily orientated to the duty to respect the relevant rights as opposed to the manifestly 
positive duties imposed on Member States by article 31 of the Revised European Social Charter to 
fulfill the right to housing. 
 
The Court has decided many precedent-setting cases on a variety of matters.
207
 In Airey v Ireland, it 
 
recognised that the rights protected and promoted by the European Convention will be interpreted in 
the context of the facts of each case, taking into account factors such as practicality, the availability 
of resources in the state concerned and the interrelatedness and indivisibility of rights.  
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 European Roma Rights Centre v Greece (note 199 above) paras 47-51. This was confirmed in Complaint No. 
51/2008, European Roma Rights Centre v France, Decision on the merits. A case dealing with substantially similar 
facts; see also: Complaint No. 58/2009, COHRE v Italy, Decision on the merits. 
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 Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 105. See also: Buckley v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 101; Chapman v 
United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 18; Moldovan and Other v Romania (no.2) Application No. 41138/98 and 
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The European Court on Human Rights has also decided many cases involving housing, such as in 
Buckley v United Kingdom (hereafter ‘Buckley’).208 The majority Court held that the applicant, a 
Gypsy, was not punished at any time by the government of the United Kingdom or subjected to 
differential treatment for trying to follow her gypsy lifestyle and tradition since the national housing 
policies in place catered for Gypsies. Therefore she could not claim to have been discriminated 
against by the government of the United Kingdom for being a Gypsy.
209
  
 
There were three dissenting judgments in this matter, the most noteworthy being that of Judge 
Lohmus, who adopted similar reasoning and conclusion to that of the Committee in the same 
matter.  Judge Lohmus reasoned that living in caravans and travelling were important parts of the 
cultural heritage and traditional lifestyle of Gyspies, which had to be balanced against rights of the 
general community, and deserved protection as well, especially against all forms of 
discrimination.
210
 
 
In Chapman v United Kingdom (hereafter ‘Chapman’),211 the Court reasoned that Mrs Chapman’s 
occupation of her caravans was an important part of her ethnic identity as a Gypsy, which entailed 
regular travel from one place to the next. This was vital even though there were indications that it 
was no longer the case with all Gypsies, since some of them remained in one place for a long time 
due to the pressure of developments and changing policies or out of their own volition in order to 
achieve stability for their children.
212
 The measures adopted against her  involved the refusal by the 
planning authorities of permission for her to remain on her own land, and subsequent measures 
aimed at her eviction. The measure thus had an impact going beyond her right to respect for her 
home, but also affected her right to live her life as a Gypsy, and to live her private and family life 
according to Gypsy traditions.
213
 
 
                                                          
208
 Buckley (note 207 above). 
209
 Buckley (note 207 above) para 85-89. The majority judgment in Buckley was confirmed in Chapman (note 207 
above) paras 111-130. 
210
 Buckley (note 207 above) (dissenting judgment of Judge Lohmus). 
211
 Chapman (note 207 above). 
212
 Chapman (note 207 above) para 73-74. 
213
 Chapman (note 207 above) para 73. 
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The Court held that the decision of the planning authorities to deny her the right to remain on her 
own land, in her own caravans, and the measures adopted against her for so remaining on her own 
land amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private life, family life and home 
guaranteed by article 8(1) of the European Convention. The question remained whether this was 
justified within the meaning of article 8(2) of the Convention.
214
 In this regard, the Court held that 
this was justified, having regard to the interests of the community, the law, and  the fact that she 
unlawfully placed her caravan on land not zoned for residential purposes.
215
 The Court also rejected 
the argument that since, statistically speaking, there are  more  Gypsy families than the number of 
places available on authorised Gypsy sites, the decision not to allow the applicant Gypsy family to 
occupy land where they wished and to install their caravan there was not by itself, without more, a 
violation of article 8 of the European Convention. This was because to find otherwise would be 
similar to imposing on the United Kingdom and other Member States a duty, by virtue of article 8, 
to provide an adequate number of suitable sites where they could live as Gypsies. Despite the 
evolution of international law in this context, the Court was not convinced that article 8 could be 
interpreted so as to imply such a far-reaching positive duty of general social policy on Member 
States.
216
 
 
There were seven dissenting judges in this case.
217
 The main dissenting judgment essentially held 
that it was not justifiable and necessary to interfere with Mrs Chapman’s rights in a democratic 
society. This was because international law promoted and protected the rights of minorities, and that 
the majority court failed to reconsider the Buckley case in light of changes in international law.
218
 
 
The minority in Chapman was clearly willing to engage substantively and practically with the 
content of the right to adequate housing, and other implicated rights. This is evident in its approach 
to article 8 of the Convention, which the minority interpreted as giving rise to positive duties on 
Member States in certain mentioned situations. The minority judgment in Chapman is therefore a 
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 Chapman (note 207 above) para 78. 
215
 Chapman (note 207 above) paras 73-74, 78-82, 90-98, 99-100, and 120-130. The Court also found that she 
should have appealed the adverse decision with the relevant authorities before going to courts. 
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 Chapman (note 207 above) paras 93-94. 
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better view compared to that of the majority court, which offers no protection to the security of 
tenure rights to people in situations like that of  Mrs Chapman. 
 
The cases of Buckley and Chapman represent a plethora of similar cases involving gypsy families 
that have been decided along similar lines as Buckley and Chapman by the Court.
219
 The Court in 
these cases has been unwilling to adopt the line of reasoning adopted by Judge Lohmus in Buckley. 
Judge Lohmus engages substantively with the housing rights and discrimination provisions of the 
Convention. The Court has chosen instead to hide behind the thin reasoning on the measures 
adopted by the United Kingdom to protect the housing rights and way of life of the gypsy families, 
instead of seriously interrogating whether those adopted measures protect the housing rights of 
minorities. 
 
The implications of the European Court of Human Rights’s jurisprudence are that the Court is still 
unwilling to protect the housing rights of minorities, like Gypsies. This is in contrast to the minority 
court which recognises that international law protects the housing rights of minorities. 
 
The other regional human rights system in which housing rights and duties imposed by this right 
have received a measure of sustained attention is the Inter-American system of human rights. Both 
the inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
have interpreted the right to housing in different contexts. 
 
3 4 5 The Inter-American human rights system 
 
3 4 5 1 Background 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘Inter-American Commission’) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (‘Inter-American Court’) are the main mechanisms to enforce 
human rights, and to promote and protect human rights in the region. In addition, they complement 
                                                          
219
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one another in the ways in which they function. For instance, article 61(1) of the American 
Convention grants the Inter-American Commission the right to submit cases to the Inter-American 
Court.
220
 
 
The Inter-American human rights system protects social rights under the American Declaration,
221
 
American Convention,
222
 and the Protocol of San Salvador. Article 26 of the American Convention 
imposes duties on Member States to adopt legislative and other measures in order to ensure the full 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, internal and international co-operation.
223
 
 
The right to housing is expressly provided for in article XI of the American Declaration, even 
though article XI makes provisions for the “right to the preservation of health and well-being.” 
Article XI provides that “Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through 
sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing, and medical care, to the extent 
permitted by public and community resources. This means that the provision of housing is seen as 
means to the preservation of health, and is therefore a precondition to the preservation of peoples’ 
health and well-being.  
 
Moreover, articles 3-25 of the American Convention guarantee civil and political rights, while 
Chapter III of the same Convention refers to the protection of economic, social and cultural rights. 
There is no express mention of the individual economic, social and cultural rights under the 
American Convention, beyond a section labelled Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, 
                                                          
220
 See also: article 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court, which relates to the filing of petitions 
by the Inter-American Commission with the Inter-American Court. The Rules of Procedure of the Court are 
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Human Rights” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
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to the fact that the individual petitions procedure under the Protocol of San Salvador is limited to two rights, trade 
union and education. 
222
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223
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Melish argues that the right to housing is guaranteed under article 26 of the Convention along with 
other economic, social and cultural rights.
224
 Article 26 provides that: 
 
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international 
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving 
progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit 
in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of 
the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 
 
The text of article 26 requires State Parties to take positive measures, both internally and through 
international assistance with a view to ensuring the progressive realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights, including the right to housing. In contrast to article 1 of the Protocol of San 
Salvador, the description of the obligations of State Parties enunciated in article 26 of the 
Convention makes no mention of available resources and the degree of development of State 
Parties. In addition, they give rise to both positive and negative duties. The positive duties are 
evident from the fact that State Parties are required to take certain measures aimed at achieving 
these rights progressively. Negative duties arise from the norm that State Parties cannot take away 
existing social rights unless there is a justification for this grounded in human rights.
225
 
 
3 4 5 2 Relevant Inter-American Commission on Human Rights jurisprudence 
 
The Inter-American Commission’s jurisprudence is full of promise, since it has issued some 
important communications on economic, social and cultural rights, including housing and related 
matters.
226
 The Inter-American Commission jurisprudence on housing is mainly concentrated in the 
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means that the Commission is slowly appreciating the seriousness with which human rights, especially economic, 
social and cultural rights should be held, this although it noted that it has jurisdiction to hear these cases, because of 
non-compliance with admissibility requirements. 
   
           
   
85 
 
areas of negative duties arising out of this right, particularly in the context of forced evictions. 
There are, as yet, no clear cases pertaining to the positive duties arising out of this right.  
 
In Maria Chiriboga and Guillermo Chiriboga v Ecuador (hereafter ‘Chiriboga’),227 the Inter-
American Commission found that the expropriation of the petitioners’ properties without 
compensation by government in the public interest to build a public park violated the rights of the 
petitioners. The petitioners alleged that the expropriation without compensation deprived them their 
use and enjoyment of their land.
228
 This matter is significant for the Commission’s jurisprudence for 
future cases because land and housing usually go hand in glove, since there can be no housing 
without the availability of suitable land on which to build housing or to settle, as evident in the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission highlighted here. 
 
In Duarte v Nicaragua (hereafter ‘Duarte’),229 the petitioner approached the Inter-American 
Commission to complain about the expropriation of his property through legislation, and its 
subsequent sale to third parties. This was a property he had been renting to third parties, and this 
rental income was his only source of income to cover his medical expenses.
230
 The petitioner further 
alleged that this expropriation deprived him of his property and prevented him from collecting 
rental from the occupiers.
231
 However, this petition was declared inadmissible because the petitioner 
had not exhausted his domestic remedies as required by article 46(1)(a) of the American 
Convention, despite the fact that the Inter-American Commission found that it had jurisdiction 
consider it.
232
 
 
In addition,  the Inter-American Commission in Corumbiara v Brazil found that Brazil had violated 
articles 4, 5, 8 and 25 of the American Convention by forcefully and violently evicting 500 families 
of extremely poor, unemployed, and landless rural workers.
233
 The Commission found the excessive 
use of force in effecting the evictions unjustifiable and a violation of the right to humane 
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treatment.
234
 The families had settled illegally on a small portion of a ranch and set up a camp there 
in order to meet their most urgent survival needs and also to put pressure on the government to 
solve the problem of land in Northern Brazil.
235
 The owner of the ranch approached the court, and 
obtained a court order, which was granted the same day. The squatters were then forcefully and 
violently evicted at night with some of them losing their lives in the process.
236
 
 
Melish however, laments the failure of the petitioners in the Corumbiara v Brazil case to broaden 
their claims, her criticism is based on Articles 11, 25 and 26 of the Convention, and that the 
Commission did not do so mero motu in order to deal with evictions holistically. Such holistic 
treatment would have incorporated issues of basic housing and duties of the state in this regard. 
This according to Melish would have addressed issues such as alternative accommodation, lack of 
consultation and a chance to make representations before the evictions were carried out, and the 
manner in which the evictions were carried out.
237
 
 
The matter of Sebastião Carmago concerned families of rural workers who were violently and 
forcefully evicted from the land they had occupied. These evictions were conducted in the early 
hours of the morning, by heavily armed men hired by owners of the land which these families had 
occupied.
238
  In addition, the perpetrators of these forced evictions destroyed the shacks that the 
families used as homes, beat them up, injured some of the people being evicted and murdered a 
senior citizen, 65 year-old Mr Carmago.
239
 The Inter-American Commission found that the State of 
Brazil had violated articles 4, 8 and 25 of the American Convention by failing to comply with the 
duties imposed on it by article 1(1) of the American Convention, which requires Member States to 
ensure and protect the rights guaranteed in the American Convention.
240
 
 
The decision in Sebastião Carmago is important because it demonstrates that the Inter-American 
Commission is willing to protect the negative duties emanating from the right to housing. It 
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highlights the obligations of State Parties to ensure that evictions are conducted in a manner that 
respects and promotes human rights, and does not leave people homeless. 
 
I will now consider how the Inter-American Court on Human Rights fared in the protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights, especially the right to housing. 
 
3 4 5 3 Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in the area of economic, social and cultural rights 
has lagged behind other regional courts on human rights. This is because of the Inter-American 
Court’s failure to recognise and deal with different economic, social and cultural aspects in an 
independent manner. The Inter-American Court chose instead to deal with these rights under the 
concept of life.
241
 The result has been that the Inter-American Court has developed the rights to 
health, education, food, recreation and adequate housing under articles 4 and 5 of the American 
Convention, which protect rights to life and personal integrity respectively instead of developing 
these rights under article 26 of the Convention.
242
 For instance, the Court interpreted the right to 
health care, education and other human rights as guarantees for a dignified life, and the violation of 
these rights an interference with the right to life and personal integrity of the person.
243
 
 
 In the Moiwana Village v Suriname (hereafter ‘Moiwana’),244 the Inter-American Commission 
submitted an application to the Court on behalf of the Moiwana community, in which they alleged 
that the State of Suriname had violated articles 25 (right to judicial protection), 8 (right to a fair 
trial), and 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) of the American Convention. In addition, the Inter-
American Court was asked to rule that the State of Suriname had to pay monetary and non-
monetary reparations, and pay the legal costs incurred by the Moiwana community.
245
 The Inter-
American Commission submitted this case to the Inter-American Court after it had failed to resolve 
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the matter through its procedures due to the failure of the State of Suriname to comply with its 
communications and recommendations.
246
 
 
The facts giving rise to this case were that on 29 November 1986, members of the Moiwana 
indigenous community were attacked by the armed forces of Suriname, which killed over 40 men, 
women, and children, as well as burning down the village belonging to the Moiwana community. In 
addition, the survivors of these attacks fled into the nearby forest, and then into exile, with some 
becoming internally displaced. Furthermore, no adequate investigation of the events leading up to 
these attacks took place, nor was anyone held accountable, while the survivors remained internally 
displaced from their lands, exiled, and unable to return to their traditional ways of life. 
  
The Inter-American Court held that it had the jurisdiction to hear and decide this case because the 
alleged violations of human rights of the Moiwana community and its members were of a 
continuing nature, and fell within the ambit of its powers conferred by the American Convention.
247
 
In addition, the Court held that the State of Suriname had implicitly waived the right to raise the 
objection of failure of exhausting domestic remedies because it did not raise it within the time 
period allowed, in the first stages of the proceedings, and that  this was clear from the record of the 
proceedings.
248
 
 
The State of Suriname was also found to have violated the rights of the Moiwana community to 
humane treatment, in relation to obligations to respect this right. This was because the Moiwana 
people had suffered severe emotional, psychological, spiritual and economic hardship because they 
were forcefully separated from their lands, preventing them from honouring their deceased 
according to their traditional ways of life, and were unable to access justice.
249
 Furthermore, the 
State of Suriname was found to have violated the right to freedom of movement and residence, as 
guaranteed in article 22, read with article 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of the 
Moiwana community.
250
 This was because of the continued internal displacement of the Moiwana 
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people, who, since 1986 remained unable to return to their ancestral lands and places of 
residence.
251
 The Court also found that the property rights (article 25 ) of the Moiwana people had 
been violated in relation to article 1(1) of the American Convention, because they were prevented 
by the foregoing events from the communal use and enjoyment of their traditional properties.
252
 
 
The State of Suriname was also found to have violated the rights of the Moiwana community to 
judicial guarantees and protection (articles 8(1) and 25) of the American Convention in relation to 
article 1(1) of the same Convention, through its failure to institute adequate investigations and hold 
people liable for violations of the rights of the Moiwana community despite overwhelming 
available evidence.
253
 
 
The State of Suriname was ordered to take measures to investigate the violations of human rights of 
the Moiwana community, identify, prosecute and hold accountable all those that were involved in 
these violations.
254
 It was also ordered to locate the remains of the deceased members of the 
Moiwana community, and deliver them to the surviving members,
255
 adopt legislative and other 
measures aimed at securing the property rights of the Moiwana community, in relation to the 
traditional territories from which they had been forcefully evicted.
256
 These measures include 
methods for the demarcation and titling of their lands and territories according to their traditional 
ways of life and customary laws.
257
 
 
Finally, the State of Suriname was also ordered to secure the safety of those members of the 
Moiwana community who decide to return to their territories, and establish a community 
development fund that would enable the community to secure basic social services, such as health, 
housing, and educational for the members of the Moiwana community.
258
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The Court has further shown signs of its willingness to be robust in the adjudication of economic, 
social and cultural rights in various cases dealing with indigenous communities.
259
 The Court in 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay held that the rights of a displaced indigenous 
community, living in extreme conditions of homelessness, lack of food, health care services, 
sanitary and water were violated. In particular, the Court found violations of articles 8, 25, 1(1), 2 
and 21and 1(1) and 2 respectively.
260
 A significant aspect of the court order required the state to 
provide the Yakye Axa community with essential goods and services necessary for their survival 
until they had a territory of their own.
261
 In addition, the state was ordered to take legislative and 
other measures necessary to guarantee the property rights of the Yakye Axa community within a 
reasonable time period.
262
 Lastly, the Court retained jurisdiction over the matter in order to monitor 
compliance with its orders.
263
 
 
The outcome of the Moiwana case, as well as the Yakye Axa case have been confirmed in another 
similar case, Saramaka People v Suriname (hereafter ‘Saramaka’).264 The only difference is that the 
facts giving rise to the Saramaka case were the ongoing effects associated with the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam in the 1960s which flooded the traditional territory of the Saramaka people. In 
addition, the Saramaka case is distinguishable from the Moiwana and Yakye Axa cases because the 
Saramaka case also involved a dispute over the recognition of the Saramaka people as an 
indigenous community.
265
 
 
Finally, and significantly, the State of Suriname was ordered to allocate six hundred thousand 
United States dollars for the creation of a community development fund on behalf of the Saramaka 
community members in their territory, in order to finance the educational, housing, agricultural, and 
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healthcare projects, including the provisions of electricity and drinking water where necessary, for 
the Saramaka community members.
266
 
 
The implications of these cases are that the Court is willing to protect and promote the social, civil 
and political rights of indigenous communities, including their rights to property, ancestral lands, 
and traditional ways of living from both state actors and non-state actors. In addition, the Court has 
shown a willingness to develop the substantive content of various rights such as property rights, 
land and housing which are linked to the traditions and customs of the indigenous communities 
concerned, including crafting innovative remedies such as moral damages
267
 and the establishment 
of a community development fund. 
 
The Inter-American Court jurisprudence on housing does not define what would constitute adequate 
housing within the meaning of the American Convention, or the American Declaration. Its biggest 
weakness lies in conflating housing with other rights, a thread that it arguably draws from the 
failure of the American Declaration or the American Convention to enumerate clearly defined 
housing rights. However, the jurisprudence shows a lot of promise in view of cases such as the 
Saramaka case, where it was  recognised that housing must also be culturally appropriate within the 
context of indigenous communities.  
 
3 5 Emerging international law norms and instruments 
 
There are many emerging norms and instruments in the area of human rights as a whole, aimed at 
strengthening protection of international human rights treaties, and also assisting in crafting other 
mechanisms for dealing with new violations of international human rights. These developments 
extend to the areas of economic, social and cultural rights, especially the right to housing.  Many 
new norms
268
 and instruments have emerged with regard to the right to housing, and these consist of 
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both binding and non-binding norms which emerged recently at different levels of international 
human rights.
269
 
 
The emerging international law instruments can be broadly grouped into those that are binding, and 
those that are not binding (soft law).
270
 It is important to distinguish between non-binding 
international law instruments and binding instruments for the purposes of identifying whether a 
state is bound by certain international law rules or not. In order for international law rules to 
become binding on a State and between States, it must generally comply with the requirements of 
customary international law, or be found in treaties that the state concerned has signed and 
ratified.
271
 However, the non-rectification of treaties by States, where for instance, the state 
concerned has only signed the treaty concerned or has failed to sign or ratify, does not by itself 
mean that that state must ignore the treaty concerned. 
 
Certain rules emanating from soft law become universally accepted and practised by the 
international community in their dealings with one another. The fact that a certain state was not 
party to the process leading to the adoption of a particular soft law instrument will not by itself 
mean that it must ignore the particular international norm. This is because certain rules of 
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international law have become universally accepted and practised by the international community in 
their dealings with one another. 
 
Soft law has the potential to assist courts in the development of the substantive content of 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to housing. For instance, the Principles and 
Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African 
Charter provides elaborate guidelines on what constitutes adequate housing, thereby filling in gaps 
that exist in the African Charter. Adequate housing is defined in the Principles and Guidelines as:  
 
[T]he right of every person to gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to 
live in peace and dignity. It includes access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, 
energy for cooking, heating, cooling and lighting, sanitation, and washing facilities, means of food 
storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services.
272
 
 
The State Reporting Guidelines complement the Principles and Guidelines,
273
 in that they should be 
used in conjunction with the Principles and Guidelines.  In addition, the State Reporting Guidelines 
are designed to provide guidelines to Member States in their submissions of state reports to the 
African Commission. These reports must deal with each of the rights enumerated in the State 
Reporting Guidelines,
274
 and must contain measures adopted by the state concerned to progressively 
realise the rights in question. These measures may take the form of laws, policies and strategies 
adopted, and must also deal with challenges that the Member State concerned faces in realising each 
individual right, and how it plans to meet these challenges. 
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The enumerated rights in the State Reporting Guidelines number ten individual rights, namely: 
rights to property, work, health, education, culture, housing, social security, water and sanitation, 
food, and protection of the family, in contrast to six individual rights expressly provided in the 
African Charter, namely: right to work, property, health, education, right to the protection of the 
family, and environment. Despite the shortcomings of the State Reporting Guidelines, they remain 
very instructive towards the realisation of the substantive content of adequate housing or shelter in 
the region. In particular, they act as a guide to Member States on the duties and standards imposed 
by the right to adequate housing or shelter and other socio-economic rights in the African Charter. 
The State Reporting Guidelines also have the potential to add clarity regarding the ways in which 
Member States can give content on the right to housing, and socio-economic rights protected in the 
African Charter. 
 
The other soft law instrument that is instructive in the context of the right to adequate housing is the 
Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Declaration or Millennium Development Goals (‘MDGs’) 
are a set of guidelines and indicators used to measure global poverty reduction.
275
 The Millennium 
Declaration has evolved into a set of global goals called the Millennium Development Goals, 
consisting of eight goals and eighteen targets which set out a specific time frame by which a 
particular right must be fulfilled, and timeframes by which certain poverty reduction measures must 
have been put in place.
276
 Goal number 7 (target 11) of the MDGs aims at improving the lives of 
100 million slum dwellers worldwide by year 2020. The key indicators for progress on this goal are 
the “proportion of urban population with improved access to improved sanitation, and proportion of 
households with access to secure tenure (owned or rented).”277 
  
The MDGs have a significant role to play in the continued quest for the substantive content of the 
right to adequate housing. This is because States are now subject to a global assessment mechanism 
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on the progress they are making in the realisation of this right, and other socio-economic rights in 
the MDGs. This assessment may go a long way in assessing successes and failures in the realisation 
of the right to adequate housing, and other socio-economic rights, and identifying any assistance 
that the particular State may need in order to fulfill the particular MDGs. 
  
The Pinheiro Principles also elaborates on the right to adequate housing by providing guidelines to 
States when faced with violations of the property and housing rights of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and dealing with issues of restitution in this context.
278
 The Pinheiro Principles 
originates from the United Nations processes dating back to year 1997, in which the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination suggested to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, the need to assess the property, housing, and the restitution status of 
returning refugees and displaced persons. This then led to the adoption of Resolution 1998/26 on 
Housing and Property Restitution in the Context of the Return of Rights of Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons. This was later followed by the appointment of Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil as an 
expert to prepare working papers on this issue. Pinheiro was then appointed as a Special Rapporteur 
on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in 2002 and 
was tasked with the drafting of what is now known as the Pinheiro Principles, which were adopted 
by the Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on 11 August 2005.
279
 
 
The Pinheiro Principles contains various guidelines on the right to housing. Principle 5 of the 
Pinheiro Principles protects the housing rights of internally displaced persons by requiring States to 
put measures in place that are in line with international law and international humanitarian law, in 
order to prevent and protect people against being displaced from their homes, land or places of 
residence. Principle 6, on the other hand, guarantees the right of “everyone to be protected against 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy and his or her home.”280  Principle 8 is the 
main guideline on housing, since it provides for the general right to adequate housing,
281
 but 
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specifically in the context of requiring States to take positive measures directed at alleviating the 
conditions of refugees and displaced persons living in inadequate housing.
282
 
 
Moreover, the other soft law instrument that makes provision for adequate housing is the 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights.
283
 Article 21 guarantees the right of indigenous people to 
the improvement of their socio-economic conditions, in the areas of education, employment, health, 
vocational training and retraining, sanitation, housing and social security.
284
 States have a duty in 
terms of article 21 to take steps to ensure that the conditions of indigenous people are secured, 
especially those of women, youth, elders, children and persons with disabilities.
285
 This is fortified 
by article 23 which gives indigenous people the right to active participation in the development of 
socio-economic programmes that affect them.
286
 
 
Finally, the other important source of soft law pertaining to the right to adequate housing is the 
reports and work produced under the auspices of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing. The Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing is a vital institution because it 
has over the years developed useful standards and benchmarks on the right to adequate housing in 
international human rights. Special Rapporteurs under the United Nations system are independent 
experts in the relevant field of human rights, who are appointed by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council to deal with specific human rights. The post of Special Rapporteur on housing was 
created on 17 April 2000 in accordance with the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights.
287
 
 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on housing includes reporting on the status of the realisation 
of the right to adequate housing around the world; promoting cooperation and assistance to 
governments in their quest to secure social rights; applying gender specific outlooks on his or her 
work; facilitating regular dialogue with governments and relevant United Nations human rights 
bodies in the area of adequate housing; identifying possible sources of financing for relevant 
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advisory and technical cooperation; and facilitating the inclusion of issues relevant to the mandate 
of the relevant United Nations projects; compiling and submitting country specific annual reports to 
the Commission on Human Rights.
288
 
 
The Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has interpreted the right to adequate housing under 
various themes in the report submitted to the United Nations General Council, in fulfillment of the 
mandate of this office.
289
 The Special Rapporteur Report on Adequate Housing dated 6 August 
2009 focused on the impact of climate change on the realisation of the right to adequate housing. It 
further highlighted the effects of climate change on the right to adequate housing, and the 
international human rights obligations that arise in conditions of extreme weather, including 
measures that States can take to anticipate these challenges, and to deal with them once they 
occur.
290
 The Special Rapporteur concluded in its 6 August 2009 report by recommending that 
States need to take climate changes into account in all the stages of the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing in accordance with local and international standards. This would include factoring 
climate changes into legislative policy measures, and implementation stages of the realisation of the 
right to adequate housing, so as to better respond to the housing needs of the people in conditions of 
extreme weather.
291
 
 
Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has dealt with the importance of factoring 
the right to adequate housing standards in post-disaster and post-conflict situations, in its report 
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dated 20 December 2010.
292
 The Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has also concluded and 
recommended that States need to take into account the devastating effects that disasters and 
conflicts can have on housing. Therefore, States need to note the importance of securing the 
security of tenure, consultations, public participation, and institutional coordination after disasters 
and conflicts for its people in accordance with the international standards and benchmarks on the 
right to adequate housing.
293
 
 
The implications of the abovementioned soft law instruments on the right to adequate housing are 
that there is a growing body of these instruments in the international human rights jurisprudence, 
which when considered in the light of international law, provide useful guidelines and norms to 
States in dealing with their domestic and international law obligations, violations, policy, and 
technical or legal problems arising out of this right.  
 
I will now  analyse the relevance of foreign case law. 
 
3 6 Relevant cases from foreign jurisdictions 
 
3 6 1 Introduction 
 
The debate on the use of foreign law to interpret the South African Constitution is fairly settled 
compared to the position, for example, under the United State’s Constitution where foreign law 
plays a very restricted role. This is because section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that “when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law.” This however, 
does not mean that there are no controversies and resistance surrounding the use of foreign law to 
interpret the South African Constitution.
294
  
 
The Constitution does not specify the extent to which foreign law may be considered. Roux argues 
that the jurisprudence of Justice Laurie Ackermann (retired Justice of the Constitutional Court) was 
                                                          
292
 Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing Report (20 December 2010). 
293
 Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing Report (20 December 2010) paras 14-57, and 58-67. 
294
 Roux T “The dignity of comparative constitutional law” (2008) Acta Juridica 185-203. 
   
           
   
99 
 
grounded in the careful analysis of foreign law, drawing out the useful principles for particular 
cases that he dealt with. This was based on the interpretation of sections 39(1)(c), read with 39(1)(a) 
and 36(1) of the South African Constitution.
295
 This was because Ackermann J was of the view that 
the use of foreign law in a democratic South Africa was not an optional choice, but a vital part of 
any constitutional interpretation.
296
 In addition, Ackermann, according to Roux, believed that the 
use of foreign law to interpret the South African Constitution was not only for educational reasons, 
but also essential for an interrogation of the values underlying an open and democratic society.
297
 
 
Ackermann J believed that foreign law should be used at the interpretation phase of constitutional 
adjudication, and at the limitations inquiry.
298
 This ensured that the courts engaged systemically 
with the values underlying particular rights, values such as human dignity, equality and freedom, 
and gave content to rights through the interrogation of the scope, and nature of the rights 
implicated.
299
 Furthermore, Roux laments the Constitutional Court’s scant use of foreign law, after 
Ackermann J left its bench.
300
  
 
Whilst judges obviously need to be cautious in their use of comparative sources, taking into account 
the fact that they lack intimate information pertaining to the historical, social and legal context of 
the particular comparative jurisdiction that they have chosen to use in a particular case they may be 
dealing with at a particular time,
301
 there is a great need to learn from other jurisdictions in order to 
illuminate and develop South African jurisprudence, especially in the context of socio-economic 
rights.
302
 
 
A court, tribunal or forum should consider foreign law when interpreting a constitution or the 
domestic legal system, particularly where there are similarities in legal, political and social 
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contexts.
303
 In the following section, I highlight key constitutional law cases dealing with housing 
rights in the context of the Colombian and Indian Constitutions to illustrate the fact that there is a 
developing jurisprudence on housing rights which can serve as a valuable reference point for the 
South African courts in developing their jurisprudence under section 26. These jurisdictions have 
been selected, given the similar socio-economic and developemental challenges they face, and their 
common history of colonialism with South Africa. 
  
3 6 2 Cases from Colombia and India 
 
There are a number of interesting developments in socio-economic and human rights jurisprudence 
in the abovementioned jurisdictions that might serve as a useful reference point for South African 
courts, especially for the Constitutional Court in the interpretation of the right of access to adequate 
housing.
304
 The Colombian Constitution (1991) protects and promotes rights in three catagories, 
fundamental rights, socio-economic rights, and collective and environmental rights.
305
 The first 
category of rights consists of civil and political rights, including some negative duties relating to 
economic, social and cultural rights.
306
 The second category is made up of economic, social and 
cultural rights,
307
 and the third made up of consumer and environmental rights.
308
 The right to 
adequate housing is guanteed in article 51 of the Colombian Constitution. Article 51 of the 
Colombian Constitution places negative and positive duties on the state to protect and promote the 
right to adequate housing by devising and providing the appropriate housing programme and 
finance aimed at the progressive realisation of this right.  
 
                                                          
303
 This could be determined by having regard to the facts of each case, and practicalities. This means that the Court 
does not need to have a strictly similar case as to facts before it in order to consider foreign law. It would suffice if 
the case before the court bears different facts, but raises similar issues of law and practice that are found in foreign 
law. 
304
 Courtis C “Argentina: Some promising signs” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends 
in International and Comparative Law (2008) 163-181 at 176-177; Sepúlveda M “Colombia: The Constitutional 
Court’s role in addressing social justice” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (2008) 144-162 at 151-152. 
305
 See chapters 1, 2 and 3 of the Colombian Constitution. 
306
 Articles 11-41 of the Colombian Constitution. 
307
 Articles 42-77 of the Colombian Constitution. 
308
 Articles 78-82 of the Colombian Constitution. 
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The Constitution also establishes a Constitutional Court, which is the final arbiter of the rights in 
the Colombian Constitution. The Court protects various rights, including the economic, social and 
cultural rights under the abstract constitutional review of legislation, as well as decisions delivered 
in the case of individual complaints.
309
 The Constitutional Court mainly protects socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution through the method of protection of fundamental rights called tutela 
action, which is a simplified procedure to refer cases to the Court. This procedure allows 
individuals and groups alike to approach a Court or tribunal for the immidiate protection of their 
fundamental rights where their rights are threatened or violated.
310
 
  
The housing jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court for instance, serves as a useful 
example.
311
 This is because of the genuine willingness to develop the substantive content of socio-
economic rights. The Colombian Constitutional Court has made great strides despite operating 
under a situation of political instability. The Court held in Judgment T-025/2004 that various rights 
of internally displaced persons as guaranteed in the Colombian Constitution have been violated by 
various organs of State.
312
 Judgment T-025/2004 was confirmed in Judgment T-821/2007, the Court 
in T-025/2004 was confronted with 108 cases filed by internally displaced persons and their 
families. These cases related to a number of similar cases filed by 1150 families, consisting of 
women, minors, elderly and many indigenous persons.  These applicants were victims of forced 
internal displacements in various parts of Colombia owing to events that took place over one and a 
half years before this case.
313
 The Court reasoned that the issues for determination were whether the 
applicants had standing before it, and whether their rights to work, minimum subsistence income, 
dignified housing, healthcare, and access to education amongst other rights were violated by the 
                                                          
309
 Sepúlveda (note 304 above) at 145. 
310
 Sepúlveda (note 304 above) at 146-147. 
311
 Judgement T-025/2004 (Colombian Constitutional Court); Judgment T-821/2007 (Colombian Constitutional 
Court); Manrique D “Restitution for internally displaced persons: A step towards peace and recovery in Colombia” 
(March 2008) 5 Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1-12 at 1-4; Yamin AE and Parra Verra O “Judgment T-
760/08 and the restructuring of Colombia’s health system” (June 2009) 6 Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1-
8 at 1-4. It is noteworthy that most judgments of the Colombian Constitutional Court are available in Spanish, with a 
select few available in English, such as T-025/2004, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media 
/Files/Projects/IDP/Laws%20and%20Policies/Colombia/Colombia_T%20025_2004.pdf (accessed on 25 June 2011). 
T-821/2007 is available from the article of Manrique 2008. 
312
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) at 2.2. 
313
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 1-2.  
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failure of the State entities concerned to adequately address their plight as internally displaced 
persons.
314
 
 
The Court reasoned further that internally displaced persons were entitled to the minimum level of 
satisfaction of their constitutional rights by reason of their vulnerable position. The minimum level 
of satisfaction involved two legs: the duty to respect the bundle of fundamental constitutional rights 
of internally displaced persons, and the satisfaction by the State of certain positive duties 
originating from the constitutional rights and international law relating to internally displaced 
persons.
315
 In this regard, the Court held that internally displaced persons had a right to basic 
subsistence. This entailed the obligation on the State to provide them with essential food and 
potable water, basic shelter and housing, appropriate clothing, necessary healthcare and sanitation. 
The compliance by the State with these duties would ensure that internally displaced persons 
enjoyed a dignified life.
316
 
 
The Court noted its previous jurisprudence in the context of the right to dignified housing for 
internally displaced persons, by holding that internally displaced persons had a right to be provided 
with basic housing and lodging conditions by the State, because of the conditions they had to 
endure as a direct result of their displacement. These include being forced to abandon their homes 
or places of residence and being forced into deplorable housing conditions at the place where they 
are placed.
317
 Moreover, the State was found to have violated various rights of the internally 
displaced persons in this case, and was ordered to provide access to programmes for economic 
stabilisation of the living conditions of the internally displaced.  These programmes were to include 
temporary jobs, productive projects, training, food security, and housing amongst other socio-
economic rights.
318
 Finally, the State was required to report to the court within a month from the 
date of judgment on its progress in complying with the order given in this judgment.
319
 
 
                                                          
314
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 1-2.  
315
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 9. 
316
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 9. 
317
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 5.2. 
318
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) paras 10.2.1 and IV. 
319
 Judgment T-025/2004 (note 311 above) para 10.2.1. 
   
           
   
103 
 
There is much to learn from the Colombian Constitutional Court’s express engagement with the 
social and economic conditions of displaced communities, and its responsiveness to their needs. In 
many respects, the living conditions of displaced persons in Colombia mirror those of people living 
in informal settlements in various parts of South Africa. Internally displaced persons have no access 
to water, sanitation, adequate housing, electricity, food, and other essential necessities, just as 
residents in informal settlements and those living in inadequate housing in South Africa. In many 
respects, the Colombian Constitutional Court shows an admirable sensitivity to the lived realities of 
socio-economic marginalised communities, and has developed an interpretation of housing-related 
rights which seeks to advance the values of human dignity and minimum participation rights in 
society for these communities. In addition, the Court has been willing to fashion participatory 
structural remedies which involve government, civil society organisations and affected communities 
in designing and monitoring the relevant programmes to give effect to the Court’s normative 
prescriptions.
320
 
 
The Indian constitutional jurisprudence is also a rich source of interpretative and remedial 
approaches to socio-economic rights, including the specific context of the right to housing. Key 
cases in this regard include Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (hereafter ‘Olga Tellis’); 
Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame (hereafter ‘Shantistar Builders’); Chameli Singh 
and Others v State of UP and Another (hereafter ‘Chameli’); and Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and Others (hereafter ‘Nawab Khan’). 321 
 
The Indian Constitution (1950) distinguishes between enforceable fundamental rights and non-
justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy (‘DPSPs’), including the powers and duties of the 
State.
322
 Section 37 of the Indian Constitution provides that the provisions found in Part IV (DPSPs) 
                                                          
320
 Sepúlveda (note 304 above) at 161-162. 
321
 Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545; Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal 
Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520; Chameli Singh and Others v State of UP and Another (1996) 2 SCC 549; Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and Others (1996) RD-SC 1300. These cases form part of a 
long list of cases since the Olga Tellis case, which deal with the plight of pavement dwellers or the homeless in 
India.   
322
 See Part III of the Indian Constitution, which protects fundamental rights such as articles 14 (the right to 
equality), 20 (right against double jeopardy), 21 (right to life), 22 (fair trial rights). For Directive Principles of State 
Policy, see: Part IV of the Indian Constitution. See also: Muralidhar S “India: the expectations and challenges of 
judicial enforcement of social rights” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Norms in 
International and Comparative Law (2008) 102-123 at 102. 
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are not enforceable by any court, but the priciples found therein are neverthess fundamental in the 
governance of the country, and must be taken into account by the State in making laws. In addition, 
section 39 of the Indian Constitution makes provision for certain principles of state policy that the 
State must follow, such as the right to an adequate means of livelihood.
323
 The DPSPs have 
however gradually acquired a measure of justiciability through the interpretation of certain 
fundamental rights by the Indian Supreme Court, such as the right to life, right to livelihood, right to 
live with dignity and equality of status as including within their ambit economic, social and cultural 
rights.    
 
The Indian Supreme Court has developed the right to housing or shelter under the auspices of the 
right to life.
324
 It has held that the right to life encompasses the right to live with dignity, the right to 
clean and safe drinking water, and the right to a livelihood.
325
 A leading example of the latter 
development, particularly in the context of housing rights, is the Indian Supreme Court decision in 
Shantistar Builders. The applicants complained that the State had set aside land under the Urban 
Land (Ceiling and Regulations) 1976, so that houses could be built for the “weaker section of 
society.”326 However, the applicants alleged that this had not been done because the weaker sections 
of society (poor people) were not accommodated by the builders in the housing scheme. This failure 
to accommodate the weaker sections of society was challenged on the basis that it violated the 
exemptions granted by the State in respect of the land. The builders were alleged to be leaving the 
weaker sections out of the scheme even though they applied timeously for apartments.
327
 The Court 
in Shantistar Builders reasoned that basic needs were no longer limited to food, clothing and 
shelter, but that the right to life included within its contours the rights to food, clothing, decent 
environment and reasonable accommodation to live in, amongst others.
328
 In addition, the Court 
reasoned that suitable accommodation is important to a human being because it allows a human 
being to grow in every aspect, physically, mentally, and intellectually.
329
  
 
                                                          
323
 Section 39(a) of the Indian Constitution. 
324
 Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
325
 Muralidhar 2008 (note 322 above) at 112-115. 
326
 This case was declared moot in the Bombay High Court because of changes in state policy. 
327
 Shantistar Builders (note 321 above) paras 7-8. 
328
 Shantistar Builders (note 321 above) para 9. 
329
 Shantistar Builders (note 321 above) para 9. 
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The Court accordingly ordered that the truthfulness of the applicants’ claims, along with those of 
others who claimed to belong to the weaker section of society be examined in accordance with the 
guidelines it laid down.
330
 The Court also ordered the builders not to allocate any apartments until 
the claims of the 1420 applicants, the same applicants who brought this case to court had been 
verified.
331
 This case and others have been confirmed and elaborated upon in the Nawab Khan 
case.
332
 The significance of the Shantistar Builders case and similar cases is that they demonstrate 
the Court’s willingness to engage with the substantive content of the economic, social and cultural 
rights, in particular, the right to adequate housing or shelter, which the Court views as connected to 
the other basic needs. 
 
The Indian Supreme Court has attempted to overcome the formal non-justiciability of the Directive 
Principles through developing the principle of the interdependence of civil and political rights, and 
economic, social and cultural rights or principles. To this end, the Court has interpreted the right to 
life, right to livelihood, right to live with dignity and equality of status, as taking within their sweep 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to shelter.  
 
The Court has interpreted the right to life so as to incorporate the essential values protected by 
housing rights or the right to shelter. It has done so through the interpretation of various provisions 
of the Indian Constitution such as the right to life as forming part of the right to shelter. However, 
this protection of shelter under the Indian Constitution has focused mainly on the negative duties 
imposed by the right to adequate housing or shelter.
333
 Despite this shortcoming, the Indian 
Supreme Court has given an expansive meaning to the right to shelter, and this may prove 
instructive for the South African Constitutional Court in interpreting the right of access to adequate 
housing entrenched in our Constitution. 
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 Shantistar Builders (note 321 above) para 14. 
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  Nawab Khan (note 321 above). 
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3 7 Conclusion 
 
In the above sections, I have attempted to demonstrate how the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing guaranteed in section 26(1) of the Constitution can be developed 
through applying the methodology set out in section 39(1) (a), (b), and (c) of the Constitution. To 
that end, I have highlighted key features of the history and context of housing in South Africa 
including how this history and context assist in understanding the current housing crisis, specifically 
the conditions of homelessness and inadequate housing in which the majority of the population live 
in. In addition, I have elaborated on how the constitutional values of human dignity, equality, 
freedom as well as ubuntu can illuminate the underlying purposes and values protected by the right 
of access to adequate housing. 
 
Furthermore, I have elaborated on the meaning of housing in international human rights law, 
including the key elements of adequacy in the context of housing which have been identified in 
international and regional human rights instruments and jurisprudence. These benchmarks of 
adequacy have great potential to assist the Court in developing the qualitative dimensions of the the 
right of access to adequate housing guaranteed in the Constitution. Finally, I have highlighted 
selected housing jurisprudence from Colombia and India to illustrate how comparative 
constitutional courts have succeeded in being responsive to the lived realities of homeless 
communities or those living in inadequate housing. This sensitivity to context and the values and 
purposes underlying housing rights can serve as  rich reference points to the South African courts as 
they agitate to develop the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing.  In the 
following chapter I shall  consider how the South African Constitutional Court has sought to define 
the meaning and the scope of the right of access to adequate housing.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ADEQUATE 
HOUSING IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, how the South African Constitutional Court (‘the Court’) has dealt with the meaning 
and content of the right of access to adequate housing in cases involving the long-standing 
deprivations of access to adequate housing, such as those involving residents of informal 
settlements, and those in inadequate housing, will be examined.1 
 
In this section, I will build on the analysis and arguments developed in the previous section dealing 
with developing the right to housing as a human right. To that end, I will assess the extent to which 
the Court has developed the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing by first 
analysing the cases of Grootboom, Port Elizabeth Municipality v various Occupiers (hereafter ‘PE 
Municipality’), Jaftha v Schoeman and Another, Van Rooyen Stoltz and Other (hereafter ‘Jaftha’), 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others (hereafter ‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’), Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (hereafter ‘Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community’), Joseph v City of Johannesburg and Others (hereafter ‘Joseph’),2 and Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others (hereafter ‘Nokotyana’).3 Secondly, I will 
evaluate the extent to which the Court has given substantive content of the right of access to 
adequate housing by evaluating the selected housing jurisprudence. I will also highlight the 
                                                          
1
 See for example The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others [2000] 
ZACC 14; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); Jaftha v 
Schoeman and Another, Van Rooyen Stoltz and Other [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others [2008] ZACC 
1; 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others [2009] 
ZACC 16; 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC).    
2
 [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC). 
3
 [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC). These housing rights cases are a representative sample of major cases 
on the right of access to adequate housing that dealt with the negative and positive duties arising out of this right.    
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inconsistent approach of the Court when it deals with the negative as opposed to the positive duties 
arising out of the right of access to adequate housing.
4
 
  
Finally, I will briefly analyse the remedies provided in these cases with a view to considering what 
light they shed on the substantive content of housing rights. This chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the extent to which the Court has developed the substantive content of the housing 
rights as found in section 26 of the Constitution. 
 
4 2 Analysis of selected jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court on housing 
rights 
 
4  2 1 Grootboom 
 
The Grootboom matter concerned a group of poor and desperate people who lived in an informal 
settlement called Wallacedene, and who were forced to move onto  privately owned land situated at 
Wallacedene, earmarked for low-cost housing because they had nowhere else to go. They were later 
evicted by the owner of the land, and had their belongings destroyed in the process. Mrs. 
Grootboom and others in the group then sought  refuge at the Wallacedene sports grounds.
5
  
 
                                                          
4
 See Shue H Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and the U.S Foreign Policy (1980) 1-248 at 35-55. Shue argued 
that economic, social and cultural rights, like civil and political rights, give rise to both positive and negative 
obligations. In addition, he argued that these obligations are imposed upon various actors. What Shue meant by 
positive obligations was that the State for instance, is required to take certain positive actions in order to realise or to 
promote and protect peoples’ rights. Negative obligations meant that the State is required to refrain from taking 
certain actions that would deprive people of their rights, or interfere with their rights. This was adopted by the 
United Nations, South African courts and courts in other countries, and academics. For a comprehensive discussion 
of positive and negative duties imposed by socio-economic rights and the critique of this categorisation, see also 
Craven M “Assessment of the progress on adjudication of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” In John Squires et 
al (eds) The Road To A Remedy: Current Issues In Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2005) 27-42. 
This fourfold typology has also been taken up in section 7(2) of the South African Constitution. See also reference 
to this typology of duties in the following Constitutional Court cases: Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [1996]; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 
78; Grootboom (note 1 above)  paras 20, 34 and 88; Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 
and Others (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721(CC) paras 23-24, 32, 39 and 46; Jaftha (note 1 above); 
Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others [2011] ZACC 14; 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC); Governing Body of Juma 
Musjid Primary School and Others v Essay N.O. and Others [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) paras 31, 
45 and 57-60. 
5
 Grootboom (note 1 above) paras 7-11. 
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On appeal to the Constitutional Court,
6
 the Court reasoned amongst other things that “socio-
economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; they cannot be said to exist on paper 
only...”7 The Court reasoned further that it was duty bound by section 7(2) of the Constitution to 
make sure that these rights are protected and fulfilled.
8
 The question was accordingly not whether 
these rights were enforceable, but how to enforce them in any particular case.
9
  
 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the issue of how to enforce such rights was a difficult issue 
that had to be determined by a court on the facts of each case.
10
 The Court reasoned further that the 
approach to the interpretation of section 26, like all other rights in the Bill of Rights, is to view 
section 26 in its context.
11
 Viewing rights in their context required a consideration of their textual 
setting, the Bill of Rights as a whole, and their social and historical context. The social and 
historical context in South Africa, as elaborated in chapter 3, is one of deep social inequality. 
Subsection (1) of section 26 guarantees the general right of everyone to have access to adequate 
housing, while subsection (2) spells out the scope of positive duties imposed upon the State to take 
“reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.” Subsection (3) protects people against arbitrary evictions and provides that 
“[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.”12 
 
The Court further reasoned that the rights guaranteed in the Constitution are interrelated and 
mutually sustaining.
13
 All socio-economic rights sought to advance certain values and purposes, 
such as human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of the Constitution.
14
 These 
values and purposes are denied to those members of society who have no food, clothing or shelter.
15
 
                                                          
6
 This matter was an appeal from a judgment and order of the Western Cape High Court, see: Grootboom and 
Others v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
7
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 20. 
8
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 20. 
9
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 20. 
10
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 20. 
11
 Grootboom (note 1 above) paras 21-22 and 25.  
12
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 21. 
13
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 23. 
14
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 23. 
15
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 23. 
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In Chapter 3 of this thesis I sought to develop and elaborate on the role of these fundamental values, 
along with the value of Ubuntu, in developing the substantive content of the right to housing. 
 
Moreover, the realisation of socio-economic rights is vital to the enjoyment of all the rights 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, and to enabling all members of our society to reach their full 
potential.
16
 It follows that the right of access to adequate housing has to be seen in light of other 
socio-economic rights.
17
 This is fortified by the Court’s reasoning that “the state is obliged to take 
positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness, or 
intolerable housing.”18 
 
The Court also rejected the arguments raised by the amici curiae based on the minimum core 
obligation concept. In this regard, the Court held that it would be difficult to determine the 
minimum core of the right of access to adequate housing in any given case, taking into account the 
variation in needs, locality and other difficulties.
19
 However, the Court held that it would be willing 
to take the minimum core into account if sufficient information was placed before it.
20
 It is 
noteworthy though that the Court did not provide examples of information that it would require to 
determine the minimum core, and what would constitute sufficient information. 
 
The Court further reasoned that international law can serve as a guide to the interpretation of the 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution, but the weight attached to a particular principle or rule of 
international law will differ from case to case, depending on the facts.
21
 However, where a 
particular rule or principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be directly applicable.
22
 
The Court went on to distinguish between the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the Constitution, and concluded that there were some differences between the 
provisions of the Covenant and the Constitution pertaining to housing rights.
23
 For example, the 
                                                          
16
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 23. 
17
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 24. 
18
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 24. 
19
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 33. 
20
 Grootboom (note 1 above) paras 30-33. The amici curiae had submitted arguments based on international law, in 
particular relying on General Comment No. 3 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
21
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 26. 
22
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 26. 
23
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 28. 
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Covenant provided for “adequate housing,” while the Constitution provided for the “the right of 
access to adequate housing”; the Covenant imposed duties on State Parties to take “appropriate 
steps” which included legislation, while the Constitution obliged the South African state to take 
“reasonable legislative and other measures.”24 
 
Significantly, the Court held in Grootboom that the right of access to adequate housing “recognises 
that housing entails more than brick and mortar.”25 It includes all that makes housing feasible and 
habitable such as land and a variety of basic services.
26
 This right also suggests that it is not only the 
state that is responsible for its provision, but that the state had to enable other actors in society, 
through legislation and other measures, to play a role in the provision of housing.
27
  
 
The Court reasoned further that a distinction must be drawn between those people who can afford to 
pay for housing, and those who cannot.
28
 This distinction determine the State’s obligations; the 
State is required to provide a springboard for those who can afford to pay for housing, by unlocking 
the housing market.
29
 In contrast, special attention to the provision of housing must be afforded by 
the State to those who cannot afford to pay for housing.
30
 This means that the State, in designing 
housing programmes, cannot treat the poor in the same way as people who have sufficient income 
to meet their housing needs. 
  
The Court held that constitutional compliance by the State with its duties in terms of section 26 
depended on whether the housing measures devised by the State were reasonable. Reasonableness 
in this context depends on factors such as the allocation of responsibilities to different spheres of 
government and ensuring that appropriate financial and human resources are made available.
31
 A 
reasonable government programme in the context of socio-economic rights must be coordinated, 
coherent and  comprehensive;
32
 it must be directed towards the progressive realisation of the right 
                                                          
24
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 28. 
25
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 35. 
26
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 35. 
27
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 35. 
28
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 36. 
29
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 36. 
30
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 36. 
31
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 39. 
32
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 40. 
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of access to adequate housing within available resources;
33
 it must be reasonably conceived and 
implemented;
34
 it must be balanced and flexible, making provision for short, medium and long term 
housing needs.
35
 Finally, it must make provision for those whose housing needs that are most 
urgent, and those who find themselves in crisis situations.
36
 The last criterion was derived 
particularly from the value of human dignity because the right of access to adequate housing is 
based on the fact that human beings are valued and must be protected by ensuring that they enjoy 
basic human necessities.
37
 
 
In applying these criteria, the Court found that the State’s housing programme in the Cape 
Metropolitan area did not meet the reasonableness review criterion, and therefore fell short of the 
duties imposed on the State by section 26(2) of the Constitution. This was because it did not make 
housing provision for those people in desperate need, with no land, no roof over their heads, and 
who lived in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.
38
 To that end, the Court found it appropriate 
to make a declaratory order to the effect that the State was required to comply with its obligations in 
terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution by devising an emergency housing programme.
39
 
 
The positive implications of the Grootboom decision of the Court are that the Court appeared 
genuinely willing to engage systematically with the substantive content of the right of access to 
adequate housing. This is evident in the Court holding that the right of access to adequate housing 
imposed both positive and negative duties on the State to shield against its impairment and to ensure 
its progressive realisation. It also acknowledges that adequate housing consist of far more than a 
simple structure providing shelter from the elements, but consist of the interrelated elements of land 
and associated services. It also acknowledges that decent housing is integrally connected to the 
value of human dignity. Finally, it acknowledges that human needs vary and that a “one-size-fits-
                                                          
33
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 41. 
34
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 42. 
35
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 43. 
36
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 44. 
37
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 44. 
38
 Grootboom (note 1 above) paras 95-96. 
39
 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 96 and 98. The Court also found that the primary duty to provide housing to 
children lay with their parents, and only alternatively with the State, where parents cannot provide for their children, 
see in this regard paras 77-78. The order of the High Court was accordingly replaced with the Court’s order. 
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all” approach in housing design and financing will not acknowledge the diversity of housing needs 
in our society. 
 
The Court also did not completely reject arguments based on the minimum core concept, but 
reasoned that it would be willing to have regard to the minimum core content duties to determine if 
the State complied with the reasonableness review model. However, this depends on the availability 
of enough information in this regard. The challenge then remains in prodding the Court in future 
cases for some guidelines on the nature and scope of this information. Doing so, would contribute 
immensely to the quest for the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
The negative aspects of the Court’s judgment in Grootboom are that the Court reasoned that section 
26(1) of the Constitution laid down the scope of the right of access to adequate housing, without 
elaborating in a systematic manner on its nature and scope and substantive content. This lack of 
attention to the substantive content of section 26(1) contributes to the conflation of the nature and 
scope of the right as guaranteed in section 26(1), and the duties imposed on the State through 
section 26(2) of the Constitution to realise this right.
40
 This conflation detracts from the quest to 
develop the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing, because it makes it 
difficult for the State to know exactly what the goals are which it is supposed to progressively 
realise, and the reasonable measures contemplated by section 26(2).
41
 It also makes it difficult for 
the courts, Chapter 9 institutions,
42
 and civil society organisations to determine if the State has 
complied with its obligations to adopt reasonable measures in the absence of normative benchmarks 
defining the right in section 26(1).
43
 The potential litigants are also left none the wiser about the 
nature of section 26(1), and may not know what this section protects and does not protect. 
Moreover, the failure of the Court to articulate clearly the objective of the right of access to 
adequate housing, leaves the Court with too much discretion in determining the reasonableness of 
the State’s acts or omissions in the context of housing rights. This means that, in the absence of 
clearly defined purposes that this right aims to fulfill, this right can be anything that the court wants 
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it to be.  This can easily result in a dilution of the normative purposes and values underlying the 
right of access to adequate housing.
44
 
 
The other criticism leveled at the Grootboom judgment is its failure to embrace the minimum core 
concept.
45
 It is argued that the Court missed an opportunity to determine the basic threshold 
protected by socio-economic rights and necessary for human survival.
46
 Although this criticism can 
also be seen to be directed at the failure of the Court to develop the substantive content of housing 
as a human right, it is also important to note that developing the substantive content of the right to 
adequate housing does not need to depend on the endorsement of a minimum core obligation 
concept. 
 
In the remedial sphere, the main criticism of the Grootboom decision is that it did not clearly direct 
the State to take positive steps to comply with the duties set out in the order.
47
 This means that 
further proceedings would have had to be instituted for the purposes of seeking a mandatory order, 
setting out in clear terms,  the order the positive steps that the State would have been required to 
comply with.
48
 This was compounded by the failure of the Court in Grootboom to allocate with 
precision,  roles to the different spheres of government, despite an express and clear allocation of 
such roles in the Housing Act 107 of 1997.
49
 This failure to allocate roles to the three spheres of 
government has been blamed for the confusion and discord between different spheres of 
government following the Grootboom decision.
50
 The handing down of a declaratory order, instead 
of a structural interdict or supervisory order so as to enable the Court to monitor progress and 
compliance with its order, has also attracted criticism.
51
 A participatory structural interdict similar 
to that issued by the Colombian Constitutional Court in the Judgment T-025/2004
52
 would enable 
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the State and civil society to enter into a supervised process of determining what precise measures 
would be necessary to ensure short-term relief for those with no access to housing and land and 
living in intolerable conditions. In this way, content could be given to the right to adequate housing 
through a negotiated process by all stakeholders, but with ultimate oversight by the courts for 
ensuring that the constitutional obligations imposed by section 26, are complied with. 
 
In conclusion, the Court in Grootboom, to its credit, edged closer to telling us what it means to have 
access to adequate housing when it reasoned that this right recognised that housing encompassed 
more than  “brick and mortar.”53 This description of what it means to have access to adequate 
housing is significant, but does not draw on the much more substantive standards elaborated under 
international law for determining the adequacy of adequate housing. Adequate housing in 
international law means an adequate standard of housing of a suitable size (taking into account 
family size); provision of essential services such as heating and electricity; and structures which are 
culturally suitable.
54
 It is vital that the meaning of access to adequate housing is elaborated upon by 
the Court taking existing international law standards onto account, as well as the fact that most 
South African families are large, and that there are different cultural groups, and that many people 
live in dire poverty with no access to essential services such as heating and electricity. 
 
4 2 2 Port Elizabeth Municipality 
 
The PE Municipality
55
 matter dealt with eviction proceedings initiated at the instance of the 
Municipality. The Municipality in PE Municipality initiated eviction proceedings in the South 
Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court (‘the High Court’) to evict a large group of people, 
consisting of 68 people, including 23 children who had erected twenty-nine shacks on privately 
owned land within the Municipality’s jurisdiction, and without the Municipality’s permission.56 
This application for eviction by the Municipality followed a petition signed by 1 600 people, which 
included people living in the area where the shacks were erected, and private property owners in the 
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area.
57
 On appeal, this case turned on the appropriate constitutional relationship and balance that 
had to be struck between sections 26 and 25 of the Constitution.
58
 
 
The Municipality argued in Court that it was aware of its constitutional duties emanating from 
section 26 of the Constitution. This was why it had devised a comprehensive housing programme.
59
 
The Municipality argued that the provision of alternative land in this case would amount to “queue-
jumping” by people who occupied private land, and when asked to move, demanded alternative 
accommodation.
60
 If this were allowed, it would disrupt the housing programme, forcing the 
Municipality to give preferential treatment to those that occupy private land unlawfully.
61
  
 
The Court reasoned that section 26(3) embodies a special constitutional space for a person’s home. 
This was because it recognised that “a home is more than just a shelter from the elements… [i]t is a 
zone of personal intimacy and family security.”62 The Constitution envisaged that land, access to 
adequate housing, and protection from arbitrary evictions could not be separated.
63
 This was 
because the stronger the section 25 right (land), the stronger the possibility of a secure home.
64
 
Section 25 of the Constitution therefore recognised in various ways the need to protect residents of 
informal settlements through strengthening their weak security of tenure.
65
 This meant that sections 
25 and 26 created a broad overlap between the land rights and socio-economic rights, emphasising 
the duty on the State to seek to satisfy both.
66
 
 
The Court reasoned further that the rights guaranteed in section 26(3) are defensive, rather than 
assertive.
67
 However, the private land owner cannot without more assert that a particular piece of 
land is his or hers, “and then send in bulldozers and sledgehammers.”68 The Court went on to hold 
that section 26(3) also envisages that the eviction of residents living in informal settlements will 
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take place, even where this results in homelessness.
69
 Furthermore, section 26(3) of the Constitution 
emphasised the need to search for case-specific solutions to the challenges that arise from the 
application of this section.
70
 According to the Court, section 26(3) of the Constitution introduces 
new duties for courts in relation to property not previously part of the common law, by ushering in a 
right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a home. This new regime now requires courts to engage in a 
balancing exercise between the rights of possession, and use, occupation and ownership, by taking 
into account all the interests and circumstances involved between the traditional private property 
rights, and the new right to a home, in order to achieve some measure of fairness between these 
competing rights.
 71  Section 26(3) and its enabling legislation was necessitated by South Africa’s 
social and historical context of forced evictions and land dispossessions along racial lines.
72
  
 
The Court found that the eviction of the residents of the informal settlement in this case was not just 
and equitable given the long period which the occupiers had remained on the land, the fact that 
there was no evidence that the private owners or the Municipality needed to use the land for some 
productive purpose, the absence of any significant attempt by the Municipality to take into account 
the problems of the informal residents in this case, and the fact that the occupiers consisted of a 
relatively small group of people who appeared genuinely homeless and in need.
73
  
 
The PE Municipality matter transformed the traditional notion of private property the origins of 
which goes back to Roman-Dutch-law, by seeking a balance between the concept of private 
property, and the right of access to adequate housing. This development had the result of removing 
the old notion of strong rights or absolute private property rights. The Court also clarified the 
principles applicable to alternative accommodation or land, it reasoned that alternative 
accommodation or land had to be taken into account when people are facing an eviction, but this 
requirement was not an inflexible one.
74
  However, courts should be reluctant to grant an eviction 
order against relatively stable ocuppiers in circumstances where no alternative accommodation or 
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land is made available, even if this is temporary, pending permanent solutions in the formal housing 
programme.
75
  
 
The Court also pointed out that the availability of suitable alternative accommodation would depend 
on a number of factors, and would vary from municipality to municipality, and would also depend 
on the number of people facing eviction; the problems associated with finding something suitable 
for the unlawful occupiers without prejudicing the claims of lawful occupiers, and those in line for 
formal housing; and serious consideration of the occupier’s request for alternative 
accommodation.
76
  The Court also pointed out that the other way of resolving contradictions 
between the section 25 and 26 interests is engagement between the parties involved with the aim of 
finding mutually acceptable solutions.
77
 Face-to-face mediation through a third party would have 
been appropriate in this context, but none of the parties supported it unconditionally, and in any 
event, many of the associated advantages of mediation were lost by the time the appeal was heard.
78
 
 
PE Municipality makes an important contribution in its attempt to flesh out the content and 
implications of the right of access to adequate housing in the specific context of the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers.  The Court recognised, for example, that section 26(3) of the Constitution 
places a high premium on a person’s home. A home is more than just shelter from the elements. It is 
a place of personal intimacy and family safety. A home in this context may also be the only safe 
place of privacy and accord in what is an unreceptive world, especially in the case of the poor and 
marginalised.
79
 
 
The Court in PE Municipality showed a serious willingness to engage systematically with the 
values and purposes underpinning the right of access to adequate housing, albeit in the context of 
section 26(3) of the Constitution.  It reasoned that it was not only the dignity of the poor that is 
negated when the homeless are sent from pillar to post in a desperate search for where they and 
their families can live, but that our society is also demeaned when the State escalates 
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marginalisation, instead of alleviating it.
80
 The Court went further and reasoned that in a society 
founded on human dignity, equality and freedom, it could not be said that the greatest good for the 
many could be achieved at the cost of the suffering of the few, especially where this could be 
avoided by the application of “judicial and administrative statecraft.”81 
 
The Court in PE Municipality also showed its concern with the actual circumstances and needs of 
the particular occupiers, when it reasoned that the existence of a housing programme was not the 
only determinant for the granting of an eviction order, but was important in establishing the context 
under which it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction order.
82
 Moreover, the Court in PE 
Municipality emphasised the interrelationship between different sections in the Bill of Rights, when 
it reasoned that sections 25 and 26 create a wide overlap between land rights, and socio-economic 
rights, and place the spotlight on the State to seek to satisfy both.
83
 The Court  recognised that 
property rights and socio-economic rights, including housing rights could not be separated from the 
land reform struggles.
84
  
 
Finally, the Court in PE Municipality displayed its seriousness in dealing with the substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing in the context of section 26(3) of the Constitution.  
It reasoned in this regard that section 26(3) embodied a need to seek tangible, case-specific 
solutions to the difficult challenges that arise. This was supported by the fact that section 26(3) was 
not prescriptive, but crafted in a way that left space for a court to manage the process.
85
 This is 
relevant to an analysis of section 26(1) of the Constitution, and the quest for the substantive content 
of this right because section 26 is also crafted in generous, non prescriptive terms, and therefore 
allows enough space for the court to guide the process relating to developing its content. 
 
4 2 3 Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
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The Jaftha case concerned the constitutionality of a law that allowed the sale of poor peoples’ 
homes in execution, in order to satisfy trifling debts, and whether this law violated the right of 
access to adequate housing in section 26(1) of the Constitution. The law in question was sections 
66(1)(a) and 67 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 (hereafter ‘the Act’).86 
 
The Court in this case dealt with two similar cases, that of Mrs. Jaftha, and that of Ms. Van Rooyen. 
Both Mrs. Jaftha and Ms. Van Rooyen lost their State subsidised homes in sales in execution, due to 
trifling debts. The net result of these sales in execution would have been evictions, homelessness, 
and both Mrs. Jaftha and Ms. Van Rooyen would have been disqualified from ever benefiting from 
State housing subsidies.
87 
This case came before the Court as an appeal from the decision of the 
Western Cape High Court.
88
  The facts remained the same, but for the first time the Constitutional 
Court, the applicants relied on sections 25(1), and 10 of the Constitution.
89
 
 
The Court in Jaftha noted that it had yet to consider the concept of adequate housing in detail, but 
that this concept had been considered in detail in international law, and the Constitution required the 
Court to consider international law when interpreting provisions of the Bill of Rights.
 90
  The Court 
went on to endorse the approach to the right to adequate housing developed in international law as 
relevant to a section 26 analysis and evaluation because the courts are required by section 39(1)(b) 
of the Constitution to take international law into account when interpreting the Bill of Rights.
91
  
 
The Court emphasised that the concept of adequacy was essential in relation to housing,    
“adequacy is ‘determined in part by social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other 
factors.’”92 The other important feature in relation to housing as noted by the Committee is the 
security of tenure, which takes many forms other than ownership.
93
 The Court also noted that the 
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Committee found that security of tenure also has to encompass a guarantee of legal protections to 
all persons against ‘forced eviction, harassment and other threats.’94  
 
The Court affirmed further that every claim based on socio-economic rights also implicates the right 
to dignity.
95
 Therefore, the appellants’ reliance on section 10 as a self-standing right does not add 
anything new to their claim, making it unnecessary to consider this argument.
96
 The Court similarly 
found that it was unnecessary to consider arguments based on section 25(1) of the Constitution even 
though this section could add new dimensions to a section 26 analysis.
97
 The reason for not 
considering section 25(1) arguments was based on the conclusion reached by the Court on section 
26.
98
 
 
The Court held that section 26(1) of the Constitution embraced a negative duty not to deprive 
persons of access to adequate housing, and any measure that allowed a person to be deprived of 
their existing access to adequate housing, constituted a limitation of section 26(1). However, this 
limitation may be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
99
  In applying section 36, the 
Court held that a balancing exercise needed to be conducted in all sales in execution. This involved 
weighing the interests of creditors who were owed sums of money by the debtors, and the interests 
of debtors who stood to lose their homes.
100
  
 
In applying the limitations inquiry to the facts in casu, the Court held that section 66(1) of the 
Magistrates’ Court Act was a severe limitation of an important right because it put the appellants in 
a position where they might never be able to benefit from State housing subsidies again, and might 
never be able to restore their human dignity, and all because of a trifling debt.
101
 Moreover, the 
Court held that once a creditor’s claim cannot be satisfied against attachment of movables, that 
creditor must request the court which has jurisdiction to consider an application to execute against 
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immovables.
102
 The Court would then have to consider all the relevant factors in the case together 
with section 26 of the Constitution.
103
 These factors included the size of the debt; compliance with 
the procedure prescribed by the rules; circumstances giving rise to the debt; and the availability of 
ways of recovering the debt, other than execution against immovable property of the debtor.
104
 
Section 66(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act was therefore declared unconstitutional and invalid to 
the extent of invalidity. 
  
By way of a remedy, a reading in remedy in respect of section 66(1) was ordered to permit judicial 
oversight over all proposed executions against immovable property.
105
 The Court reasoned that 
courts must have judicial oversight over all executions against immovable property. This required 
that a creditor first execute against movables to discharge the debt, and only once insufficient 
movables to satisfy the debt are found, must the creditor apply to the court to execute against 
immovable property.
106
 
 
The Jaftha matter signals the Court’s willingness to develop the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing, in the context of the negative duties imposed by this right. This is 
evident in the Court’s application of international law, its sensitivity to the social and historical 
context of housing in South Africa, and its express engagement with the values and purposes 
protected by the right of access to adequate housing. Of particular importance in this context  was 
the right to human dignity.
107
 
 
Furthermore, the Court made an important contribution to the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing by requiring that there be judicial oversight in all contemplated sales in 
execution of people’s homes. This judicial oversight requires courts to consider all the relevant 
circumstances of the case in all proposed sales in execution of the debtor’s home. This contributes 
to the development of the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing because it 
means that courts will be slow to allow the taking away of existing access to adequate housing 
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without consideration of the matrix of factors which the Court held were relevant to executions 
against immovable property.  
 
The Jaftha matter marked the Court’s first case in which the Court elaborated to some extent on the 
nature of negative duties imposed by section 26, and the model of judicial review applicable to 
cases involving violations of negative duties.
108
 It illustrate’s the Court’s willingness to robustly 
protect poor people who already enjoy access to adequate housing, and are deprived of such access 
through legislative or other measures.
109
 
 
4 2 4 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
 
This matter involved more than 400 occupiers of two buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg, 
who challenged the correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) in the 
Constitutional Court.
110
 The SCA decision confirmed their eviction by the City of Johannesburg 
based on the finding that the buildings they occupied were unsafe and unhealthy.
111
 The conduct of 
the City of Johannesburg in evicting the occupiers from the said buildings was pursuant to the 
provisions of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (‘the 
Act’), and the Health Act of 1977.112 
 
The Court held that it was clear that the City had not made any attempt to meaningfully engage with 
the occupiers, before and after their eviction proceedings, even though the City must have been 
aware of the possibility that the eviction proceedings would leave the occupiers homeless.
113
 
Section 26(2) of the Constitution in this context required the Municipality to give a reasonable 
response to potentially homeless people with whom it engages.
114
 This response could entail 
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making permanent housing available in some cases or to providing no housing at all in some 
cases.
115
 
 
The Court held further that meaningful engagement emanates from section 26(2) of the 
Constitution, and imposes duties on the City to engage with those that are likely to be homeless as a 
result of the eviction.
116
 This was because reasonableness embraced every step taken to secure the 
provision of adequate housing.
117
 The Court reasoned further that where a Municipality institutes 
eviction proceedings against people who could become homeless, it has a constitutional duty to 
meaningfully engage, and this fact forms part of the factors that should be taken into account in the 
section 26(3) enquiry.
118
 The Court also held that, in this case, the SCA erred in granting an order of 
eviction when no meaningful engagement took place before the eviction of the occupiers.
119
 
 
The Court elaborated in some detail on the purposes and nature of meaningful engagement. It held 
that meaningful engagement played an essential role in the resolution of disputes, and contributed 
towards an increased understanding and care where both parties were willing to take part in the 
process. It held that meaningful engagement entailed a two-way process in which the City and the 
occupiers about to become homeless, would communicate with each other in order to achieve 
certain aims.
120
 There was no closed-list of aims that meaningful engagement could seek to achieve, 
but these could include the circumstances and consequences of the proposed evictions.
121
 A 
Municipality needed to be aware that people who were facing an eviction were vulnerable, and may 
not understand the essential nature of engagement, and may refuse to take part in the meaningful 
engagement process. If those facing eviction refused to take part in this process, the Municipality 
could not simply walk away, but had a duty to make reasonable efforts to reach out to those facing 
eviction.
122
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The Court in this case issued an order for the parties to engage meaningfully with each other on 
various aspects of the dispute before the Court’s final judgment. The parties were required to report-
back to Court on the outcomes of this engagement process.
123
 It was in this context that that the 
Court endorsed an agreement reached between the parties, in terms of which the City and the 
occupiers reached an agreement on issues of alternative accommodation, making it unnecessary for 
the Court to consider it.
124
 The Court also found it unnecessary to deal with the issue of permanent 
housing because the settlement agreement between the parties provided that the solution in relation 
to permanent housing would be developed in consultation with the occupiers.
125
 In addition, the 
Court reasoned that there was no reason to believe that the consultation process would not be 
conducted in good faith since the City was now willing to engage meanigfully with the occupiers. 
Consequently, the dire situation of the occupiers was alleviated by the City’s response in the 
engagement process.
126
 What is more, the Court was not willing to be the court of first and final 
instance on the question of whether the City had conducted itself reasonably in the engagement 
process, and was not willing to be the only determinant on the reasonableness of the permanent 
housing plan.
127
 
 
The Court’s endorsement of the agreement between the parties implied that the Court was satisfied 
that the City intended to comply with its constitutional duties in relation to the right of access to 
adequate housing, that the City would make the bad buildings safe and habitable, provide 
alternative accommodation, and provide basic services in the interim, while negotiating permanent 
housing in consultation with the occupiers.
128
 
 
The Court therefore held that the SCA erred in concluding that there was nothing constitutionally 
problematic in the failure of the City to take into account the availability of suitable alternative 
accommodation or land for the occupiers in taking a decision in terms of section 12(4)(b)
129
 of the 
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Act.
130
  The City must therefore take into account the possibility of the homelessness of any 
occupier as a result of a section 12(4)(b) eviction process. 
 
Moreover, the Court found that it was neither just nor equitable to set aside section 12(6) of the Act. 
However, it was appropriate to encourage people to vacate unsafe and unhealthy buildings in line 
with a court order for their eviction.
131
 The Court went on to hold that a criminal sanction, such as 
that envisaged in section 12(6) of the Act did not have this effect, but provided an additional 
encouragement for occupiers to leave unsafe and unhealthy buildings, reducing the necessity for the 
state to pursue forceful evictions.
132
 
 
Finally, the Court held that judicial oversight needed to be infused into a  reading and application of 
section 12(6) of the Act through a reading-in remedy, so as to require that the subsection apply to 
occupiers, who after the service on them of an eviction order, continued to remain in occupation of 
the unsafe and unhealthy property.
133
 
 
This case represents what is possible when the Court engages with the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing, in the context of section 26(3), and by extension what can be 
achieved in the context of section 26(1) of the Constitution. The Court in this case endorsed a post-
engagement agreement that made provision for the interim improvements to the bad buildings, the 
provision of  alternative accommodation, and provision of basic services to the occupiers pending 
engagement on permanent housing. This endorsement took place prior to the determination of the 
main case, and this means that the Court was serious about the plight of those in desperate need of 
housing. 
 
The endorsement of a post-engagement agreement by the Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
prior to the the finalisation of the matter represents a further development of meaningful 
engagement beyond PE Municipality,
134
 which in turn shows the potential of meaningful 
engagement to agitate for the development of the substantive content of the right of access to 
                                                          
130
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 1 above) para 46. 
131
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 1 above) para 50. 
132
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 1 above) paras 50-51 and 54.  
133
 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road (note 1 above) para 51. 
134
 PE Municipality (note 1 above). 
   
127 
 
adequate housing.
135
 However, there are differences of opinion on the contribution of meaningful 
engagement to the development of the right of access to adequate housing.  
 
Lillian Chenwi argues that meaningful engagement enhances democracy through the promotion of 
participatory and deliberative democracy, and is a progressive remedy capable of promoting social 
transformation.
136
 She further argues that the Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road grounded the 
duty to engage meanifully within the City’s constitutional duties to provide services to communities 
in a systematic manner, promote social and economic development, and encourage community 
involvement in local government matters, to fulfill the goals set in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and the State’s duty 
in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution, and the need to treat human beings as human 
beings.
137
 
 
Kirsty McLean notes the potential positive contribution that meaningful engagement can play, but 
criticises the Court’s use of meaningful engagement to avoid dealing with issues, and argues that 
meaningful engagment amounts to nothing but the audi alteram partem rule.
138
 She argues further 
that the Court failed to engage with the substantive issues raised, and that this is illustrated by its 
decision in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, where it failed to deal with the substance of the challenge 
on the housing policy brought by the parties, and encouraged the parties to resolve their dispute 
through a settlement.
139
 
 
McLean further argues that despite the Court’s identification of outstanding issues between the 
parties, such as the failure of the City to conceive and formulate a housing plan for similarly 
situated people; the City’s policy in dealing with dilapidated buildings; the constitutionality of 
section 12(4)(b) of the Act; the review of the City’s eviction notices to the occupiers; the 
applicability of the PIE Act; and the reach and applicability of section 26 (1), (2) and (3) of the 
                                                          
135 
Different opinions on this are taken up in the evaluation section below. 
136
 Chenwi L “A new approach to remedies in socio-economic rights adjudication: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v 
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 371-394 at 379-382 and 382-
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Constitution.
140
 The Court ended up deciding a narrow question of the constitutionality of the 
criminal sanction imposed by section 12 of the Act, in the event of non-compliance with the notices 
issued in terms of the Act. The rest of the issues were left to the parties to negotiate about, despite 
the fact that the occupiers complained that the parties had not been able to reach agreement 
previously on these issues.
141
 This approach by the Court according to McLean, is different from 
“judicial avoidance,” but appears to be unwillingness to decide the issues at all.142 
 
The Court confirmed its earlier housing jurisprudence in Grootboom, and PE Municipality, on the 
need to apply the purposes and values protected by the right of access to adequate housing.
143
 In 
particular, it held that any enquiry into section 26 must take into account the foundational values of 
the Constitution, human dignity, equality and freedom. This means that human beings, especially 
those in desperate need of suitable housing need to be treated with the appropriate care and 
respect.
144
 
 
Lastly, Chenwi criticises the decision in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road for the failure of the Court to 
address the question of the location of the alternative accommodation.
145
 She argues that addressing 
this question was important for the provision of guidelines for future cases.
146
 This criticism may be 
unfair on the Court, taking into account that the issue of the location of alternative accommodation 
was largely resolved through a post-engagement agreement.
147
 This agreement also obliged the City 
to provide the occupiers with alternative accommodation in certain identified buildings, pending the 
provision of permanent housing.
148
 However, Chenwi is correct to assert that the location of 
alternative accommodation is a critical factor that must be taken into account in determining the 
justice and equity of eviction orders.
149
 The Court could have made this clearer in its judgment, so 
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that location as a critical element of the suitability of alternative accommodation does not simply 
depend on negotiations between the parties.  
 
4 2 5 Residents of Joe Slovo Community 
 
Another key Constitutional Court case dealing with the right of access to adequate housing from the 
perspective of section 26(3) of the Constitution, is the Residents of Joe Slovo Community case.
150
  
This case concerned a proposed eviction of residents of an informal settlement in terms of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE Act’)  
for the purposes of relocating the said community (approximately 20 000 people) in order to 
upgrade their informal settlement, so that low-cost houses could be built.
151
  
 
On appeal,
152
 five judgments regarding this case were prepared by different members of the 
Court.
153
 The main issues for decision were whether the applicants were unlawful occupiers within 
the meaning of the PIE Act at the time of their eviction.
154
 Secondly, the Court had to determine 
whether the respondents acted reasonably within the meaning of section 26 of the Constitution in 
seeking the eviction of the applicants.
155
 
 
In all the judgments, it was accepted that by the time the eviction case was initiated, the applicants 
were unlawful occupiers within the meaning of the PIE Act, although reasons given in this regard 
differ among the five judgments.
156
 This difference lies in whether the applicants had the consent of 
the Municipality to occupy the land in question within the meaning of the PIE Act.
157
 Yacoob J held 
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in this regard that the occupiers did not have the consent of the Municipality at all, while Moseneke 
DCJ, Ngcobo J, O’Regan J and Sachs J held that the occupiers had the consent of the Municipality, 
but this consent was later withdrawn.
158
  There was also agreement that the eviction order crafted by 
the majority court in this case was just and equitable within the meaning of the PIE Act.
159
 
However, the order of the Court and that of the High Court differed significantly.
160
 
 
The Court held that the relocation of the occupiers would be in the public interest, taking into 
account the purpose of the relocation, and the fact that more than 1000 people from the informal 
settlement had already moved, transport arrangements would be made, and that the City would 
assist the residents to settle at Delft.
161
 The Court therefore found that taking into account various 
circumstances of this case, and the promise of 70% of the houses to be built, the eviction and 
relocation of the occupiers would be just and equitable.
162
 The Court found that the eviction would 
be reasonable because it was aimed at facilitating low-cost housing that would benefit the 
occupiers, and this constituted a measure to ensure the achievement of the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing within the meaning of section 26(2).
163
 
 
The Court issued a supervisory order in terms of which the applicants were required to vacate Joe 
Slovo Informal Settlement according to a set time-table set out in its order, and subject to any 
revisions to the set time-table.
164
 The vacation was made conditional upon relocation to Delft or 
other agreed suitable temporary accommodation for each family as set out in the judgment.
165
 The 
temporary accommodation had to meet certain detailed criteria set out in the judgment. It had to be 
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newly constructed and of superior quality, and contain basic infrastructural services, electricity, 
water and other basic sanitation facilities.
166
  
 
The applicants and respondents were also ordered to engage meaningfully with each other through 
their representatives in order to reach an agreement on the date of relocation, a  relocation timetable 
different from that contained in the annexure to the order, and any other matter they may need to 
agree upon.
167
 The process of meaningful engagement was expected to be completed by 30 June 
2009, and if it resulted in an agreement, the agreement had to be filed with the Court by 7 July 2009 
for its consideration.
168
 The State was also found to have acted in accordance with its housing 
duties, and to have engaged reasonably with the occupiers, although it would have been ideal to 
engage with each family, but the engagement must be seen in light of reality and practicality. 
Therefore engagement with the occupiers through their representatives was reasonable.
169
 
 
This matter was back in Court nearly two years after the original eviction order, coupled with a 
supervisory order that was granted by the Court on 10 June 2009.
170
 The issues before the Court this 
time concerned the question of whether the eviction order previously granted by the Court, coupled 
with a supervisory order with regard to the execution of that eviction order should be discharged in 
light of changed circumstances of this matter.
171
 The Court found that it had the powers to discharge 
its orders concerning the eviction of people from their homes where this was required by 
exceptional circumstances and considerations of justice and equity.
172
 It further reasoned that these 
requirements had been met in this case because the order had been in suspension for more than a 
year, and the circumstances of the case had changed since the original eviction order was made.
173
  
 
The implications of Residents of Joe Slovo Community matter for the right of access to adequate 
housing are firstly that people should not be left homeless after an eviction, even in cases where the 
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said eviction is for the building of low-cost housing for their benefit.  Secondly, the Court 
developed detailed standards applicable to the quality of alternative accommodation that should be 
afforded to people who have been evicted. These detailed standards adopted by the Court seem to 
draw from similar standards developed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in its General Comments.
174
 The Court was very concerned about the dignity of the 
occupiers during the whole eviction process.
175
 This is why it ordered the eviction of the occupiers 
conditional upon the provision of alternative accommodation in the form of temporary residential 
units situated at Delft or another suitable place, subject to further conditions as set out in the 
order.
176
 The Court here appeared alive to the dignity interests of the occupiers, by emphasising that 
housing, even if temporary, must be of appropriate standards and quality. It must also be 
accompanied by appropriate infrastructural development, such as tarred roads, and cannot be 
separated from the provision of basic sanitation services. 
 
The Court also confirmed the nature and importance of meaningful engagement in eviction disputes 
as established in earlier housing cases.
177
 However, there is some debate with regard to the 
approach of the Court to meaningful engagement in this case, and with regard to whether 
meaningful engagement as a remedy can assist the Court to develop the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing.
178
 Chenwi argues that the Court in Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community has not taken forward the gains made in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road in the context of 
meanigful engagement.
179
 This is because the Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community condoned 
the inadequacies in the consultation process that was afforded to the occupiers, on the basis that 
these inadequacies were outweighted by the purpose of the eviction, and the implementation of  the 
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housing project on land occupied by the informal settlement residents.
180
 The failure of the Court to 
seriouly consider meaningful engagment in this case meant that the voices of the residents were not 
taken into account in decisions that were aimed at determining where they would live. However, to 
its credit, the Court gave a robust order in relation to the engagement process, by crafting a detailed 
order listing the minimum requirements to be met in the engagement process.
181
 
 
McLean offers a diffrent view on meaningful engagment, she argues that meaningful engagement 
was utilised by the Court to avoid dealing with the substantive content of the rights implicated.
182
 
Furthermore, she argues that meaningful engagement does not add anything new to the duties 
imposed by the audi alteram partem rule. According McLean, meaningful engagement may in fact, 
be narrower than the audi, in Residents of Joe Slovo for instance, the Court notes the inadequate 
consultation, but does not set it aside, instead, it orders that there be meaningful engagement with 
the occupiers on a narrow set of issues shortly before their eviction.
183
 
 
This case has made an important contribution in relation to developing the qualitative dimensions of 
the alternative accommodation which must be provided in the case of evictions. These qualitative 
elements can usefully inform the development of the substantive content of the right in section 
26(1), particularly in the context of the positive duty of the State to fulfil the right of access to 
adequate housing in the context of people who are homeless or living in vastly inferior housing 
conditions in informal settlements and rural areas. 
 
4 2 6 Joseph 
 
The Joseph matter concerned tenants of a block of flats, Ennerdale Mansions, which were owned by 
Mr Nel. The City of Johannesburg, through City Power, cut off the electricity supply to this block 
of flats without prior notice to the tenants because of arrears incurred by the owner on his 
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electricity.
184
 On appeal
185
 to the Constitutional Court, the applicants relied on similar relief as that 
relied upon in the High Court. Their arguments were that section 3 of the PAJA applied to the facts 
of this case because their rights were adversely affected by the termination of the electricity 
supply.
186
 In addition, they argued that sections 26(1) and 10 of the Constitution applied.
187
 The 
Constitutional Court reasoned that City Power supplied electricity to the flats in question in 
fulfillment of the constitutional and statutory duties of local government, to provide basic municipal 
services to all people residing within its jurisdiction, and these services included electricity.
188
 The 
applicants received this municipal service based on their corresponding public law right to receive 
basic municipal services.
189
 Therefore, the conduct of the City, through City Power to deprive the 
applicants of this service meant that City Power was obliged to afford them procedural fairness 
before taking the decision to disconnect their electricity supply.
190
 Procedural fairness in the context 
of this case was held to mean that the applicants should be afforded a pre-termination notice of 14 
days in the form of a physical notice affixed in a prominent place in the building.
191
 In addition, this 
notice had to contain all the relevant information like the time and date of the disconnection, 
reasons for the disconnection, and the place where the disconnection could be challenged. 
Furthermore, in order to be adequate, such a notice should afford the applicants enough time to 
respond to it.
192
 
 
The Court accordingly held that the Electricity By-laws were inconsistent with the PAJA and 
section 33 of the Constitution, to the extent that the Electricity By-laws made provision for the 
disconnection of peoples’ electricity supply without prior notice.193 By way of a remedy, the Court 
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ordered that the words ‘without notice’ be severed from By-law 14(1) of the Electricity By-laws.194 
Therefore, the termination of electricity supply at Ennerdale Mansions was declared unlawful, and 
the City and City Power were ordered to immediately reconnect it.
195
 
 
The Court found it unnecessary to determine the arguments based on sections 26(1) and 10 of the 
Constitution, in the light of conclusions reached in the case.  The applicants had argued that section 
26(1) of the Constitution was relevant to this case as electricity was an element of the right of 
access to adequate housing, and the termination of the electricity supply constituted a retrogressive 
step that violated the negative duty to respect the right of access to adequate housing. It thereby 
adversely affected their constitutional right to housing for the purposes of PAJA.
196
 
 
The Court in this case missed an opportunity to develop the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing by resorting to the duties of local government and the PAJA to dispose 
of the case, instead of applying international law or its Grootboom jurisprudence along with the 
duties of local government. It is well established in international law that adequate housing includes 
the provision of electricity or adequate lighting.
197
  
 
The positive aspect of Joseph is the Court’s affirmation of the relationship between citizens and 
government.
198
 The Court’s reasoning in Joseph in relation to ubuntu shows the Court’s recognition 
that the relationship between the citizens and the government is grounded in communal 
relationships as opposed to strict legalistic relationships.
199
 This recognition represents a positive 
development in which the citizens are treated with decency, good faith and friendliness.
200
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4 2 7 Nokotyana 
 
The Nokotyana case
201
 concerned residents of the Harry Gwala informal settlement who challenged 
the failure of the Municipality to provide them with basic services in line with the Municipality’s 
constitutional duties, pending the decision to upgrade the settlement. The Municipality disagreed 
with this view, holding that the National Housing Code provided that the Municipality did not have 
to provide basic services that required a huge capital expenditure until a decision to upgrade had 
been taken, and that the duty to provide emergency services did not arise in this case.
202
 
 
The applicants’ case in the Constitutional Court turned on the issue of sanitation and lighting. The 
residents wanted the Municipality to provide them with one ventilated pit latrine (VIP toilets) per 
family, and high-mast lighting in order to increase safety and access by emergency vehicles.
203
 
These arguments were fortified by reliance on section 26 of the Constitution.
204
 The case turned on 
these issues in the Constitutional Court because the other issues had been disposed of in favour of 
the applicants in the High Court. The Constitutional Court essentially confirmed the decision of the 
High Court except in certain respects.
205
 The Court held that the applicants’ submissions based on 
Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code had to fail because an emergency situation had not been 
declared by the MEC nor did the applicants apply for such a declaration.
206
  
 
The Court held further that the arguments based on Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code had to 
fail because the Municipality had complied with its duties in terms of paragraph 13.7.1 of Chapter 
13 of the National Housing Code, in that it had submitted an application to the MEC for assistance 
under Chapter 13, and was still awaiting a response.
207
 The Court reasoned that Chapter 13 made 
provision for phased development, consisting of four phases. The provision of basic services kicked 
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into operation in the second phase, after a decision to upgrade had been taken by the MEC in the 
first phase.
208
 
 
The Court further reasoned that the challenge and opposition to the City’s newly adopted policy on 
the provision of temporary sanitation services, adopted on 16 April 2009, and the challenge based 
on Regulation 2 of Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards to Conserve Water 
(Promulgated in terms of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997) had to fail because it was brought to 
bear for the first time on appeal to the Court, requiring it to be a court of first and final instance.
209
 
The City’s policy could also not be scrutinised in the absence of a challenge to Chapter 13 of the 
National Housing Code. The Court held in this regard that the applicants could not rely directly on 
section 26 of the Constitution to sustain their claims because there was legislation giving effect to 
section 26 of the Constitution.
210
 Therefore the applicants needed to rely on the legislation giving 
effect to the right, section 26 of the Constitution, or challenge the said legislation as inconsistent 
with the Constitution.
211
 
 
Finally, the Court found it necessary to make provision for a speedy decision in its order. In 
particular, since the delay by the Gauteng provincial government in reaching a decision on the 
application by the municipality on the upgrading of the informal settlement was, in this case the 
prime cause of the desperate situation in which the residents found themselves.
212
 The Court then 
dismissed the appeal and issued an order that it deemed just and equitable to order the MEC to 
reach a decision on whether to upgrade the settlement or not, within a period of 14 months.
213
 
 
The approach of the Court in Nokotyana shows an irreconcilable inconsistency in its adjudication of 
the right of access to adequate housing. The Court in Joseph was comfortable to reason that 
electricity formed part of the States’ duties of local government to provide basic services including 
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electricity, in a consistent manner, yet the same Court in Nokotyana, a case involving basic 
sanitation and lighting, is suddenly uncomfortable to extend the same reasoning it applied in 
Joseph.
214
 
 
Moreover, the Court’s approach in Nokotyana confirmed the Court’s overly deferential approach 
similar to that adopted in Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others.
215
 Kapindu 
argues that the approach adopted by the Court in Nokotyana is overly deferential and amounts to the 
Court abdicating its constitutional role as the final arbiter of the rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution, by elevating legal technicalities above substantive justice issues.
216
 This is evident in 
the Court’s focus on how the issues were pleaded, and the fact that the applicants raised some of the 
relevant issues for the first time in the Constitutional Court and the failure to raise some issues 
before the Court.
217
 This is particularly illustratated by the overly rigid and technical manner in 
which the Court applied the doctrine of subsidiarity. Bilchitz has criticised the Court in this regard 
for its failure to deal comprehensively with arguments related to section 26, by choosing instead to 
invoke the doctrine of subsidiarity.
218
  Bilchitz argues that the application of this doctrine in the 
context of socio-economic rights as opposed to administrative law is unfounded because of the 
open-ended language of section 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.
219
 These two subsections 
suggest that the rights they protect cannot be realised through one major piece of legislation, as is 
the case with administrative justice. What is more, the Court erred in the way it understood the 
doctrine, by placing more focus on the manner in which the claim was formulated in the papers, and 
whether the applicants directly challenged the reasonableness of the legislation in question.
220
 
 
In conclusion, the Court in Nokotyana displayed an unwillingness to deal with the content of the 
fundamental rights implicated.
221
 The Court chose to rely on formalistic forms of adjudication 
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which are not in line with the transformative vision of the Constitution, which requires the Court to 
undertake substantive legal reasoning.
222
 The Court in Nokotyana had a constitutional duty to 
clarify whether basic sanitation and high-mast lighting form part of the right of access to adequate 
housing. This would have gone a long way in developing the substantive content of the right of 
access to adequate housing, and aligning our housing jurisprudence with international law. 
 
I will now evaluate the abovementioned housing jurisprudence of the Court. To this end, I will 
determine the extent to which the Court has given to substantive content of the right of access to 
adequate housing. 
 
4 3 Evaluation: To what extent has the Constitutional Court given substantive content to the right 
of access to adequate housing? 
 
The above major housing jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court reveals far more willingness on 
the part of the Court to develop the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing, in 
the context of the negative duties imposed by this right, and less willingness to develop this right in 
the context of the positive duties imposed by it. This is evident in its development of various 
procedural and substantive mechanisms in its eviction jurisprudence to protect and promote the 
negative duties imposed by this right, from the Jaftha case onwards. To this end, the Court has 
found in a long list of cases that it would be slow to grant an eviction order, or sanction evictions as 
just and equitable against people who are relatively settled on the land; where no or inadequate 
meaningful engagement or mediation took place prior to eviction; where people would be left 
homeless; and where there was no judicial oversight in a process that leads to loss of homes. The 
Court has also issued orders for the provision of alternative accommodation and basic services to 
occupiers of inadequate housing, pending meaningful engagement on permanemt housing plans. In 
addition, the Court has  found that the eviction and relocation of residents of informal settlements to 
make way for the implementation of a housing project, needs to be conducted in a dignified manner 
that respects the human rights of the occupiers. 
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Moreover, the Court has recognised that the relationship between government and citizens is rooted 
in communal, as opposed to strict legalistic form, and that occupiers need to be given notice and an 
opportunity to make representations before their access to basic services such as electricity is cut-
off. Therefore, the Court’s evictions jurisprudence, such as that developed in PE Municipality has 
contributed a rich, substantive jurisprudence on housing rights. In contrast to this robust protection 
and promotion of the negative duties arising out of the right of access to adequate housing, the 
Court has been far less willing to develop the substantive content of this right, in the context of the 
positive duties imposed by this right. The Court has instead developed the reasonableness review 
model to assess whether the State has complied with its duties in terms of section 26(1) and (2) of 
the Constitution. To this end, the Court has developed various criteria to assess whether the housing 
programme complied with the reasonableness review model. However, the reasonableness review 
model as developed in Grootboom and subsequent cases, does not take into account the nature and 
scope of this right, nor does it provide any guidance on the substantive content of the right of access 
to adequate housing, beyond statements that housing entails  “more than brick and mortar.”223 The 
Court has therefore adopted a strong model of judicial review that it applies whenever it deals with 
the negative duties protected by the right of access to adequate housing, and a relatively weak 
model of judicial review whenever the positive duties of this right are implicated. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
 
In this section, there has been a discussion of the selected jurisprudence of the Court, with a view to 
analysing and evaluating whether the Court has given substantive content to the right of access to 
adequate housing. There has been an attempt to show how the Court has tended to give greater 
substantive content to socio-economic rights in the context of the negative duties imposed by these 
rights, while its jurisprudence in respect of the positive duties remain thin and insubstantial. In the 
next section alternative approaches which could contribute to the development of a more 
substantive approach to housing in the South African constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, will be 
suggested.  
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CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS A MORE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO HOUSING 
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In this section, alternative approaches that might contribute to the development of the substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing will be suggested.  I will do so by suggesting 
ways of overcoming the impediments to the adjudication of this right, and socio-economic rights in 
general. To this end, I will highlight the importance of assessing the reasonableness review model 
in the context of the purposes and values protected by the right of access to adequate housing. In 
addition, I will examine the implications of this approach for the development of the jurisprudence 
as a whole, and how the Constitutional Court (‘the Court’) may build and improve on its current 
housing jurisprudence. 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers, judicial deference and the manner in which the courts, 
especially the Court ought to give meaning to the right of access to adequate housing and other 
socio-economic rights,  have become the subject of much debate over the years in South Africa.
1
 
The Court’s role as the ultimate guardian and guarantor of the rights in the Bill of Rights has been 
cast into the spotlight.
2
 In particular,  the Court’s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers, 
and judicial deference in socio-economic rights cases and how it should deal with these rights in 
ways that promote and protect their substantive content, has enjoyed attention.
3
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[1997] ZACC 8; 1997 (12) BCLR 1653 (CC) para 8; De Lange NO v Smuts NO [1998] ZACC 6; 1998 (3) SA 785 
(CC); South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others [2000] ZACC 22; 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) paras 
18-22, and 24-26; S v Dodo [2001] ZACC 16; 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC); Certification of the Mpumalanga Petitions 
Bill, 2000 [2001] ZACC 10; 2002 (1) SA 447 (CC); United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of 
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Before suggesting alternative approaches aimed at overcoming the use of the doctrine of separation 
of powers and judicial deference as impediments, it is important to contextualise the current state of 
the relationship between the three branches of government in South Africa. This is because the 
relationship between these three branches, including how they view their constitutional duties, has a 
direct bearing on the appropriate model of separation of powers doctrine, and judicial review in the 
context of the right of access to adequate housing, and other socio-economic rights. 
 
The relationship between the executive and the judiciary, specifically the Constitutional Court has 
become controversial recently. The President of the Republic of South Africa recently remarked 
that courts should allow the executive to conduct its administration and policy-making business 
freely, and that the courts’ powers cannot be superior to the popular mandate vested in the 
Executive and Parliament.
4
 These and other similar statements from the executive and other 
political organisations prompted the former Chief Justice, Sandile Ngcobo, to stress the importance 
of the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in a democracy,
5
 in particular, the 
importance of an independent judiciary that also enjoys the confidence of society and is able to 
dispense justice.
6
 This is even more essential in the arena of socio-economic rights and what should 
be the appropriate approach to the interpretation of the right of access to adequate housing so as to 
develop the substantive content of the rights in section 26? 
 
5 2 Addressing the impediments to the adjudication of socio-economic rights 
 
Besides the need for the Court to focus more on the normative nature and scope of socio-economic 
rights (the right of access to adequate housing) in order to progressively develop their substantive 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
South Africa and Others (NO 2) [2002] ZACC 21; 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC); Doctors For Life International v Speaker 
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content, as explored in chapters 2, 3 and 4, the Court’s role could also be enhanced by the need to 
mantain the appropriate doctrine of separation of powers, and judicial deference.
7
 
 
The reliance on the doctrine of separation of powers, and by extension judicial deference to oppose 
the enforcement of socio-economic rights,  is mainly based on two arguments.
8
 The first argument 
maintains that socio-economic rights adjudication allows an unelected judiciary to decide matters 
that require democratic deliberation. Secondly, the judiciary is institutionally incapable of dealing 
with certain issues arising out of the enforcement of socio-economic rights, such as budgetary, 
policy, and polycentric issues.
9
 Despite the Court’s emphatic statements in its jurisprudence on 
socio-economic rights that it will interpret and enforce socio-economic rights, including the right of 
access to adequate housing, even if the matter involves an enquiry into budgetary, policy, and 
polycentric issues, the Court has not been immune to the clutches of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, and judicial deference.
10
 
 
The Court has been careful to interpret and enforce socio-economic rights in ways that will not 
result in the Court exercising the functions that are constitutionally allocated to the legislature and 
the executive arm of government. To this end, the Court has been careful to note that it will not 
dictate policy, and the allocation of budgets to the responsible functionaries, but this does not mean 
abdication of its duties, because it will intervene in appropriate cases, and the intervention is 
mandated by the Constitution. The institutional constraints have impacted on the Court’s approach 
to socio-economic rights, including the right of access to adequate housing in the context of the 
substantive content of this right, including remedies meted out for violation of these rights.
11
 This is 
partly because the Court has been very conservative in the arena of remedies such as far-reaching 
structural interdicts.
12
 
 
According to Mbazira, the Court’s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers explains why 
this doctrine cannot simply be brushed aside on the basis that the Court is mandated by the 
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principles of checks and balances, and the rule of law to enforce socio-economic rights.
13
 This is 
because the courts, unlike the executive and legislative arms of government, face many challenges, 
such as the lack of technical know-how to deal with budgetary issues and issues of policy that may 
arise when they are engaged in their judicial functions.
14
 
 
The institutional challenges such as lack of skills and expertise to deal with budgetary- and policy 
issues, also lead to the courts  facing questions that they find difficult to answer.
15
 Some of these 
questions relate to the allocation of the budget, and setting priorities.
16
 The courts’ institutional 
challenges are the reason why the courts need to defer these issues to the executive and legislative 
branches in appropriate cases. This deference however, should not mean the courts’ abdication of 
their judicial functions of interpreting and enforcing the rights in the Bill of Rights. This means that 
the courts need to maintain a fine line and balance between the demands of their judicial functions, 
and leaving enough space for the executive and legislative arms of government to perform their 
functions.
17
 Seeing the courts’ role in this context means that the courts should be able to intervene 
when the other arms of government violate human rights and fail to adhere to their constitutional 
duties.
18
 This intervention should however, be guided by the seriousness of the violation of human 
rights or failure to adhere to constitutional duties, especially in the context of socio-economic 
rights. 
 
The courts’ intervention of necessity operates at two levels, at the interpretive level, and at the 
remedial level.
19
 The intervention at the interpretive level should be determined by the severity of 
the violation of human rights or failure to comply with constitutional duties,
20
 whereas, the 
intervention at the remedial level should be determined by the level of non-compliance with courts’ 
orders or the likelihood thereof. This means that the intervention would also determine the nature 
and scope of the remedy meted out. Where there is naked non-compliance with the courts’ orders 
by the legislative and executive arms of government, then the courts would be justified in issuing 
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highly instrusive remedies such as mandatory or structural interdicts to remedy the violation or non-
compliance with constitutional duties.
21
 The nature of the right involved should also play a role in 
this matrix, the more critical the right, the more the court should be willing to issue highly 
instrusive orders. 
 
It is noteworthy though, according to Mbazira, that the application of highly instrusive remedies 
should be used as a measure of last resort.
22
 These remedies should be preceded by efforts to obtain 
the co-operation of the other arms of governement.
23
 However, these remedies should be used by 
courts as a measure of first resort where there is clear evidence that the courts are unlikely to obtain 
the co-operation of the implicated arm of government or where the seriousness of the case demands 
urgent intervention to restore human rights or correct the non-compliance with constitutional 
duties.
24
 
 
Furthermore, the doctrine of separation of powers must be deployed by the courts in the context of 
the prevailing economic and social challenges in order for this doctrine to be applied in light of the 
transformative vision of the Constitution, just as the classical conceptions of this doctrine were 
meant to be responsive to the challenges of an earlier era.
25
 Deploying and applying the doctrine of 
separation of powers to take stock of the prevailing societal challenges will of necessity require the 
courts to take into account the values and purposes protected and promoted by socio-economic 
rights, including the right of access to adequate housing, and the manner in which these rights have 
been dealt with in international and foreign law. 
 
Deploying and applying the doctrine of separation of powers, and by extension judicial deference in 
the manner suggested above, demonstrates that the doctrine of separation of powers, and judicial 
deference are not impediments in themselves, but become impediments to the progressive 
realisation of the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing and other socio-
economic rights when they are deployed in a manner that overemphasises the challenges that they 
present. 
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In the following section, I consider how the Court can develop the substantive content of the right 
of access to adequate housing. In this regard, I draw on the value-based, transformative 
constitutionalism standards, and contextual and international law standards analysed in chapters 2 
and 3. 
 
5 2 1 Developing the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing 
 
There are many ways which the Court could explore in order to develop the substantive meaning of 
the right of access to adequate housing. Firstly, the Court could start by exploring the meaning of 
access to adequate housing, whenever it is faced with cases implicating section 26(3) of the 
Constitution. The Court has already developed the substantive content of housing rights, 
particularly in the context of evictions or negative deprivations of housing rights, section 26(3), 
such as in the Jaftha v Schoeman and Another, Van Rooyen Stoltz and Others.
26
 The challenge is to 
develop this substantive content in the context of applications by homeless people or people living 
in inadequate housing to enforce the positive duties imposed by section 26(1) read with section 
26(2).
27
 The Court could develop the substantive content of section 26(1) read with section 26(2) in 
the same way it has done in cases dealing with evictions, by developing various procedural 
protections, clarifying the nature and scope of the positive duties. 
 
Secondly, as Sandra Liebenberg argues, by reconceiving the model of reasonableness review in the 
context of socio-economic rights, the Court could also develop the substantive content of the right 
of access to adequate housing.
28
 Repositioning the reasonableness review model could also include 
grounding it in a more substantive account of the values and purposes underpinning section 26(1) 
of the Constitution, instead of exclusively focusing on the reasonableness of government conduct in 
the context of section 26(2) of the Constitution.
29
 Tied to this, the Court could link the 
reasonableness review model to a more broad expansion of the substantive content of individual 
rights and duties, so as to situate the compliance-measuring benchmarks to the nature and scope of 
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this right. This would  give impetus to the prioritisation of the right of access to adequate housing, 
and other socio-economic rights, and in so-doing align them with the transformative promise and 
vision of the Constitution.
30
  
 
Thirdly, the Court could also develop the substantive content of the right of access to adequate 
housing by enhancing the constitutional dialogue between itself, the legislature and the executive 
arm of government.
31
 This could be achieved by the development of clear non binding guidelines 
with regard to the model of separation of powers doctrine and judicial deference that it will apply in 
the context of the right of access to adequate housing, and by extension other socio-economic 
rights. 
 
Fourth, in order for the Court to further contribute to the development of the substantive content of 
the right of access to adequate housing, it is suggested that the Court should adopt the practice of 
joining the Minister of Finance or Member of the Executive (MEC) as a joinder of necessity in all 
cases involving the right of access to adequate housing where parties have not done so.
32
 This 
would enable the Court to properly engage with the claims of limited resources in the context of the 
right of access to adequate housing, because the Court would be in a position to interrogate limited 
resources defences by asking for explanations on current and future budgets. These explanations 
would not involve the Court in prescribing or dictating budgetary policies to the other arms of 
government, but would require justifications regarding what the government is doing to meet its 
constitutional duties in the context of the right of access to adequate housing. 
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The Court could also conduct inspections in loco or on-site visits to informal settlements and 
inadequate housing sites.
33
 These steps could facilitate the Court in developing the substantive 
content of housing rights owing to a better understanding of the factual and social context of the 
oral evidence and the record in the context of review applications. The benefits of an inspection in 
loco are illustrated by the order made in the Grootboom case in the High Court by Josman AJ. After 
he conducted an inspection in loco, Josman AJ was in a position to make an interim order for the 
provision of alternative accommodation for Mrs Grootboom and others, pending the final 
determination of that case. Therefore, the Court could either appoint two judges to conduct the 
inspections or appoint independent people who are not part of the litigation to conduct the 
inspections, and collect data on its behalf. 
 
Finally, the Court should also play a proactive role in coming up with creative remedies to remedy 
non-compliance with the positive duties imposed by the right of access to adequate housing, and 
these remedies could include more utilisation and development of  mandatory or structural 
interdicts in appropriate cases. Devising creative remedies in this context would be in line with the 
court’s mandate in terms of sections 38 and 172(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Applying its wide 
remedial powers also presents an opportnuity for the Court to nurture and enhance its relationship 
and dialogue with the other arms of government.
34
 This approach to remedies may go a long way 
towards achieving the appropriate balance between the need for appropriate remedies, the dictates 
of the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial deference, and the need to maintain the 
appropriate checks and balances between the three arms of government.
35
 
 
5 2 2  The importance of assessing reasonableness in the context of the purposes and values 
promoted by the right of access to adequate housing 
 
It is essential that the reasonableness review standard adopted by the Court to adjudicate the 
positive duties arising out of the right of access to adequate housing is assessed in the light of the 
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purposes and values protected by this right. The reasons for this are numerous and varied, as doing 
so has the potential to assist in dealing with the legacy of past policies, laws, and practices. 
Secondly, it has the potential to contribute to the freeing of the potential of each person.
36
 Assessing 
the reasonableness review standard in the context of the values and purposes protected by the right 
of access to adequate housing has the potential to assist the Court to use the doctrine of separation 
of powers and judicial deference as tools to maintain and protect the checks and balances between 
the three arms of government.  Assessing the reasonableness review standard in the context of the 
purposes and values protected by the right of access to adequate housing has the potential to 
promote the transformative goals of the Constitution, and to deal with the realities of the right of 
access to adequate housing,
37
 and might gradually contribute to the improvement of the quality of 
life of all citizens. 
38
 
 
5 3 Implications for the development of the jurisprudence 
 
The suggested model of separation of powers doctrine, and judicial deference for the development 
of the right of access to adequate housing has a number of implications for the adjudication of 
socio-economic rights. The Court might be able to utilise the separation of powers doctrine, and 
judicial deference as a means of promoting and protecting checks and balances between the three 
arms of government, as opposed to using them as tools to avoid its judicial duty to give meaning to 
the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
The suggested model of separation of powers and judicial deference might also encourage the Court 
to uphold the transformative vision of the Constitution, by developing the positive duties arising out 
of the right of access to adequate housing, in line with the preamble, sections 7(1), and (2), and 
39(1)(a) of the Constitution. This is because the suggested model of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, and judicial deference might encourage the Court to interrogate what is expected of it in 
the promotion of quality of life for all, and freeing the potential of each person, and what its role 
                                                          
36
 For a detailed discussion of this point, see: chapter 3, 3 3; Fox L “The meaning of home: A chimera concept or a 
legal challenge?” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 580-610; Fox L Conceptualising Home-Theories, Laws and 
Policies (2007). 
37
 Bilchitz D “Giving Socio-Economic Rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance” (2002) 119 SALJ 484-
489 at 486-489; Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (2007); Liebenberg 2010 (ch 1, n 5) at 131-223. 
38
 See chapter 2, for a full discussion of transformative constitutionalism, and its potential. 
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should be in the promotion of the values of human dignity, equality, freedom and ubuntu in relation 
to the right of access to adequate housing and other socio-economic rights. 
 
Assessing the reasonableness review standard in the light of the purposes and values protected by 
the right of access to adequate housing may lead to a re-evaluation of the reasonableness review 
standard, because the Court might be required to answer some tough, but necessary questions, in 
particular, whether the people who live in informal settlements and inadequate housing across 
South Africa enjoy human dignity, equality, freedom, and ubuntu. 
 
The Court might further be required to take a fresh look at the remedies ordered in housing rights 
cases. This will involve the Court asking whether it is not time to retain jurisdiction through 
supervisory orders in all cases involving the right of access to adequate housing, as a general rule.
39
 
This will allow the Court to sufficiently take into account the nature of the right, urgency of the 
situation, and the need to protect the residents of informal settlements, and those in inadequate 
housing. This would also dovetail well with the dialogic nature of the relationship between the three 
arms of government, affected communities and non-government organisations by encouraging them 
to jointly seek solutions for those people who reside in informal settlements and inadequate 
housing. 
 
Finally, the Court might be encouraged to come up with innovative ways of adjudicating the right 
of access to adequate housing, by looking at the meaning of adequate housing under international 
law and foreign law, and then gradually adapting those meanings to fit local contexts on a case by 
case basis. 
 
5 4 Conclusion 
 
In this section, the focus is on making suggestions on the appropriate models of the separation of 
powers doctrine, and judicial deference to be applied by the Court in the context of the right of 
access to adequate housing, and how the Court could develop the substantive content of this right. It 
                                                          
39
 It is noteworthy though that the Court might not have the necessary human capacity in the form of judges to 
perform this function. Therefore, the Court could perform this function with the cooperation of the High Courts. 
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was suggested above that the separation of powers doctrine and judicial deference are not 
impediments per se, but become impediments to the development of the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing and other socio-economic rights when the Court deploys them 
in ways that do not advance the transformative vision of the Constitution. In order to overcome this 
deployment of the doctrine of separation of powers and judicial deference, it was suggested that the 
Court should maintain the appropriate checks and balances by leaving enough room for the other 
arms of government to perform their constitutional functions, but intervene where necessary at the 
interpretive and remedial stages of adjudication to restore human rights, and ensure that these arms 
of government protect, promote and fulfill their constitutional duties, especially in the context of 
the right of access to adequate housing, and other socio-economic rights. 
 
Tied to the appropriate models of the separation of powers and judicial doctrine is the development 
of the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing. In this context, it was 
suggested that the Court could gradually develop the substantive content of the right of access to 
adequate housing by fleshing out its nature and scope whenever it deals with eviction cases. It was 
further suggested that the Court could reposition the reasonableness review model by locating it in 
the substantive account of the values and purposes protected and promoted by the right of access to 
adequate housing, and other socio-economic rights, instead of overly focusing on the reasonabless 
of government conduct. The Court could also link the reasonableness review model to the 
development of the substantive content of individual rights and duties so as to ground the 
compliance-measuring benchmarks established by the reasonableness review model to the nature 
and scope of the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
It was further suggested that the Court could gradually develop the substantive content of the right 
of access to adequate housing by deveoping the practice of joining the Minister of Finance or 
relevant MEC (finance) where necessary, as a joinder of necessity in all cases involving scarce 
resource defences. Connected to the joinder of the Minister of Finance or relevant MEC are on-site 
visits. The Court could develop the practice of conducting on-site visits to  informal settlements and 
inadequate housing sites. Conducting on-site visits might assist the Court to develop a better 
understanding of the factual and social context of the oral evidence and the record in housing 
matters before it. 
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In the context of remedies, it was suggested that the Court needs to utilise its wide discretionary 
powers in terms of sections 38 and 172(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution to craft creative remedies. 
Creative remedies could include more utilisation of the mandatory or structural interdicts and other 
remedies in appropriate cases to remedy non-compliance with the positive duties imposed by the 
right of access to adequate housing.  
 
The next section comprises a summary of the findings and a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6 1 Summary 
 
This thesis set out to determine the extent to which the South African Constitutional Court (‘the 
Court’) has given substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing,1 including the 
positive duties imposed by this right.
2
 To this end, the work of various authors, case law (South 
African, international human rights law and foreign law), and international human rights 
instruments and emerging norms were  examined. In addition, there was an  attempt to establish the 
role of courts in the enforcement of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution, with 
the specific reference to the right of access to adequate housing of people in informal settlements 
and inadequate housing.  
 
In chapter 1, a background to the whole study was provided, and the current state of housing in 
South Africa in general, and the causes and challenges of this deplorable state of housing, were 
discussed. The various measures that have been adopted so far in trying to deal with the housing 
backlog and the deplorable state of housing and the challenges involved, were mentioned , in the 
context of people in informal settlements and those in inadequate housing. 
 
In chapter 2, the concept of transformative constitutionalism was examined  by exploring its  
history, significance and its particular role in the context of the right of access to adequate housing. 
In addition, the origins and strong and weak points of the reasonableness review model used by the 
Court to adjudicate the positive aspects of socio-economic rights, in particular the right of access to 
adequate housing, were traced.  
 
Furthermore, in chapter 2 of this study, the theoretical foundations of the doctrine of separation of 
powers and judicial deference were laid down with a view to demonstrate how the doctrine of 
separation of powers and judicial deference serve important purposes in the adjudication of socio-
economic rights and other rights, when deployed appropriately. It was noted that the doctrine of 
                                                          
1
 Section 26(1) of the Constitution as read with subsection (2) of this section. 
2
 The focus is on the way in which the Court has adjudicated this right. 
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separation of powers and judicial deference serve important purposes of maintaining the necessary 
checks and balances between the three arms of government, but can also act as impediments to the 
development and realisation of the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing, 
and other socio-economic rights when they are deployed by the Court in ways that undermine the 
transfromative vision of the Constitution. 
 
In chapter 3 there is an investigation of the potential of developing the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing, using the methodology found in section 39(1)(a), (b) and (c) of 
the Constitution. To this end, this chapter begins by highlighting the essential characteristics of the 
history and social context of housing in South Africa, and how this history and social context 
illuminates the present housing crisis, in particular, the specific conditions of homelessness and 
inadequate housing in which the majority of people live. I have also elaborated on how the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom, as well as ubuntu can illuminate the 
underlying purposes and values of the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
Furthermore, there is an elaboration of the meaning of housing in international human rights law, 
including the key components of the concept of adequacy in the housing, developed in international 
and regional human rights instruments and jurisprudence.  In international law housing has been 
interpreted to mean more than a dwelling. A house must contain basic amenities such as heating, 
electricity, must be culturally suitable, be of suitable size and take into account the size and make-
up of the family, in order to satisfy the requirement of adequacy. I then concluded by arguing that 
the substantive content of the right to adequate housing as developed in international law has a great 
potential to assist the South African Constitutional Court to progressively develop the substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing in the context of the positive duties imposed by 
this right.  
 
In chapter 3, I also highlight selected housing jurisprudence from Colombia, and India to 
demonstrate how comparative courts have succeeded in being responsive and sensitive to the lived 
realities of the homeless communities and those in inadequate housing. The Colombian 
Constitutional Court has been far more willling to order the Colombian State to provide the 
vulnerable members of the community with essential food, potable water, basic shelter and housing, 
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appropriate clothing, health care and basic sanitation. The Colombian Constitutional Court has also 
been more willing to utilise participatory structural interdicts where the relevant government 
departments are not complying with their constitutional duties.
3
 Similarly, the Indian Supreme 
Court has been willing to develop the substantive content of the right to adequate housing, using an 
expansive interpretation of the right to life. The Indian Supreme Court developed the nature and 
content of the right to shelter or housing in cases such as Shantistar Builders and subsequent cases 
by interpreting the right to life to include within its contours, the right to food, clothing, decent 
environment, reasonable accommodation to live in, amongst others. The Court also underscores the 
importance of adequate shelter or housing by reasoning that suitable accommodation was essential 
to human beings because it enables them to grow in all aspects of of life such as physically, 
mentally and intellectually.
4
 I then conclude by noting that the sensitivity of the Colombian and 
Indian courts to context and the purposes and values protected and promoted by the right to housing 
or shelter can serve as useful and rich reference points to the South African Constitutional Court as 
it agitates to develop the substantive content of the right of  access to adequate housing. 
 
In chapter 4 of the study, arguments advanced in the preceding chapters are developed and analysed 
by examining the selected housing jurisprudence from the South African Constitutional Court, with 
a view to determining the extent to which these cases contribute to the search for the substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing. The findings of this case law analysis are that the 
Court has given significant substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing in the 
context of its evictions or threatened evictions jurisprudence, section 26(3) of the Constitution. The 
Court has given significant substantive content to section 26(3) of the Constitution through the 
development of the requirements of justice and equity in evictions or threatened evictions, as well 
as the development of creative remedies, such as those involving mediation, meaningful 
engagement, and alternative accommodation as significant factors in the evaluation of the justice 
and equity requirement in evictions. This protection and promotion of the substantive content of 
section 26(3) has been enhanced by the protection of limited positive duties that arise after the court 
has given orders of mediation, meaningful engagement, and alternative accommodation because the 
remedies require the State to take positive steps or action in order to comply with the court orders. 
                                                          
3
 See ch 3, 3 6. 
4
 See ch 3, 3 6. 
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In this chapter, there is also an attempt to show that the Court has failed to consistently give an 
expansive meaning to the right of access to adequate housing, in line with the values and purposes 
protected by this right in the South African context, international human rights law, and foreign law. 
The Court has been far more willing to engage with the substantive content of section 26(3) of the 
Constitution, by developing the procedural protections, and substantive content of this right. 
 
Moreover, there has been an attempt to show how the negative/positive categorisation of socio-
economic rights has given rise to dualistic standards of judicial review in socio-economic rights 
claims, including the right of access to adequate housing. A relatively weak standard of judicial 
review is applied by the Court when the positive duties arising out of these rights are implicated, 
and a strong standard of judicial review is applied when the negative duties of these rights are 
implicated. As a consequence, a less stringent standard of scrutiny is applied when people who lack 
access to adequate housing are involved, as opposed to situations where people who are deprived of 
their existing access to housing through evictions or threatened sales in execution against their 
homes are involved. 
 
Chapter 5 of this study builds on the theoretical foundation laid down in chapter 2, and expands on 
the arguments advanced in the other chapters on the substantive content of the right of access to 
adequate housing. In this chapter, there is an attempt to provide alternative approaches that could 
help the Court to develop the substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing. To this 
end, I tentatively suggest ways of overcoming the impediments to adjudicating this right by 
suggesting that the Court maintain the appropriate checks and balances through allowing the other 
arms of government enough space to perform their constitutional duties, while at the same time 
being able to intervene at the interpretive and remedial stages of adjudication in appropriate cases, 
where there is a violation of human rights or a failure to comply with the duties imposed by the 
right of access to adequate housing or other socio-economic rights.  
 
I also suggest that the Court adopt the practice of joining the Minister of Finance or relevant MEC 
(Finance) as joinders of necessity where parties have not done so, in order to better understand the 
resource arguments. In addition, I suggest that the Court should conduct on-site visits at informal 
settlements and inadequate housing sites, so as to better understand the factual and social context of 
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the oral evidence and the record, in housing cases before it.  Moreover, I suggest that the Court 
should develop the nature and scope of the positive duties arising out of the right of access to 
adequate housing whenever it deals with eviction cases. Finally, I highlight the importance of 
repositioning the reasonableness review model by developing the reasonableness review model in 
the context of individual rights and duties, and values and purposes promoted and protected by the 
right of access to adequate housing, so as to develop the substantive content of this right. 
 
6 2 Conclusion 
 
The South African Constitutional Court’s housing jurisprudence has come a long way in developing 
the substantive content of the right of access to adequate in the context of section 26(3) of the 
Constitution, negative duties of this rights. In particular, the Court has developed various procedural 
and substantive safeguards in the context of the negative duties imposed by this right, through its 
eviction and threatened eviction jurisprudence. However, the Court has not developed the 
substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing, section 26(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution, positive duties imposed by this right. The Court has failed to develop the nature and 
scope of the positive duties imposed by this right, through its focus on the compliance with the 
reasonableness review model. 
 
This thesis also attempts to demonstrate that the Court could develop the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing in the context of the positive duties imposed by this right, 
provided that the Court focuses on the transformative vision of the Constitution, and also 
concentrates on the values and purposes protected and promoted by this right in the South African 
context, international law and comparative law. Finally, I suggest that the Court could develop the 
substantive content of this right in the context of its positive duties by cultivating the potential of its 
early jurisprudence in order to gradually flesh out the nature and scope of this right. 
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